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Since 1948, South Korea has maintained restrictive immigration and citizenship 
policies that promote ethnic homogeneity and discourage the settlement of immigrants 
who do not have marital or family ties to ethnic Koreans. From 2005, the Korean 
government has instituted unprecedented reforms that have included local voting rights to 
permanent residents, dual citizenship for certain categories of citizens, and policies that 
promote multiculturalism; such reforms have made Korea the country with the most 
progressive stance on immigration in East Asia. Why has the Korean government 
proactively embraced immigrant incorporation under the banner of multiculturalism, after 
decades of promoting ethnic homogeneity and racial purity?  
In contrast to previous studies that focus on the adoption of liberal international 
norms, the remnants of the developmental state, and grassroots pressures from civil 
society, this dissertation explains immigrant incorporation in Korea as the unintended 
consequences of the negotiations between state efforts to regulate women’s access to 
rights and the attempts by women’s organizations and migrant women to secure rights 
and expand memberships.  Although they comprise less than twenty percent of the total 
foreign population, marriage migrants, or foreign women married to Korean men, have 
been situated at the center of efforts to promote multiculturalism. Consequently, gender 
has figured prominently in shaping immigrant incorporation. Through a framework that 
defines citizenship as a negotiated relationship, this study demonstrates that women and 
the state are engaged in ongoing negotiations over three dimensions of citizenship: access 
to rights, rights, and memberships where the outcome of these negotiations is uneven and 
contradictory. Grassroots women’s organizations capitalized on the growing significance 




and rights. In bargaining with the state however, women’s organizations have become 
implicated in state efforts to incorporate migrant women as wives and mothers based 
upon the very patriarchal ideals of womanhood and family that women’s activists have 
long struggled against. Thus, citizenship ultimately poses a paradox for women, one that 
offers emancipatory potential for equality and inclusion while reinforcing gender ideals 
that exclude and marginalize them. Based on ethnographic and archival research, 
including personal interviews with fifty-one women’s activists, migrant women, and 
policymakers conducted throughout the Seoul- Gyeonggi metropolitan area from 
September 2011 to November 2012, this dissertation highlights the unintended 
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“That Korea has already transitioned to a multi-racial, multi-cultural society is irreversible…we 
must dedicate our efforts to integrating migrants through multicultural policies.” 
 –President Roh Moo-Hyun, April 26 2006 
 
Korean Multiculturalism  
In late April 2006, the President of South Korea (hereafter Korea), Roh Moo-
Hyun proclaimed that Korea has transitioned away from a one race-nation (danil minjok) 
to a “multi-racial, multicultural society” (Yonhap News 26 April 2006).  After over half 
of a century of propagating exclusionary ideologies based on the primacy of racial purity 
and ethnic homogeneity that denied the acceptance of mixed-race individuals as members 
of the nation, the proclamation marked the introduction of a widespread campaign to 
promote multiculturalism, or tamunhwa. At the center of this multiculturalism campaign 
were marriage migrants, mostly foreign-born women married to Korean men and their 
families who are collectively called “multicultural families” (tamunhwa kajok). As part of 
this campaign, the Korean government implemented an array of policy and legislative 
reforms that included the Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners (2007), the Act to 
Support Multicultural Families (2008), followed by the announcement of the 1
st
 Basic 
Plan on Foreigner Policy (2008) and the 1
st
 Basic Plan on Multicultural Family Support 
Policy (2010). Taken together, these reforms represent the Korean government’s 
blueprint for how it seeks to incorporate foreign residents as members of Korean society.
1
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 According to Article 1, the purpose of the Basic Act is to “help foreigners in Korea reach their full 
potential in adjusting to Korean society and to create a society where Koreans and foreigners understand 
and respect each other in ways that contribute to  social progress and integration in Korea.” The Basic Act 
called for the Basic Plan on Foreigner Policy (Article 5) which outlines the policy tasks and objectives for 
policies related to foreign residents every five years. Meanwhile the Act to Support Multicultural Families 
aims to “contribute to the improvement of the quality of life for multicultural families and to foster the 




From 2007 to 2014, the central government spent approximately US$497 million 
on multicultural family support programs, the majority of which was distributed to the 
Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MGEF), the main governmental ministry in 
charge of multicultural family policies (H. Kim 2012, NABO 2014). Since 2007, more 
than 150 different voluntary civic organizations have partnered with the state to operate a 
nationwide network of “multicultural family support centers” (tamunhwa kajok jiwŏn 
sent’ŏ) that offer a variety of welfare services, including counseling and language 
education programs to multicultural families (MGEF 2013). Not only in government 
affairs and civil society, but also in academia, multiculturalism has been one of the most 
researched and written about topics over the past few years. In 2010, over 15,000 
newspaper articles and over 800 academic journal articles contained the word 
“tamunhwa,” according to DBpia, a major database for academic journals and the Korea 
Integrated Newspaper Database System (KINDS) (Ahn 2012, Seol 2010). 
When it comes to immigration and demographics, Korea shares striking 
similarities with Japan and Taiwan. Like Japan and Taiwan, Korea maintains restrictive 
immigration policies that deny the right to family unification for low-skilled migrant 
workers and descent-based citizenship policies that make it impossible for migrant 
laborers without marital or family ties to ethnic Koreans to acquire citizenship (E. Chung 
2010a, Friedman 2010, Lee and Park 2005). Korean foreign labor policies render migrant 
workers ineligible to apply for citizenship and permanent residency by mandating that 
migrant workers return to their country of origin after a sanctioned period of time (Seol 
and Skrentny 2009). 
2
 Meanwhile, the long-term presence of third and even fourth 
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 The nationality law stipulates that applicants for naturalization must reside in the country consecutively 




generation immigrants from China, or hwagyo, who lack substantive rights as foreign 
residents demonstrate the exclusionary aspects of descent-based Korean citizenship 
policies (N. Kim 2012). However, continued labor shortages have prompted Korea, like 
Japan and Taiwan, to permit the “side-door” immigration of migrant workers which has 
contributed to the accelerated growth of the foreign resident population over the past 
three decades (Lim 2003). At the end of 2013, the Korean Immigration Service (KIS) 
within the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) which keeps track of foreign residents reported 
nearly 1 million registered long-term foreign nationals residing in the country, with the 
vast majority of them migrant workers.   
In addition, Korea along with Japan and Taiwan face demographic challenges 
posed by the fastest ageing populations and the lowest fertility rates in the developed 
world. Although the population aged sixty-five and older presently constitutes 
approximately 12 percent of the total population, Korea has experienced a 35 percent 
increase in the aged population from 2002 to 2012, making it the country with the most 
rapidly ageing society in the world (NSO 2012). Japan is already the world’s oldest 
society with the aged population comprising approximately one-fourth of the country’s 
total population. In terms of fertility, Korea and Japan respectively recorded fertility rates 
of 1.08 and 1.26 in 2005, the lowest among OECD countries (OECD 2012). In 2010, 
Taiwan reported the world’s lowest fertility rate at 0.9 children per woman, far below the 
world’s average replacement rate of 2.0 children per woman (Jennings 2011). Based on 
these “ultra-low” fertility rates and rapidly ageing societies, East Asian countries are 
confronted with a steep demographic decline that has serious implications for future 




Unlike Japan and Taiwan however, the Korean government has taken a pro-active 
approach to immigrant incorporation under the banner of the multiculturalism campaign 
(A. Kim 2009, N. Kim 2012, D. Seol 2010). In 2006, Korea granted local voting rights to 
permanent residents, making it the first country in East Asia to grant political rights to 
non-citizens (E. Chung 2010a). Since 2009, the MOJ has operated the Korean 
Immigration and Integration Program (KIIP) which encourages eligible foreign residents 
to naturalize by offering an expedited path to citizenship in exchange for receiving 
instruction in Korean language and culture.
 3
 Furthermore, the National Assembly passed 
a “multiple nationality law” (boksu gukjeok) in 2010, which recognizes dual nationalities 
for certain categories of citizens (Chung and Kim 2012). These sweeping reforms to 
incorporate immigrants have made Korea one of the most progressive countries in East 
Asia when it comes to immigration. 
While Japan extends civil and social rights to foreign residents and promotes a 
“harmonious” coexistence between foreign residents and local citizens, it has failed to 
incorporate many of its foreign residents, including long-term Korean residents, by 
equating nationality with ethnicity (E. Chung 2010b). Furthermore, the Taiwanese 
government maintains strict distinctions between its citizens who maintain their 
household registration in Taiwan and non-citizens, who are permitted access to 
employment and residency, but are subject to immigration control (Friedman 2010). In 
contrast to Japan and Taiwan, why has the Korean government prioritized the 
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 The Korean Immigration and Integration Program (KIIP) consists of 455 hours of instruction: 415 hours 
in Korean language and 50 hours in “understanding Korean society.” Successful completion of the program 
exempts applicants for naturalization from the written citizenship exam. It should be noted that while the 




incorporation of multi-ethnic, multi-racial immigrants after decades of promoting 
ideologies that insisted on racial purity and ethnic homogeneity?  
Moreover, the multiculturalism campaign in Korea targets a very specific and 
exclusive category of immigrants: marriage migrants. Marriage migrants refer to migrants 
whose legal status is legitimated by marriage to a national of the host country. Since the 
late 1980s, Korea as well as Japan and Taiwan has experienced severe shortages of young 
women in the rural areas which local governments and commercial brokers sought to 
address by facilitating cross-border marriages and the influx of marriage migrants from 
other parts of East and Southeast Asia (H. Lee 2008, Nakamatsu 2003, H. Wang 2007). 
As foreign spouses of citizens who have access to citizenship, marriage migrants 
represent an exception to restrictive immigration and descent-based citizenship policies in 
all three countries. In Korea, the extraordinary public attention paid to marriage migrants 
has been disproportionate to their numbers. In 2013, marriage migrants with foreign 
nationality numbered 150,865, constituting approximately fifteen percent of the total 
foreign population (KIS, 2013). Even when the family members of marriage migrants are 
taken into account, multicultural families account for less than two percent of the total 
population of Korea. Why then has Korea’s multiculturalism campaign focused 
exclusively on women married to Korean men, who constitute less than one-fifth of the 
entire foreign population? 
Based on a Korean national identity that has long espoused ideologies of ethnic 
homogeneity and racial purity, we would expect that immigrants would remain un-
incorporated and denied substantive rights much like previous generations of foreign 
residents and mixed-race people in Korea (M. Lee 2008). On the contrary, the Korean 




marriage migrants and their families. Unlike previous studies that has looked to 
international norms, Korea’s developmental state, and pressures from civil society, this 
dissertation focuses on the role of Korean women’s organizations and their engagements 
with the state in shaping immigrant incorporation. Treating citizenship as a negotiated 
relationship that entails emancipatory potential as well as unavoidable compromise, I 
argue that Korea’s multiculturalism campaign reflects the unintended consequences of 
negotiations between state efforts to regulate women’s access to rights and women’s 
organizations attempts to gain rights and expand memberships for women. By focusing 
on the relations between women and the state, this dissertation situates immigrant 
incorporation within the broader analytical framework of gender and citizenship.  
Theories of Liberal Convergence: International Norms 
Theories of liberal convergence point to international norms to account for why 
liberal states accept more immigrants than their restrictionist rhetoric and policies intend. 
According to this view, liberal norms impose a self-limited sovereignty on liberal states 
to accept “unwanted” immigrants (Freeman 1994, Joppke 1998). Thus, liberal states are 
internally constrained by norms that undermine effective immigration control. In addition, 
pro-immigrant actors, such as lawyers, nongovernmental organizations, and local 
governments have utilized norms to successfully persuade national governments that are 
reluctant to extend rights to non-citizens. In her study of norms and pro-immigrant NGOs 
in Japan, Amy Gurowitz (1999: 442) argues that pro-immigrant actors secured rights for 
Korean settlers and migrant workers in Japan by mobilizing human rights norms which 
effectively linked immigration issues to Japan’s preoccupation with its international 




by focusing on how advocacy activists used framing strategies that reconciled 
international norms with Korean nationalism.  
While explanations rooted in international norms provide compelling accounts for 
the growing global phenomenon of “unwanted” immigration among liberal states, they 
leave unanswered the question of how immigration policies and their outcomes change. 
For instance, the Korean government extended formal labor rights to migrant workers 
when it adopted the Employment Permit System (EPS) in 2004 which regulates foreign 
labor; however, the granting of labor rights did not result in substantive changes to 
immigration policies in that migrant workers continued to remain ineligible for long-term 
settlement (Lim 2003). Furthermore, despite its rhetorical nod to human rights, the 
Korean state has turned a blind eye to human rights violations committed by employers 
and business interests, especially when it relates to undocumented workers (Doucette and 
Prey 2010). The adoption of human rights norms thus cannot explain the persistence of 
Korea’s restrictive stance on immigration when it comes to migrant labor.  
Furthermore, states may extend rights to immigrants irrespective of international 
conventions. Korea is not a signatory to the International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, yet it grants labor 
rights to migrant workers which many migrant labor-receiving countries do not. Rather 
than international norms, the efforts of the migrant worker advocacy movement which 
grew out of prior democratization and labor movements in Korea account for the 
extension of labor rights to migrant workers (N.-K. Kim 2012).  
Finally, the ratification of international conventions is insufficient in guaranteeing 
the enforcement of international norms. For instance, Korea is signatory to the 




refugees. While the National Assembly passed the Refugee Act in 2011, making Korea 
the first country in East Asia to have a special law for refugees, it remains to be seen 
whether this legislation will result in sizable increases in the number of asylum seekers 
who are accepted as refugees.
4
 The Korean case demonstrates that states can be highy 
selective in terms of which international norms are adopted and that they can apply 
adopted norms discriminately.  
The Developmental State Thesis: State-led Multiculturalism 
A second body of scholarship on comparative immigration has focused on the role 
of domestic political institutions- the state, legislative courts and political parties- to 
account for countries’ responses to immigrant incorporation (Bale 2008, Guiraudon 1999, 
Joppke 2010).  State-centered approaches have explained multiculturalism in Korea as an 
expression of the state’s developmental strategy which prioritizes continued economic 
growth and of Korea’s desires to be acknowledged by the international community as an 
advanced country that respects human rights (N. Kim 2007). This perspective highlights 
how the multiculturalism campaign resembles prior developmental strategies adopted by 
Korean state planners, like modernization (geundaehwa) and globalization (segyehwa) 
which relied on state intervention and the mass mobilization of resources toward reaching 
these goals (S. Kim 2000). Characterizing multiculturalism in Korea as “state-led,” 
sociologist Nora Kim (2007) emphasizes the Korean state’s instrumental approach 
towards multiculturalism, one that treats multiculturalism as a utilitarian tool for the 
government to deal with the demographic crisis while attempting to preserve national 
identity. This approach provides important insights by pointing to the centralized, top-
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 The Refugee Act aims to shorten the period of time that asylum seekers must wait for decisions to be 




down approach adopted by the Korean state to engineer the rapid expansion of 
multicultural family support programs.  
However, there are several shortcomings to the argument. The first is that it 
presupposes the intentionality of the state in initiating the multiculturalism campaign. 
Studies of pro-migrant advocacy reveal that although the state has had a strong hand 
dictating the terms of incorporation, the demand for immigrant incorporation preceded 
state policies (E. Chung 2010a, Lim 2003). For instance, Korean women’s organizations 
have demanded support programs for integrating marriage migrants since the early 2000s, 
several years before the institution of policies for marriage migrants in 2006 (Lee 2003). 
This perspective demonstrates that the state was reacting to demands made from below, 
rather than taking a proactive stance driven by calculated intent.  
Second, the developmental state argument assumes the state’s ability to control 
immigration. From the very beginning, immigration to Korea by migrant workers has 
increased in spite of state efforts to discourage their settlement. In the early 1990s, small 
to medium business owners in the face of severe and persistent labor shortages especially 
in so-called 3-D (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) sectors lobbied the Korean government 
to institute a system that would allow them to recruit foreign labor (Lim 2003). In 
response, the Korean government established the Industrial Technical Trainee Program in 
1991 which would allow Korean businesses to hire foreign workers as “trainees.” 
However, the number of undocumented workers continued to increase due to major 
human rights abuses and labor exploitation by the employers. In response to the 
grassroots pressure to address these problems, the Korean government implemented the 
Employment Permit System in 2004, which regulates the entry and exit of migrant 




government has continued to conduct periodic crackdowns that have led to the forced 
deportations of thousands of undocumented migrant workers. Despite these efforts to 
control the size of the migrant population, the large numbers of undocumented migrants 
that in recent years have exceeded 100,000, challenge the notion of state control.  
Third, the idea of a state-initiated multiculturalism is based on the tenuous 
assumption that the Korean state functions in much the same manner today as it did in the 
previous authoritarian era. Yet, scholarship on the Korean state post-democratization and 
economic liberalization indicates an unresolved debate over whether Korea remains a 
developmental state (Minns 2001, Y. Park 2011). Finally, the single-handed emphasis on 
the developmental state overlooks the grassroots push for multiculturalism from civil 
society organizations. As I discuss below, diverse civil society organizations, from pro-
labor, Christian, to human rights organizations have promoted rights for different migrant 
groups prior to the institution of the state’s multiculturalism campaign and they continue 
to remain involved after the institution of state policies. 
Korean Civil Society as a Democratizing Force 
A third vein in the scholarly literature centers on the role of civil society activists 
who have promoted immigrant rights at the grassroots level (E. Chung 2010b, J. Kim 
2003, D. Kim 2011, N.-K. 2012, Moon 2000). According to this literature, Korean civil 
society’s unique historical formation rooted in earlier democracy movements paved the 
way for the emergence of a pro-immigrant advocacy movement that has persistently 
pushed for the democratic inclusion of immigrants. Since staging a highly publicized sit-
in front of Myeongdong Cathedral, a powerful symbol within the labor movement, 
migrant workers and civil society actors have sustained mobilization strategies that 




1980s pro-democratization movement by adopting an antagonistic and oftentimes militant 
stance towards the state and business interests. Korean activist leaders within civil society 
who were engaged in prior labor and pro-democracy struggles were critical in raising the 
issue of migrant workers’ rights and in securing institutional change in a short period of 
time. For instance, the efforts of civil society leaders were critical in the institution of the 
EPS which replaced the highly exploitative industrial trainee system and granted the three 
basic labor rights to migrant workers: the right to join unions, the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to strike (D. Kim 2011, J. Kim 2003).
5
 Although the migrant 
worker advocacy movement has since experienced a split between more reform-minded 
and radical militant forces since the introduction of the EPS, civil society activists 
continue to be influential advocates of migrants’ rights.  
An explanation rooted in civil society provides important insights into the 
grassroots impetus behind the expansion of incremental rights for migrants; however, by 
focusing primarily on migrant workers, the majority of who are men, explanations rooted 
in civil society tend to overlook the highly gendered aspects of immigration politics in 
Korea. In part, the focus on male migrant workers reflects the “androcentric” tendency of 
civil society in Korea which has traditionally been dominated by men and often 
characterized as violent and militant (S. Moon 2002). Studies that emphasize civil society 
writ large and focus on labor-based struggles cannot provide a satisfactory explanation as 
to why marriage migrant women have been the main targets of immigrant incorporation. 
The gendered nature of immigrant incorporation thus demands a critical eye on women’s 
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 The EPS has been controversial among civil society activists. Although the EPS acknowledges labor 
rights for migrant workers, it also stipulates that migrant workers cannot stay and work for more than five 
years at a time. It also does not permit family unification and it did not allow workers the right to change 




organizations and migrant women as central political actors who shape the politics of 
immigration. Rather than pro-labor activists, women’s activists have been the primary 
advocates of migrant women’s rights who serve as intermediaries between migrant 
women and state actors. While this study builds from the scholarship on civil society, it 
also seeks to shift the analytical lens away from the labor to the women’s movement. 
Women and Negotiated Citizenship 
The contradictions of immigrant incorporation in Korea- between restrictive 
immigration policies and descent-based citizenship policies based on the principle of 
racial purity on the one hand, and a multiculturalism campaign that prioritizes the 
inclusion of multi-racial, multi-ethnic immigrant women on the other, are not driven by 
international norms, the developmental state, and a robust civil society. Although 
international norms may have had an influence on Korea’s policies toward immigrants, 
they have not necessarily translated into liberal immigration policies.  The Korean state 
has intervened heavily in promoting the multiculturalism campaign, but the integration 
policies were not pre-determined by developmental strategies; rather, they were ad-hoc 
responses to demands for change from the grassroots. Lastly, while activism on the part 
of various civil society actors has been critical to the expansion of migrants’ rights, it was 
not the pro-labor, but women’s organizations that were pivotal in fostering a 
multiculturalism campaign that has focused primarily on women and their children.  
Treating citizenship as a negotiated relationship, I argue that the multiculturalism 
campaign reflects the unintended consequences of ongoing negotiations between state 
efforts to regulate women’s access to rights and the attempts by women’s organizations 
and migrant women to secure rights and expand their memberships.  Building on the 




ongoing negotiations between state and non-state actors over rights and membership. In 
this framework, I identify three dimensions to citizenship: 1) access to rights, 2) a 
broadened conception of rights that includes human rights, and 3) membership in 
multiple collectivities. By including access to rights as a component of citizenship, I seek 
to shift the focus away from the granting or denial of formal rights to how rights are 
differentially accessed. In particular, the gendered division of labor which demands 
women’s unpaid labor has been pivotal to how women access and exercise their rights.  
Second, while dominant approaches that follow in the steps of T.H. Marshall have 
neatly divided rights into three categories: civil, political and social, the close association 
of human rights with women’s rights in recent decades means that conceptualizations of 
women’s citizenship should include a discussion of human rights. Third, this framework 
recognizes that citizenship does not constitute a single overarching membership, but 
multiple memberships not only in the state, but also civil society and the family. While I 
do not contest the importance of state membership, I seek to broaden the notion of 
citizenship to include the multiple memberships that individuals hold.  
The argument can be further elaborated in two parts. First, states attempt to 
regulate how citizens and noncitizens access various types of rights and obligations not 
only as individuals but also as members of collectivities such as families and corporations.  
As such, policies like family policies which regulate individuals’ access to rights through 
membership in the family invariably shape citizenship. An examination of family policies 
thus sheds light on how citizenship is shaped by state efforts to regulate women’s access 
to rights through demands on their unpaid care and reproductive labor as wives and 
mothers. In the 1960s post-war era, the authoritarian regime in Korea formulated family 




(S. Moon 2005, Chung and Gupta 2007). The mass mobilization of women through state-
controlled organizations that inculcated contraception as women’s civic duty made 
population control not only possible but extremely effective in curbing population growth.  
Despite the transition to democracy and the emergence of a women’s movement, 
state attempts to regulate women’s access to rights, including reproductive care, health 
and social rights through demands on their unpaid reproductive and care labor have 
demonstrated remarkable resilience. The re-formulation of family planning into family 
policies in the early 2000s represent continued state efforts to link women’s citizenship to 
their roles as care providers who socially and biologically reproduce the nation vis-à-vis 
the family and the gendered division of labor. By mobilizing women as the primary care 
providers to families, the state continues to privatize the burden of care and welfare. 
Similarly, the state has sought to regulate marriage migrants’ access to rights by 
incorporating them through the framework of multicultural family support policies. 
 The second part of the argument relates to the agency of Korean women’s 
activists and migrant women in their efforts to negotiate rights and protections for 
migrant women. During the 1970s, women mobilized on behalf of women factory 
workers who faced exploitative working conditions, while in the 1980s women’s activists 
organized against violence inflicted upon women by the authoritarian state in the name of 
national security. Since the transition to democracy in 1987, women’s organizations have 
continued to push for gender equality and greater rights for women. These efforts 
culminated in legislative and institutional changes such as the Equal Employment Act in 
1985, the establishment of gender quotas that increased women’s political representation 
in 2000, and the creation of a government agency dedicated to gender equality in 2001. 




where women’s organizations have increasingly adopted the language of human rights to 
mobilize around the protection of women’s rights, such as sexual and domestic violence, 
and trafficking.  
During this period of growth and diversification in the women’s movement, 
Korea’s demographic landscape changed dramatically due to the influx of migrant 
workers and brides. From 2000 to 2010, the foreign resident population in Korea grew 
from 210,248 to 918,917, representing more than a four-fold increase over the decade 
(NSO 2010). In 2007, the total foreign population including short-term residents 
exceeded one million. Moreover, the greater social, cultural and political impact of these 
demographic changes came from marriage migrants, women mostly from China and 
Vietnam married to Korean men who have transformed the ethnic and racial composition 
of families and entire rural communities. For instance, the National Statistics Office 
(NSO) reported in 2006 that over 40 percent of Korean men working in agriculture or 
fisheries were married to a foreign bride (NSO 2006). As they came to comprise the 
majority of newly naturalized Korean citizens, marriage migrants have represented a 
direct challenge to mono-cultural conceptualizations of citizenship and nationality based 
on ideologies of ethnic homogeneity and racial purity (Chung and Kim 2012).  
Meanwhile, the emergence of marriage migrants as the new victims of patriarchy 
whose human rights are at risk invigorated Korean women’s organizations to mobilize 
around rights and protections for migrant women beginning in the early 2000s. During 
this time, women’s organizations benefited from their growing cooperative relations with 
two successive progressive governments to come to power, first with the Kim Dae Jung 
(1998-2003) and later with the Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2008) government, which were 




from the women’s organizations led to incremental reforms aimed at protecting migrant 
women’s rights: changes to immigration procedures and nationality law (2005), 
legislation to regulate the marriage brokerage industry (2007), and policies to support 
multicultural families (2008), which aim to provide a more secure legal status, social 
provisions, and welfare benefits to marriage migrants.  
For women’s organizations, however, bargaining with the state proved to be a 
double-edged sword (S. and K. Kim 2014). On the one hand, it increased public support 
programs for women, including educational, counseling, and welfare programs, and 
created opportunities for migrant women to negotiate the terms of their incorporation. On 
the other hand, close partnerships with the state in providing support services for migrant 
women have prompted women’s organizations to shift their focus from advocacy to 
service provisions. The unintended consequence of these engagements with the state is 
that women’s organizations have become implicated in state efforts to incorporate 
marriage migrants as wives and mothers which work to reinforce, not challenge 
patriarchal ideals of family and womanhood. 
By treating citizenship as an ongoing negotiation of rights and membership, this 
study highlights the contradictions of citizenship for women.  Because it constitutes a 
dynamic process that entails not only status but also participation and human agency, 
citizenship holds the possibility of transformative social change, such as mitigating 
inequalities and social conflicts. On the other hand, citizenship rests on specific 
articulations and notions of nationhood that can also work to reinforce existing gender, 
class, and racial hierarchies in spite of attempts to challenge them. Thus, citizenship 




unintended consequences that work to perpetuate various gender, class, and racial 
inequalities. 
Second, this study provides valuable insights on the relationship between gender 
and immigrant incorporation. While studies of migration have brought to light the various 
ways that migration, citizenship and gender intersect, there has been a noted absence of 
studies that focus on how gender politics shape patterns of immigrant incorporation 
(Abraham 2010, Tastsoglou 2006). By situating women as the main actors of analysis, I 
demonstrate how incorporation is the mutually constituted relationship between the 
receiving society and immigrants, but also a particular type of gendered immigrant. 
Although immigrant incorporation is often regarded as a normative ideal that denotes 
inclusion and empowerment within the host society, incorporation may not be ideal for 
women when it is premised on gender inequality and the fulfillment of gender roles that 
perpetuate women’s subordinated and unequal status. This study sheds light on 
immigrant incorporation as an uneven and unpredictable process that reinforces gender 
inequalities even as it extends citizenship rights to immigrant women.  
Lastly, this study situates Korea’s multiculturalism campaign as an attempt to 
balance the pressures for democratic inclusion, including gender equality on the one hand 
and the need to address demographic challenges on the other hand. Despite adhering to 
national ideologies that espouses racial purity and ethnic homogeneity, the Korean 
government no longer finds it tenable to deny rights to non-citizens due to domestic as 
well as mounting international pressures to promote democratic inclusion. Furthermore, 
the exigencies of the rapid demographic decline, an unforeseen outgrowth of accelerated 
economic and political development, have prompted a response that links immigrant 




experiences of other countries faced with the challenge of integrating diverse immigrants 
into their societies amid demographic challenges, it is also unique in that the “solution” to 
the demographic challenge has focused disproportionately on women. 
Korea as a Country of Immigration  
Korea parallels other countries of immigration in several important ways.  First, 
like Spain, Italy, and Portugal, Korea has recently transitioned from being an emigrant-
sending to an immigrant-receiving country (Hollifield, Martin and Orrenius 2014). In 
these countries, increased immigration flows have challenged existing policies and 
institutions as the host states and societies are pressed to devise innovative ways to 
manage diversity and accommodate new members. Pressures for change have also 
prompted a renewed reflection upon traditional understandings of national identity. 
Because of their lack of prior experience with immigration, these countries have 
employed contradictory and anomalous policies that demonstrate a grappling with the 
unprecedented challenges posed by new immigrant populations.  In other words, such 
countries are at a crossroads in deciding how they will integrate immigrants and it 
remains to be seen whether they will be able to avoid substantial social conflict and 
political instability in the process.  
Second, like other advanced industrial nations, Korea has been experiencing 
increased immigration flows over the past few decades alongside declining birth rates and 
rapidly aging populations. Along with countries like Japan, Germany, and Italy, 
downward demographic pressures complicate Korea’s response to immigration where 
perceptions of immigration are inevitably colored by growing national anxieties due to 
population decline. While states are reluctant to admit that immigration could be part of a 




interests and employers to continue to recruit migrant labor to fulfill labor shortages, 
especially in labor intense sectors and in care-giving to the young and elderly. Responses 
to immigration also stem from the recognition that the inability to address demographic 
concerns bodes ill for future development and growth. 
 Finally, Korea resembles other countries in that it has extended benefits and 
rights to immigrants and non-citizens, such as partial political rights to permanent 
residents, in spite of a reluctance to accept large-scale immigration. Like other countries 
of immigration, Korea now recognizes permanent residency and grants quasi-citizenship 
rights to permanent residents (D. Seol 2012). Moreover, it has revised naturalization 
procedures which make it easier for targeted categories of foreign residents, including 
high-skilled professionals, overseas Koreans (or dongpo), and marriage migrants to 
naturalize. These measures reflect what Christian Joppke (2005) termed a growing “de-
ethniciziation” of citizenship, where citizenship is no longer strictly defined by the 
principle of jus sanguinis, but by jus soli and other factors unrelated to ethnicity that 
facilitate access to citizenship.  In short, the boundaries of state membership are no longer 
defined primarily by ethnicity and descent, but other considerations, such as liberal norms 
and demographic concerns.   
At the same time, a number of differences stand out in terms of the patterns of 
immigrant incorporation in Korea. Immigration in Korea is notable in that the majority of 
the migrant population is composed of co-ethnics with foreign nationality: ethnic Koreans 
primarily from China and to a much lesser extent from the former Soviet Union, 
including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Seol and Skrentny 2009). Because the majority of 
migrants are co-ethnics, the racial differences between migrant and non-migrant 




though distinct linguistic and cultural differences do exist. Even among non-ethnic 
migrants, most originate from within the Asian continent. Because many of these 
migrants come from a shared cultural background such as Confucianism, as in the case of 
the Vietnamese and Han Chinese, the cultural differences between citizens and 
immigrants are relatively less striking than in countries where this is not the case.   
Second, unlike European countries, refugees and asylum seekers compose only a 
small percentage of immigrants to Korea. In Europe, refugees and asylum seekers from 
the Middle East and Africa compose a majority of present-day immigrants. Long 
criticized by the international community for its unwillingness to accept refugees, the 
Korean government made a concerted effort to accept more refugees by passing the Act 
on the Status and Treatment of Refugees in 2011. The number of refugees and asylum 
seekers that Korea currently accepts however pales in comparison to that of Western 
countries. Instead of refugees, Korea has accepted the inflow of defectors from North 
Korea, whose numbers have exceeded 25,000 in recent years (B. Chung 2008). Upon 
arrival, these defectors not only automatically acquire South Korean citizenship, but they 
receive resettlement subsidies and a variety of other support services from the Korean 
government to help them adjust to life in the South.
6
 As de-facto citizens, defectors from 
the North are not considered immigrants but a special category of “new settlers.”  
Finally, Korea’s multiculturalism campaign has not prompted substantial changes 
to exclusionary and restrictive policies; rather, the campaign for multiculturalism 
represents an anomaly to closed-door immigration and descent-based citizenship policies. 
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Through a system of tight state regulation that includes periodic crackdowns, detentions, 
and forced deportations, the Korean government makes it rather difficult for low-skilled 
migrant workers to remain in Korea for the long-term. Given the persistent numbers of 
undocumented migrants, many scholars have raised doubts as to the long-term 
sustainability of this guest worker system in lieu of a liberalized immigration policy (T. 
Lim 2012, A. Kim 2009). Yet, it remains to be seen whether Korea will join the ranks of 
other immigrant-receiving countries to allow the settlement of migrant workers, or 
whether it will continue to rely on strong-handed measures to maintain restrictive and 
exclusionary policies.  
Methodology 
 This dissertation adopts a multi-method qualitative approach that draws from 
archival research, in-depth personal interviews, and participant observation. The purpose 
of this dissertation is to address the following questions: what explains the disjuncture 
between Korea’s restrictive immigration and descent-based citizenship policies and the 
promotion of a multiculturalism campaign that seeks to incorporate multi-ethnic, multi-
racial immigrants? Furthermore, why has this multiculturalism campaign focused 
exclusively on women? In order to reconstruct the historical and contextual background, I 
consulted a wide range of archival materials consisting of statistical records, policy plans, 
legislation, and media sources. Second, personal interviews with key actors from civil 
society, the central and local governments, and grassroots migrant communities allowed 
me to understand how the stories, aspirations and frustrations of individuals came to 
impact their decisions and actions. Third, focused participant observation gathered while 
interacting with Korean activists and migrant women provided firsthand insights that 




For secondary sources, I relied on government documents published in Korean, 
such as statistical reports from the Korea Immigration Service (KIS), policy statements 
from various government ministries and presidential committees, and legislative meeting 
records from the National Assembly from 2000 to the present. These materials were 
gathered through visits to the library at Yonsei University (where I was affiliated as a 
Fulbright researcher), the National Library of Korea, and National Assembly Library as 
well as through access to digital academic databases, such as the Research Information 
Service System (RISS). I also referenced major print and digital news media publications 
in both English and Korean. Whenever possible, I referenced newspaper publications 
from a range of different political affiliations, such as the Chosun Ilbo, JoongangDaily, 
Donga Ilbo, OhMyNews, and Hankyoreh in Korean and the Korea Herald and Korea 
Times in English.  
The ethnographic data stems out of fourteen months of field research conducted in 
the Seoul-Gyeonggi metropolitan area (including the commuter cities of Ansan, Guri, 
Goyang, and Ilsan) in Korea from September 2011 to November 2012. During this time, I 
collected primary documents, including printed pamphlets and brochures, budget reports, 
project summaries, informal surveys, and newsletters from governmental and voluntary 
organizations, such as migrant women’s support organizations and multicultural family 
support centers. Furthermore, I conducted participant observation in two major non-profit 
voluntary organizations for migrant women: the Korean Women Migrants Human Rights 
Center (Han’guk Iju Yŏsŏng In'gwŏn Sent'ŏ, or the Center) and the Migrant Women 
Human Rights Forum (Iju Yŏsŏng In'gwŏn P'orŏm, or Forum), both based in Seoul.   
A leading human rights organization for migrant women since 2001, the Center 




2010 when I worked as a part-time intern from the beginning of July to the end of August. 
From September 2011 to September 2012, I voluntarily taught English to two 
Vietnamese migrant women activists. They desired to learn English because they wanted 
to understand the borrowed English terms that Koreans increasingly utilize in their daily 
speech. I met with the migrant women after the end of their work hours twice a week for 
one hour after which we always went out for dinner. I was also part of a migrant women 
study group composed of those who were interested in reading and discussing academic 
works on migration written in Korean. Led by a Korean activist at the Center, the study 
group met once a week from November 2011 to March 2012. From April 2012 to June 
2012, I participated in the Center’s training program for domestic violence counselors 
where I received 100 hours of training alongside twenty-two other migrant and Korean 
activists. While in the field, I routinely kept a written journal of my observations, 
recording my thoughts, interactions, and conversations with migrant women and Korean 
activists.  
The other organization that I participated regularly as an active member was the 
Migrant Women Human Rights Forum which is a scholar-activist organization led by 
Kim Young-ock and Kim Jung-sun, two prominent university lecturers in women’s 
studies. The Forum is an organization that aims to further scholarship on migrant women 
through workshops, seminars, and publications. I was invited to join the organization by 
my host professor Kim Hyun-Mee from the Department of Cultural Anthropology at 
Yonsei University. From January 2012 to November 2014, I regularly attended the 
monthly seminar meetings and workshops and I collaborated with the other members in 




March 2013. I contributed a chapter written in Korean on the topic of regularizing illegal 
migrant status in Korea.  
Furthermore, I conducted personal interviews with fifty-one Korean activists, 
migrant women, scholars, journalists, local and national politicians, and policy 
researchers based in Seoul and around the country. I was able to secure these interviews 
through introductions from the contacts I established through my participation in the two 
migrant women’s organizations and through my affiliation with Yonsei University. While 
I was based primarily in Seoul, I conducted short-term research trips to interview activists 
and policymakers in Gyeonggi province in Ilsan, Goyang, Ansan, and Guri cities. Of all 
the provinces in Korea, Gyeonggi province which surrounds the capital city of Seoul has 
the highest concentration of both marriage migrant residents and migrant workers. 
Through introductions, I was also able to visit multicultural family support centers and 
migrant support organizations on Jeju Island and in Gochang County, North Jeolla 
Province, where I interviewed the leaders and staff members of the organizations. 
My interviews and field research targeted Korean women activists and 
organizations and their role in shaping Korean immigration and gender politics. I 
identified these organizations with the guidance of leading scholars and activists on 
marriage migration. I conducted all my interviews in person, using open-ended but semi-
structured questions that aimed to elicit interviewees’ responses to three main sets of 
questions: a) the interviewees’ career background and identity as an activist for migrant 
women; b) their primary responsibilities and roles within their affiliated organizations; c) 
their opinions and evaluations of government policies and programs for migrant women 
and multicultural families. All interviews were conducted in Korean and ranged from a 




interviews from Korean into English are mine. Throughout the dissertation, I use the 
personal names of only those who gave me their prior consent; the rest have been 
replaced with pseudonyms.  
Organization of the Chapters  
 This dissertation examines the relationship between women and the state by 
analyzing the interactions between the state and women’s organizations. The empirical 
chapters are structured around the three central actors who are the focus of this study: 1) 
the state and its institutions, 2) women’s movement organizations, and 3) migrant women. 
In Chapter Two, I present the theoretical framework. First, I review the dominant 
approaches to citizenship and discuss the contributions of feminist theorists and recent 
studies that examine the intersections of gender, migration and citizenship. I then propose 
a framework that conceptualizes citizenship along three dimensions: access to rights, 
human rights, and multiple memberships. Central to this framework is the agency of 
women in shaping their citizenship which is not pre-determined and imposed upon them 
as passive subjects, but negotiated and re-negotiated by organized groups of women, both 
citizens and non-citizens, who contest the terms and conditions of their incorporation.  
Chapter Three examines how the state has regulated women’s access to rights first 
through family planning and later through family policies by incorporating women as the 
primary providers of care and reproductive labor for families. National anxiety 
concerning the impact of population on economic growth fueled by the exigencies of 
national security and anti-Communism resulted in the implementation of family planning 
programs from the 1960s throughout the 1990s. The state thus incorporated women into 
the nation by mass mobilizing them for the purposes of monitoring their contraceptive 




population growth demanded state efforts to reverse low fertility rates that presently pose 
demographic challenges. Resembling previous efforts to incorporate Korean women, the 
state instituted family policies in 2004 which aims to incorporate Korean and migrant 
women as primary care providers to families by regulating their access to social rights. 
These policies have mobilized Korean women’s organizations to educate and provide 
care to migrant women so that they become “proper” wives and mothers who provide 
care labor and thereby socially and biologically reproduce Korean families.  
In Chapter Four, I trace the origins and evolution of the movement for migrant 
women to prior campaigns within the broader women’s movement to secure human rights. 
The influx of marriage migrants presented an opportunity for women’s organizations to 
renew their negotiations with the state for the expansion of rights and protections for 
women, especially for victims of gender violence and trafficking. While a small but 
closely knit coalition of advocacy organizations pushed for policies that would protect 
migrant women from human rights abuses, the policies that were passed ultimately fell 
short of their aims by prioritizing educational and welfare service provisions. Based on 
my examination of the women’s human rights movement, I argue that claiming human 
rights for women has distinct consequences or costs that ultimately reproduce rather than 
undermine patriarchy. As a result, women’s organizations have found themselves trapped 
in the contradictory position of implementing policies that promote what they have long 
opposed: patriarchal ideals of Korean womanhood and family. 
 Chapter Five explores the different strategies by which migrant women are 
negotiating their different memberships through the active support of women’s 
organizations. I focus on three approaches to negotiating membership by migrant women: 




the multiculturalism campaign has provided opportunities for migrant women to 
negotiate their memberships, it rests on gender inequality because it roots migrant 
women’s access to rights and citizenship through their unpaid labor as mothers and wives 
who provide care to families. Ultimately, citizenship presents a paradox for migrant 
women, one that both facilities and hinders their political empowerment.  
 The concluding chapter revisits the central questions posed in the dissertation: 
why has Korea prioritized immigrant incorporation despite national ideologies based on 
racial purity and ethnic homogeneity? Why has Korea’s multiculturalism campaign 
focused exclusively on marriage migrant women? More broadly, how does gender shape 
immigrant incorporation? I summarize my main points and link my empirical discussion 
to the theoretical framework I proposed earlier.  Finally, I discuss the comparative 
implications and suggest future avenues for research that will further understandings on 






Citizenship as a Negotiated Relationship 
 
 
Over the past two decades, the increased migration flows of women on a global 
scale and the entry of diverse groups of women into new geographic spaces and 
communities have prompted growing attention to the intersections between citizenship, 
migration and gender (Anthias 2013, Tastsoglou 2006, Abraham 2010, Willis and Yeoh 
2000). By situating gender as a central focus of analysis, these studies have sought to 
illuminate the agency exercised by diverse groups of migrant women, in contrast to 
dominant portrayals that regard them as powerless and disempowered. Furthermore, they 
have brought to light how citizenship and immigrant incorporation are gendered 
processes that can work to both reinforce and mitigate gender inequalities.  
In this chapter, I build upon existing scholarship to introduce a theoretical 
framework for citizenship as a negotiated relationship. The first section briefly discusses 
the theoretical contributions of T.H. Marshall (1950) as a departure point for feminist 
approaches in citizenship. In the following section, I survey the major works on 
citizenship that have grappled with the question of gender. The third section examines 
three dominant scholarly approaches to citizenship, gender, and migration. I then 
introduce my framework which highlights three dimensions of citizenship: a) the 
regulation of access to rights through the gendered division of labor, b) the inclusion of 
human rights as the basis of citizenship rights, and c) multiple memberships that 
individuals hold. 
T.H. Marshall as Point of Departure 
In his well-known treatise Citizenship and Social Class, T.H. Marshall (1950: 28-




community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with 
which the status is endowed.” Marshall’s study sought to account for the development of 
social citizenship in Great Britain, which he characterized as an evolutionary progression 
of different sets of rights. In the 18
th
 century, the emergence of a bourgeoisie that 
demanded liberty, the freedom of speech, and rights to a fair trial resulted in the rise of 
civil rights defended by a system of courts. As the working class waged struggles for 
political equality and access within the political process in the 19
th
 century, citizenship 
gained another dimension: political rights. In the 20
th
 century, social rights emerged as a 
basis of claims to welfare and social security. This progression of rights coincided with 
the rise of capitalism which as a system of inequality has increasingly been at “war” with 
citizenship (Marshall 1950). Specifically, Marshall was referring to the contradictions 
between formal political equality and the persistence of widespread social and economic 
inequalities associated with modern-day capitalism.  
When it comes to gender however, Marshall’s account of citizenship glaringly 
overlooked how gender has intersected with class to influence the development of social 
rights and the welfare state (Siim 2000, Bock 1992, Orloff 1993). For instance, in most 
European welfare states, the gendered division of labor which distinguished between 
waged and unpaid labor lay at the heart of the development of welfare systems. The 
gendered division of labor as the basis of the capitalist welfare system raises important 
questions about how the meanings and the chronology of civil, political and social rights 
are influenced by gender (Orloff, 1993). Additionally, the evolutionary treatment of 
rights fails to recognize that women on the whole were generally granted citizenship 
rights later than men and in a different order from them. Marshall situated the 
development of political rights in Britain to the 19
th






century that women in Britain attained full suffrage. Furthermore, in many cases, women 
often gained social rights as mothers before they obtained the right to vote (Bock 1992). 
Despite these criticisms however, feminists have been reluctant to abandon 
Marshall’s framework. For one, feminist scholar Sylvia Walby (1994: 381) argues that 
Marshall’s long historical approach to citizenship left open the possibility of discussing 
degrees of citizenship obtained by different groups at different times. This disaggregated 
treatment of citizenship recognizes the uneven and differentiated progression by which 
citizenship developed in different contexts. More importantly, Nira Yuval-Davis 
attributes Marshall’s broad definition of citizenship as opening up opportunities for 
feminists to discuss women’s different memberships. Yuval-Davis (1997b: 70) argues 
that Marshall’s definition “raises the possibility of multi-tier citizenship in both sub and 
supra-state collectivities as well as the question of the relationships of these collectivities 
to the state.” Only by recognizing citizenship as a multi-tier construct which recognizes 
citizens as members of different communities, rather than primarily that of states, can we 
begin to account for the different positioning of women in different communities. 
Marshall’s study thus inspired new theory and research about citizenship, including 
critical feminist analyses (Siim 2000).  
Feminist Approaches to Citizenship 
One of the central questions that have occupied feminists is how to reconcile 
women’s duties in the private sphere with a more egalitarian form of politics in the public 
realm. From one end of the spectrum, “maternalists” such as Jean Elshtain (1981) and 
Sara Ruddick (1990) challenged the “matriphobia” of the feminist movement and 




of motherhood and the private sphere.
7
 Elshtain (1983:183) insists that “the family 
remains the locus of the deepest and most resonant human ties,” in an attempt to 
reconstruct the moral primacy of the private sphere.  In contrast to Marxist feminists who 
conflate citizenship with labor, class struggle and socialist revolution, these maternal 
feminists aim for women’s liberation by reconstructing the private sphere as a site of 
women’s liberation, rather than of their oppression. Instead of a negative, the gendered 
division of work within the family serves as a positive basis for the forging of women’s 
political identities and for their integration into politics.   
Meanwhile, Carol Pateman (1988b) finds the divisions between the private and 
public spheres irreconcilable. Rather than reclaim the moral superiority of the private 
sphere, a more egalitarian form of politics for women stems from a “sexually 
differentiated citizenship” that distinguishes between the private and public spheres. The 
source of the problem for Pateman is that women cannot obtain full citizenship as women. 
Referring to this as “Wollstonecraft’s dilemma,” Pateman points out that women are torn 
between the demand for a gender-neutral idea of citizenship and a citizenship that can 
express their specific concerns in their capacities as women. According to Pateman 
(1988a: 252), “either women become (like) men,and so full citizens, or they continue at 
women’s work, which is of no value for citizenship.” 
This dilemma stems from the fact that the social contract is based on an unspoken 
fraternity or brotherhood of men, which has served to privilege men and subordinate 
women through a tacit sexual contract that underlies the social contract. Pateman argues 
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that there are two reasons why the sexual contract has not been discussed by theorists: 
first, patriarchy tends to be interpreted as paternal rule rather than a ‘political right’ that 
originates in male sex-right. The second reason for the silence is that attention has been 
primarily directed at the public sphere, where the private sphere has more or less been 
neglected. Because of their relegation to the private sphere through the sexual contract, it 
is impossible for women to obtain full citizenship as women. As a response to the 
Wollstonecraft dilemma, Pateman proposes a ‘sexually differentiated’ citizenship that 
recognizes the specificity of womanhood within a context of civil equality. 
Anne Phillips (1991) seeks a middle ground between the glorification of the 
private sphere by Elshtain and its complete separation from the public sphere as proposed 
by Pateman. She critiques the three models of democracy: traditional liberalism, 
participatory democracy and civic republicanism as models that have inadequately 
addressed feminist concerns. By focusing on abstract individualism, traditional liberalism 
tends to ignore the differences and inequalities between men and women. While 
participatory democracy demands significant time and energy and thereby overlooks the 
realities of women’s lives, civic republicanism tends to overlook the distinctive concerns 
of traditionally subordinate groups and maintains distinctions between the public and 
private realms (Phillips 1991:26-33).  
Despite its flaws, Phillips argues that liberal democracy, based on universal 
suffrage and representation, offers the best promise for gender-equal democratic 
representation. It does so in two ways: first by developing representative mechanisms that 
explicitly acknowledge gender difference and inequality. Second and perhaps more 
importantly, liberal democracy permits the re-ordering of the relationship between the 




affirmative action in the form of a quota for women candidates in the electoral system. 
Turning to the empirical example of Nordic democracies, Phillips (1991:130) argues that 
greater representation ultimately translates into greater inclusion for women, even though 
it requires a long period of time for the transformation to fully take place.  
These varied engagements in democratic theory constitute feminists’ attempt to 
re-conceptualize citizenship which has been defined on the basis of a male norm. While 
Elshtain seeks to find the source of women’s empowerment from within the private 
sphere of the family, Pateman suggests a sexually differentiated citizenship that 
simultaneously recognizes women as different but equal. Anne Phillips calls for a 
rethinking of how to include women through mechanisms of representation by 
engendering democracy itself. Although these contributions acknowledge the differences 
between men and women, by treating the category of woman as universal, they leave 
unanswered how different groups of women are to be incorporated as citizens. For 
instance, Elshtain insists on a public realm that addresses women as mothers and thereby 
reshapes the private realm, but as many of her critics point out, this assumes that 
motherhood is an ideal cherished by all women (Dietz 1985). 
8
 Furthermore, critics have 
raised the question of whether maternal thinking in fact reifies the differences and 
inequalities between men and women.  
Other theorists have sought to conceptualize a citizenship that recognizes 
difference and promotes equality among different groups of women. Two prominent 
contributions have suggested a citizenship based on a feminist solidarity rooted in 
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difference. The first is Nira Yuval-Davis’s (1997b) work, Gender and Nation, which 
highlights how specific notions of manhood and womanhood have constructed 
nationhood as well as citizenship. According to Yuval-Davis (1997b: 24), “[w]omen have 
tended to be differentially regulated to men in nationality, immigration and refugee 
legislation, often being constructed as dependent on their family men and expected to 
follow them and live where they do.” Unlike liberal definitions of citizenship which treats 
the differences of class, ethnicity, gender, as irrelevant to their status as citizens, Yuval-
Davis (1997b:75) argues that citizenship needs to be examined from a perspective that 
would include “the different positioning of different states as well as the different 
positioning of individuals and groupings within states.” By embedding the individual in 
different social relations and communities, she attempts to sever the exclusive association 
of citizenship with the nation-state. In other words, she attempts to re-conceptualize 
citizenship to pay heed to how the specific location of people in society mediates the 
construction of their citizenship as ‘different’ and thus determines their access to 
entitlements and their capacity to exercise independent agency (Yuval-Davis and 
Werbner 1999:5). For Yuval-Davis, citizenship is a “multi-tier” construct and one that 
applies to people’s membership in a variety of collectivities. By treating citizenship as 
multi-tiered, it is possible to see how each tier is associated with different rights and 
duties that women must negotiate for a more gender equal membership. 
As feminist practice, Yuval Davis (1997b) advocates a “transversal perspective,” 
a form of coalition politics whereby the differences among women are recognized and 
given a voice. Transversal politics is not based on specific identities but in terms of what 
a community seeks to achieve; furthermore, it is based on continuous dialogue and the 




who have different memberships and identities. According to Yuval-Davis (1997b: 130), 
transversal politics revolves around two central principles: the first is that the shifting (of 
perspectives) should not involve the loss of one’s own rooting (i.e. identity and 
membership) and set of values. Second, the process of shifting should not homogenize 
the ‘other,’ but recognize that members within a different group hold different positions 
and viewpoints. Thus, Yuval-Davis offers transversal politics as a path to a less sexist, 
less racist and a more democratic society. 
While Yuval Davis aims for an expanded notion of citizenship based on multiple 
tiers of membership, Ruth Lister (1997a, 1997b) deconstructs and provides a synthesis of 
existing traditions: traditional liberalism and civic republicanism. For Lister (1997b: 195-
6), citizenship is “understood as both a status, carrying a set of rights including social and 
reproductive rights and a practice, involving political participation broadly defined so as 
to include the kind of informal politics in which women are more likely to engage.” This 
definition of citizenship rejects the “false universalism” of traditional citizenship theory 
that is unable to appreciate diversity, recognize difference, and overlooks the exclusion of 
groups who do not conform to the norm of the White, able-bodied, heterosexual male 
(Ibid: 199). While Lister critiques liberal universalism, she does not reject universalism 
entirely, because universalism embodies an “emancipatory potential” in that it serves to 
function as a standard by which “the denial of full and genuine citizenship to women and 
minority groups can be measured and claims for inclusion can be directed” (Vogel 1988: 
157, Lister 1997b: 89). 
9
 Thus, by synthesizing traditional approaches toward citizenship, 
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Lister seeks to promote women’s participation and representation in a more democratic 
form of politics. By promoting a differentiated universalism, Lister has forcefully argued 
that it is possible to conceive of a women-friendly citizenship as theory and as praxis. 
Similar to Yuval-Davis’s notion of transversal politics, differentiated universalism is 
about the search for a politics of solidarity rooted in difference. Through the framework 
of differentiated universalism, Lister is able to reformulate citizenship to give full 
recognition to the different and shifting identities that women simultaneously hold.  
Yuval-Davis and Lister both seek to bring women into discussions of citizenship 
and to include women in all their diversity, including immigrant women. In doing so, 
they are responding to the calls of feminist philosophers like Uma Narayan (1997: 63), 
who has critiqued feminist literature on citizenship for being “less attuned to the fact that 
category of citizenship itself can function to marginalize and occlude the interests and 
problems faced by non-citizen residents.” Yuval-Davis and Lister’s approaches to 
citizenship consider the political struggles at the level of the state as well as in sub-
national and transnational communities. In both approaches, the realization of a truly 
feminist citizenship is one that recognizes not only women but different groups of people 
and their different social, political and economic positionings. Citizenship as feminist 
praxis hence requires that diverse groups of women do their share to transform 
citizenship through political activism and participation.  By recognizing and taking 
seriously differences among women, these critical perspectives on citizenship have paved 
the way for discussions on gender, migration and citizenship.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
to dismiss the applicability of those universal concepts associated with the principle of equal rights? Its 




The Intersections of Migration, Gender and Citizenship 
Contemporary scholarship on the “feminization of migration” has highlighted 
how gender inequalities facilitate and hinder patterns of migration (Sharpe 2001, Anthias, 
Kontos and Morokvasic-Muller 2013, Piper and Roces 2003). For one, women’s marital 
status can facilitate migration, but it does so on the basis of their position as dependents 
of men whose legal status and rights are not individually granted but vis-à-vis their 
relationship to men. When their legal status is dependent on their relations with men, 
migration can thus serve to perpetuate women’s subordinated and unequal status. On the 
other hand, migration can open up opportunities for women not only for economic and 
social advancement but for negotiating a more empowered status for instance, when they 
become the main breadwinners for their households through migration and the 
remittances they send (Parrenas 2001b).   
Inequalities between men and women, but also between different groups of 
women have shaped the migration patterns of women along class, racial and ethnic lines. 
As maids, housekeepers, and caregivers, migrant women constitute a global labor force 
that is often overlooked as cheap, informal and expendable. Most if not all economies of 
the developed world, including welfare states, depends on the reproductive and care labor 
provided by these women to sustain the productive labor force. For instance, dual-earner 
upper and middle class families in the U.S. and Canada, the Middle East, and Hong Kong, 
have increasingly relied on the care labor of domestic workers to look after their 
households and to care for children and the elderly (Stasiulis and Bakan 1997, Fernandez 
2014, Triandafyllidou 2013). The global transferring of caregiving labor from women in 
developed countries to women in developing countries sustains what sociologist Rhacel 




domestic workers, Parrenas (2001a: 78) argues that the hierarchy of womanhood is a 
distinct form of the transnational division of labor that links women across race, class and 
nation in an interdependent and hierarchal relationship.  
The denial of formal citizenship and rights however, has not prevented immigrant 
women from contesting and challenging the meanings and practices of citizenship at the 
local, national and transnational levels. Contrary to the notion that women are forced into 
migration by global structures of patriarchy, this perspective highlights how migration 
can provide opportunities for women to challenge patriarchy. As Dobrowolsky and 
Tastsoglou (2006: 6) argue, “[i]mmigrant women are complex subjects whose 
autonomous action and agency even under the most dire circumstances should not be 
underplayed.” Through political engagement, ranging from rights-based movements to 
everyday struggles to negotiate their rights, immigrant women seek to define and re-
define the boundaries of citizenship. Although there is no guarantee that waging such 
struggles will necessarily result in progress, women undertake costly personal and 
collective sacrifices in order to strive for change that will better their lives. In short, as 
Abraham (2010:12-13) and others argue, citizenship is a fluid and dynamic process of 
agency, contestation and resistance.  
One of the central questions that the growing scholarship on citizenship, women 
and migration seeks to address is: how do migrant women negotiate rights in host 
societies that are otherwise reluctant to extend rights to them? Based on analyses of how 
immigrant women seek to transform citizenship, I identify three broad overlapping 
approaches to citizenship: as contentious claims-making, as a cultural process of subject-
making, and as a strategic tool of resistance. The first approach explains the extension of 




support organizations. The second approach is focused on the construction of migrant 
women as racialized and gendered subjects who are included and excluded based on these 
subjectivities. Lastly, the third approach understands the rights of migrant women as a 
strategy that is negotiated within unequal relations of power between countries and within 
families.  
Contentious Politics Approaches: Citizenship as Claims-Making 
In her analysis of South Asian immigrant communities in the U.S., sociologist 
Monisha Das Gupta (2006), focuses on the various claims made by South Asian migrants, 
such as married women, queers and taxi drivers. Departing from the typical narrative of 
struggles by immigrant minorities to demand full citizenship rights, Das Gupta develops 
the concept of “transnational complex of rights,” where rights are mobile and not rooted 
in national membership. Rather than organize for citizenship status, Das Gupta brings to 
light how activists have preferred to explore access to rights distinct from formal 
citizenship. In this way, the “transnational complex of rights” functions to pry apart the 
taken-for-granted connection between citizenship and rights (Das Gupta 2006:19) . She 
argues that the struggles that these “unruly immigrants” wage are specific to their social 
location and class status. For instance, Das Gupta highlights the distinct ways by which 
South Asian women’s organizations have re-conceptualized domestic violence to reflect 
immigrant women’s experiences and their particular predicaments, and how they have 
articulated rights for immigrant women without the benefit of claiming citizenship. In 
doing so, Das Gupta claims that these organizations have expanded notions of feminism 
in the U.S., and she demonstrates that immigrants make claims such as the basic right to 




Catherine Raissiguier (2010) in her examination of immigration in contemporary 
France, focuses on how women in the sans-papiers movement have appropriated and 
thereby transformed notions of democracy, citizenship, and republican belonging. Mostly 
from former French colonies in sub-Sahara Africa, the sans-papiers refer to refugees and 
immigrants many of whom had entered legally as family members of French citizens but 
were rendered illegal by immigration laws that have become increasingly more restrictive 
since the mid-1970s.
10
 Raissiguier specifically points to the dual processes of 
foregrounding and erasure of African immigrant women within the movement as a 
reflection of the intersections of race and gender in the construction of the immigration 
“problem” in France. Immigrant women occupy a unique social location where discursive 
and material conditions have constructed immigrant women as those without subjectivity, 
or “impossible subjects.”  
Yet, immigrant women have creatively organized around a notion and identity of 
“lack” that allows them to make claims that cannot easily be dismissed by the French 
state. By organizing around a collective identity of lack shared by those who sit at the 
margins of French society, the movement challenged the very foundations of the French 
republican tradition. In short, immigrant women have demonstrated that even though 
gender discrimination has been constitutive of the French republican tradition it is still 
possible to envision a politics of inclusion and universal humanity (Raissiguier 2010: 
130).  
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An approach that focuses on the claims that immigrants make is important in that 
it poses challenges to conventional understandings of citizenship as the basis for rights. 
On the other hand, focusing primarily on contentious claims made by immigrant women 
can overlook an adequate consideration of the factors that enable claims making. 
Raissiguier demonstrates how the legalization of a portion of the sans-papiers led to a de-
mobilization of the movement as many who were unable to secure a change of status left 
the movement, was deported, or re-organized to renew the struggle. Such changes 
inevitably shaped how successive sans-papier collectives made their claims. While 
Raissiguier makes the important point that migrants do have discursive tools at their 
disposal to challenge the myths behind citizenship, the ability to exercise these tools is 
conditioned by political constraints and opportunities- specifically, whether migrants are 
given a political space to make those claims. For instance, the visible support of well-
respected French intellectuals and officials who were sympathetic toward the sans 
papiers’ cause was critical to enabling the sans-papiers to demand rights and moreover, 
legitimize such claims to rights.  
Additionally, an examination of the claims made by immigrants helps us to see 
how “unruly immigrants” subvert traditional meanings of citizenship-as-rights, but as Das 
Gupta (2006:18) admits “the deployment of the complex of rights by no means signals a 
decline in the salience of borders and nation-state.” Insofar as rights are granted or denied 
by nation-states, as long as immigrants make claims to the state, they reinforce the state’s 
link to citizenship. Therefore, while the social location and lived experiences of 
immigrants are critical to understanding how migrants negotiate citizenship, claims-based 
approaches still need to consider the role of the state and its policies in structuring the 




Cultural Approaches: Citizenship as Subjectivity 
A second perspective on gender, migration and citizenship focuses on citizenship 
as a cultural process of subject-making into a particular type of racialized and gendered 
subject. Anthropologist Aihwa Ong (1996:738) has characterized citizenship as a cultural 
process of subjectification, “a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs 
of power linked to the nation-state and civil society.” In her comparative study of 
Cambodian refugees and affluent Chinese cosmopolitans in the state of California, Ong 
(1996:741) demonstrates how Asian Americans have been variously socialized by and 
positioned to manipulate state institutions, religious organizations, civilian groups, and 
market forces that have inscribed them as racialized and gendered citizens of differential 
worth. For Khmer immigrant women, the welfare state system and Mormon church 
organizations provided opportunities for them to challenge traditional gender norms 
within the household, where women who receive welfare support have increased 
bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands and children. At the same time, these public 
and private institutions have rendered immigrant women victims of domestic abuse who 
are dependent on public welfare.  
On the other hand, wealthy overseas Chinese strategically manage their 
membership as investor-immigrants and professionals who shuttle back and forth 
between California and the Pacific (Ong 1996: 748). Yet there are cultural limits to how 
they construct their subjectivity as globe-trotting cosmopolitans especially when they 
come in conflict with American local values and norms about civic behavior. To some 
extent, these affluent Chinese as transnational cosmopolitans are able to evade 
disciplining by the state but when it comes to local racialized battles over neighborhood 




fashion themselves as cosmopolitans as opposed to racialized Chinese subjects. The 
entanglements between race, gender and class thus operate to position and marginalize 
immigrants into the single homogenized category of “Asian American.”  
Adopting this conceptualization of citizenship as a process of subjectification and 
self-making, Rhacel Parrenas (2001b: 1130), partial citizenship refers “to the stunted 
integration of migrants in receiving nation-states,” and is the outgrowth of globalization 
and inequalities in the global system which relies on the labor provided by domestic 
workers and other low-wage laborers. While partial citizenship differs based on the 
policies of receiving countries, it is characterized by the fact that partial citizens lack 
many basic rights, such as family unification, reproductive rights (where pregnancy is 
grounds for deportation in some countries), and labor rights which subject them to 
substandard living conditions and even confinement within the homes of their employers. 
Partial citizenship however, is not just imposed Filipina domestic workers, but 
also constructed by the Filipinas who take advantage of their privileged status vis-à-vis 
the Philippines. Regarded by the home country as economic “heroes” who sustain the 
national economy by sending back remittances, Filipinas gain a sense of entitlement, 
which reinforces their nationalist identity, even as partial citizens (Parrenas 2001:1136). 
Furthermore, migrant domestic workers have constructed their own imagined global 
community that transgresses the nation-state: a diaspora that is connected through several 
transnational projects. These transnational projects include the circulation of ethnic goods, 
nonprofits that provide support services for members of the diaspora, multinational 
households, and widely circulating publications that link together multiple migrant 
communities located in different transnational spaces. The creation of a community based 




nation-state and represents the political potential for the creation of an even larger 
“imagined” global community of migrant workers (Parrenas 2001:1131). 
The treatment of citizenship as a socio-cultural process of subject making and 
self-making demonstrates how citizenship is dialectically constructed by citizens and 
institutional structures such as markets, civil societies, and states. On the other hand, 
focusing too much on the cultural dimension of citizenship runs the risk of reifying it 
without adequately scrutinizing what it is and how it operates. Ong (1996:739) 
characterizes citizenship in the U.S. as a cultural process of “whitening” that is rooted in 
the Western experience of imperialism and slavery; it is this racialization that has shaped 
the construction of Asian immigrants. Ong’s treatment of culture however, tends to 
conflate culture with race without properly teasing out how one feeds upon the other and 
how definitions of race and culture have changed over time. Such a static treatment of 
culture ultimately leaves only residual room for immigrants to negotiate a self, where the 
emphasis is on how immigrants are made into passive racialized subjects.  
Also missing in Ong’s framework is how the pre-existing cultural identities of 
immigrants get translated in the negotiation of racial and cultural boundaries in the host 
countries. As Parrenas’s study demonstrates, the cultural affinities and sense of national 
identity embraced by Filipina domestic workers can reinforce the construction of their 
selves as partial citizens despite being far away from the territorial “home.” In other 
words, a cultural approach to citizenship needs to take into account how immigrants 
negotiate multiple cultural boundaries across space and time. 
Strategic Approaches: Citizenship as Strategy 
A third body of literature approaches citizenship by focusing on the strategies 




and conflictual power relations at both the local and transnational levels. Because of their 
dependence on men is grounded in unequal family and work relations, immigrant women 
are often regarded as those who are deprived of individual autonomy and various rights. 
Migrant brides in particular are in a unique position because as spouses of citizens, they 
are especially vulnerable to abuses that occur in the private, less visible settings of 
intimacy. Since their legal status and citizenship rights are tied to their marital status, 
many immigrant women have endured abusive and violent relationships in order to 
maintain their legal status. On the other hand, the sphere of the family also affords some 
immigrant women with the means, or a “vantage point” to contest and negotiate their 
location within a particular citizenship regime (R. Ito 2005). For instance, as members of 
families, immigrant women are embedded in social relations and networks that enable 
them to access rights, including employment and residency which can eventually lead to 
the expansion of their citizenship rights.    
Focusing on Vietnamese immigrant brides in Singapore, Brenda Yeoh et al (2013) 
examines how these women challenge the dominant rubric of citizenship based on state-
delineated divisions among Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Other (CMIO) ethnic categories. 
As an ethnic subject who does not fit neatly into these categories, Vietnamese wives of 
Singaporean citizens engage in a privatized strategy within the realm of the family to 
create a pathway to residency rights.  For immigrant women, the permanent resident (PR) 
status is not simply a change in legal status but a strategy for gaining paid work, possible 
healthcare benefits and an independent source of income (Yeoh et al 2013:149). In the 
face of weak or partial incorporation by the host state, maintaining “citizenship” in the 
marital home constitutes an act of resilience and defiance that leads to the eventual 




strategic act to gain incorporation in the host society. Once the immigrant wife secures a 
PR status, she gains bargaining power within the marriage which can lead to a measure of 
independence from the marital family. It is through these “everyday practices of 
belonging to a family that reflect the interplay of being part of different local and social 
settings in different political and geographical locations that constitute “strategies of 
simultaneity” (Yeoh et al 2013:151). Such “strategies of simultaneity” demonstrate that 
marriage migrants are simultaneously negotiating their citizenship rights in the sphere of 
family, civil society and state as well as via the sending and receiving countries.  
In his discussion of Vietnamese immigrant wives in Taiwan, Hong-zen Wang 
(2007) discusses how Vietnamese migrant women engage in strategies of resistance 
through “hidden spaces” which stem from their position within abnormal social relations 
and contexts. According to Wang (2007:715), Vietnamese brides are dis-embedded from 
the host society because they engage in commodified marriage practices that in turn allow 
them to escape from some of the social norms forced upon women in Taiwan. These 
“hidden spaces of resistance” exist within the family as evidenced by the immigrant 
wives’ manipulation of their intimate relations with their husbands. Threats to leave the 
marriage by immigrant wives is sometimes an effective strategy because the men and 
their families have invested a considerable amount of money into the marriage and are 
not willing to have the immigrant bride, an important provider of unpaid care labor, leave 
the family. Hidden spaces of resistance are also forged outside of the family when 
Vietnamese immigrants purchase mobile phones and communicate with other immigrant 
brides and create social networks outside the reach of the family through their visits to 




Additionally, the refusal to naturalize and acquire the citizenship of her spouse 
can itself constitute a strategy of resistance. In her study of Filipina migrant wives in 
Korea, sociologist Minjeong Kim (2013:473) argues that the refusal of some Filipina 
mothers to acquire Korean citizenship constitutes a “maternal strategy” that disrupts, 
subverts, or resists the patriarchal and ethno-nationalist impetus of their incorporation. 
These studies highlight the fact that immigrant wives albeit disempowered, do have 
weapons of resistance at their disposal to strategically negotiate their citizenship rights.   
 As a strategic tool, citizenship is not only a practice of resistance and subversion, 
but also an object of negotiation. In their comparative study of foreign domestic workers 
in Canada, Daiva Stasiulis and Abigail Bakan (2003, 1997) bring to light how even the 
most vulnerable and exploited migrants employ creative and effective strategies to 
negotiate with multiple gatekeepers, such as immigration officials, private interests, and 
employers at the global and nationals level. First, by focusing on how Canadian policies 
deny foreign domestic workers from the Caribbean and the Philippines basic citizenship 
rights, including the protection of labor rights, Stasiulis and Bakan (2003) de-bunk the 
myth of Canada as the poster child for liberal multiculturalism. Despite the embrace of 
official multicultural policies beginning in the 1970s, Canadian policies have denied 
basic labor rights as well as access to citizenship rights for migrant domestic workers.  
Despite their lack of rights, domestic workers even those who are undocumented, 
can and do negotiate better living and workplace conditions. For example, domestic 
workers have at times persuaded their employers to spare them from the live-in 
requirement which is mandated by the Live-in Care Provider program instituted by the 
Canadian government to regulate the entry and exit of migrant domestic workers 




provided domestic workers with a place of rest, privacy and thus a degree of autonomy 
from their employers and from the Canadian government. Despite negotiating with 
gatekeepers within a highly unequal global capitalist system where women from poor 
under-developed countries supply cheap domestic and care labor under unequal terms and 
conditions, West Indian and Filipina domestic workers have tools of resistance at their 
disposal to negotiate their citizenship which have led to the incremental expansion of 
rights. 
 Of the three approaches, studies that focus on the strategic and calculated actions 
undertaken by migrants offer valuable insights as to why migrants may be able to 
circumvent restrictive immigration and citizenship policies. While the strategic approach 
to citizenship demonstrates that migrant women even as non-citizens exercise negotiating 
power, it is also important to recognize that the ability of women to engage in strategic 
acts and transform their citizenship is conditioned by their partial or incomplete 
incorporation as non-citizens. Furthermore, membership in the family, whether as 
immigrant wives or domestic workers, can serve as a vantage point, but also a place of 
oppression for immigrant women. While existing studies have emphasized the ways 
“strategies of resistance” can be unexpectedly empowering for some, a more 
comprehensive account of migrant women’s rights needs to highlight the failures as well 
as the successes that come from these strategic struggles by focusing on the structural 
constraints as well as the opportunities for their political engagement.   
Citizenship as a Negotiated Relationship 
Building from Daiva Stasilius and Abigail Bakan (2003:2), who define citizenship 
as “a negotiated relationship,” I treat citizenship as the product of active and ongoing 




Citizenship entails negotiation across three dimensions: 1) policies and institutions that 
regulate how citizens and noncitizens access rights; 2) an array of rights, including 
human rights; 3) memberships that include the family, civil society as well as the state.  
At any given time, states, intermediary organizations (local governments, civil society 
organizations, transnational advocacy networks), and individuals negotiate these different 
dimensions to produce overlapping and at times contradictory practices and meanings of 
citizenship.  
While most scholarship regards citizenship as entailing equal rights and duties for 
those who hold the status, feminist approaches have pointed to how access to rights has 
been far from equal.  For one, men and women access rights differently due in large part 
to the gendered division of labor. TH Marshall’s (1950) study of the development of 
modern citizenship was based on men’s access to social rights through their waged labor. 
As Norwegian scholar and politician Helga Hernes (1988:190) notes, “the social-
democratic citizen is the citizen worker, a male family provider, a working-class hero. 
His rights, identities and participation patterns were determined by his ties to the labor 
market, and by the web of associations and corporate structures which had grown up 
around these ties.” In short, employment and access to paid work has been the key 
criterion in the development and expansion of citizenship for men (Pateman 1988b). 
Meanwhile, the unpaid labor of women who until recent history were denied the 
right to work has shaped women’s access to rights. Women’s unpaid labor includes not 
only reproduction but providing care to children, the elderly, and the sick which many 
women are expected to perform without pay. For the most part, the unpaid labor of 
women in providing care has been compulsory where married women in particular cannot 




women’s claims to the welfare state and access to social rights have been legitimated first 
and foremost by their familial or marital roles as dependents of men, rather than as 
individuals (Siim 2000, Orloff 1993). By regulating women’s access to rights through 
mechanisms that deny or grant rights such as population and family policies, citizenship 
is a gendered institution that structures the relations between the state and women as well 
as between men and women. 
The institution of citizenship not only shapes and constructs a certain gendered 
citizen but is reshaped by women and men who seek to contest and negotiate a more 
equal and inclusive citizenship.  Citizenship, by structuring the relations between the state 
and individuals on the one hand and enabling individuals to reshape citizenship on the 
other, is thus a negotiated relationship. As citizens and as noncitizens, women have 
actively sought to reshape citizenship by organizing for equal rights, such as the right to 





 centuries focused on women’s suffrage, and in the case of the American women’s 
movement, the abolition of slavery. Women have not only demanded rights that have 
been granted to men, but also organized around rights that are specific to women (i.e. 
women’s rights) based on their sexual difference such as reproductive rights and the right 
to abortion. Moreover, influenced by the global movement on human rights, women have 
sought to reshape citizenship by re-conceptualizing women’s rights as human rights in 
more recent decades (Keck and Sikkink 1998). By demanding that states have a 
responsibility to prevent the abuse of women’s human rights, such as wartime rape, 
domestic violence, and trafficking, women have redefined women’s rights as human 




Women, including noncitizen women, have also shaped citizenship policies and 
practices by looking beyond state membership to negotiate their autonomy and rights in 
multiple spheres, including the so-called private sphere. As a membership organization, 
citizenship is generally associated with being a member of a nation-state and thus 
belonging to a single community (Brubaker 1992). Accordingly, noncitizens are those 
who are “outsiders” based on their lack of membership, whose quest for citizenship is 
associated with expanding the boundaries of state membership. Yet, women who are 
already members of the state have not aimed to reshape citizenship by focusing on their 
state membership but on their unequal memberships in the family and within civil society. 
In short, women’s exclusion from citizenship cannot be fully understood without an 
examination of their unequal status in different membership communities, especially the 
family. The reshaping of citizenship is thus intimately tied to addressing women’s 
unequal membership in multiple spheres where citizenship is ultimately about individual 
autonomy and rights allowed to citizens vis-à-vis their different memberships (Yuval-
Davis 1997b).  
Lastly, the impact that women have on shaping citizenship is ultimately structured 
by the material and ideological construction of nationhood which involves specific 
articulations of womanhood. As Rogers Brubaker (1992) has forcefully argued, different 
patterns of self-understanding, or nationhood, have shaped citizenship politics. 
Furthermore, understandings of nationhood are heavily gendered constructs that rely on 
women to both biologically and culturally reproduce the nation in a certain way. As such, 
women’s citizenship has had a dual nature: inclusion in the general body of citizens but 




the mutually constitutive relationship between gender and nation means that citizenship is 
inherently gendered (Walby 1994). 
The Paradox of Citizenship: the Price of Rights 
For women, the institution of citizenship presents a paradox: they are included as 
citizens but excluded as women (Voet 1998: 26, Hobson 2002). In other words, the very 
construction of citizenship rests on the exclusion of women. Characterized by Carole 
Pateman as “Wollstonecraft’s dilemma,” women cannot become equal citizens as women 
because citizenship demands that they become like men (Pateman 1988a). The 
contradictions of citizenship mean that the exclusion of women cannot simply be 
corrected by their formal incorporation but that it requires a re-conceptualization of 
citizenship itself (Lister, 2003: 38).  
It is no surprise then that recent attempts by countries to include women into 
formal institutions and encourage their civic, political, and economic participation have 
not correlated with significant improvements in gender equality. For instance, Japan 
which among advanced industrialized has long been noted for its low measures of gender 
equality, has recently espoused the inclusion of women under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe. Based on the understanding that the inclusion of women is the key 
to facilitating economic growth, “Abenomics” has specifically targeted expanding 
opportunities for women to participate in leadership positions in both the political and the 
corporate world (Tyson 2013). However, critics have pointed to the fact that these 
initiatives in the face of a strong corporate and societal culture where the majority of 
women leave the workplace after childbirth, fall significantly short of what is needed to 




Similarly, governments in Europe have recently demonstrated a commitment to 
including women and expanding their participation in the public sphere. For example, the 
Italian government under former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi appointed an 
unprecedented number of women to cabinet-level positions. Berlusconi’s cabinet formed 
in 2008 had six female members, including a former beauty queen, Mara Carfagna. 
Italy’s incumbent Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, to date has appointed eight women to 
the cabinet (Cohen 2014). Despite these notable efforts, gender inequality in Italy 
remains one of the highest within Europe.  According to the European Gender Equality 
Index, female employment rates in Italy are consistently low, where women are over-
represented in irregular and precarious jobs.  
In short, the gendered construction of citizenship cannot be rectified simply by the 
formal incorporation of women. Rather than treat incorporation as a normative ideal, 
there is a need to question how incorporation for certain groups can constitute a trade-off 
that rests upon inequalities not just between men and women, but also between different 
groups of women. As my discussion of the link between human rights and citizenship 
illustrates, women’s claim to human rights for migrant women came at a costly price for 
migrant women who have been constructed as victimized subjects who require paternal 
care and the watchful protection of the state. When they are incorporated and extended 
rights on the basis of their victimhood, migrant women are deprived of agency and 
thereby become exceptions to the rule, subjects who are inherently unequal. 
Furthermore, in exchange for their incorporation, migrant women are expected to 
provide reproductive labor for their families. For instance, migrant women who do not 
willingly take on their roles as obliging wives and dutiful mothers are regarded with 




and family are morally suspect. Ironically, these demands made upon migrant women go 
against the patriarchal ideals of family and womanhood that Korean women have long 
struggled against and for the most part, no longer embrace. As my examination of 
immigrant incorporation in Korea shows, access to citizenship does not necessarily lead 
to equality and empowerment for migrant women. When incorporation works to 







Population Anxieties, Family Policies, and Multicultural Families:  
Women as Care Providers 
 
 
The intersections between the contemporary welfare state and women’s 
movements that demanded greater social rights for women led to the emergence of a 
broad range of social policies known as family polices (O’Connor 1999, Huber 2001). In 
the late 1990s, most European countries began to design and implement family policies to 
support women’s employment and the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities 
by providing resources to assist families, including family allowances, expanded parental 
leave, and funding for childcare institutions (Castles 2003). These policies have ranged 
from childcare provisions to various initiatives that encourage women’s employment as 
well as monetary compensation for their unpaid care labor, and have often overlapped 
with other policy domains such as employment, education, welfare, and gender. 
Increasingly, countries facing population decline including Japan and Korea have also 
implemented family policies, where changes in gender relations and demographic 
patterns have stimulated the expansion of previously underdeveloped welfare states 
(Roberts 2005, P. Ito 2002, Kwon 2005).  
By regulating their access to social rights, family policies can shed light on the 
ways the state seeks to incorporate women as citizens (Jenson 1995, Siim 2000, Bier 
2010). On the one hand, family policies have facilitated a more egalitarian citizenship for 
women by expanding social rights, especially for working women with children. By 
promoting women’s participation in the labor force, family policies have encouraged 
women to push for more rights not only as mothers, but as workers and as citizens. On 




women’s rights because they can work to privilege families with a male wage earner. 
Furthermore, by conditioning women’s access to rights via their roles as mothers and 
wives, family policies can strengthen the link between women’s citizenship and 
motherhood and childbearing (Jenson 1986, Pederson 1993). In short, the tensions 
between family policies and women’s citizenship demonstrate the need to distinguish 
between the “different logics behind types of family policies” by carefully examining 
how family policies have been formulated by the state (Siim 2000:59).  
Similar to Japan and Taiwan, Korea’s record low birth rates and rapid aging have 
forced state actors to seriously grapple with the prospect of impending population decline 
(S. Lee 2009, Park and Cho 1995). Although the Japanese and Taiwanese governments 
have attempted to respond to demographic trends through pro-natalist initiatives, the 
expansion of childcare provisions, and the acceptance of temporary foreign workers, 
neither country has opted to incorporate immigrants as a response to downward 
demographic trends (Chen 2012, P. Ito 2004, Mason 2001). In Korea, the government 
responded to population decline through the adoption of family policies, including a 
“multicultural family policy” that targets the incorporation of foreign women married to 
its citizens. Why did Korea, unlike Japan and Taiwan, respond to its population woes by 
instituting family policies aimed at incorporating migrant women?  
In this chapter, I explain the process by which the Korean state seeks to 
incorporate marriage migrant women as members of Korean society through an 
examination of family policies. I trace the evolution of family policies, beginning with 
the family planning policies in the 1960s to the multicultural family support policies in 
the present day. I argue that family policies demonstrate the resilience of state efforts to 




between citizenship and their unpaid labor as the primary providers of care for families. 
By fostering private-public partnerships that continue to mobilize women to take on the 
primary responsibility of providing care and welfare in both the public and private 
spheres, the state has effectively privatized the burden of social care and welfare onto 
Korean and migrant women.  
In the first section, I examine the origins of family policies by turning to the 
state’s family planning programs which were instituted in the 1960s. In the second 
section, I link the expansion of a women’s policy fostered by democratization and the 
growth of the women’s movement on the one hand with a growing discourse on families 
in “crisis” which paved the way for conservative coalitions to push for family policies on 
the other hand. Third, I analyze the contested emergence of a family policy that 
emphasizes the normative “healthy” family by demanding women’s roles as care 
providers which reveals tensions between conservative and progressive social forces over 
how to address issues concerning the family. The fourth section discusses how 
multicultural families became the focus of family policies amid growing national anxiety 
over population decline. The last section discusses how family policies have created 
opportunities for women to participate as providers of welfare provisions for families and 
thereby continued to place the burden of socially reproducing “normative” families onto 
women. 
Family Planning as Women’s Civic Duty 
The historical origins of family policy in Korea are rooted in the family planning 
programs that were instituted by the Park Chung-Hee authoritarian regime as part of the 
population control policy in the 1960s. Acknowledged as one of the most successful 




the mass mobilization and participation of housewives and rural women to implement 
and monitor contraceptive use. As family planning agents and members of Mother’s 
Clubs, women, mostly housewives, were expected to be responsible reproducers and 
household managers (S. Moon 2005, Park 1976). At the same time, an unintended 
consequence of these family planning programs was that through their participation, 
women became active participants in rural and local community activities (J. Lee 2014).  
Many developing countries, such as Brazil, Taiwan and Egypt, adopted family 
planning as a form of population control in the 1960s and 1970s. In the context of the 
Cold War, the US and her allies regarded overpopulation in the non-industrialized Third 
World as the cause of poverty and a breeding ground for communism (Greenhalgh 
1996).
11
 International organizations such as the World Bank, USAID, and UNFDP 
increased funding for demographic research to be conducted by organizations such as the 
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and the Population Council which 
exerted pressure on the governments of developing countries to adopt family planning 
programs as a condition for economic aid (Donaldson 1990). Moreover, population 
control aimed at facilitating economic growth had particular appeal to authoritarian 
leaders who adopted family planning measures as part of their economic development 
strategies in places such as Taiwan (1959), Egypt (1960), Korea (1962), Brazil (1977), 
Bangladesh (1978), and China (1980) (Robinson 2007).  
In Korea, the military regime under Park Chung-hee (1960-79) integrated family 
planning policies into its economic development strategy (S. Moon 2005). In 1962, 
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Korea’s population growth rate of 3 percent superseded the economic growth rate which 
was recorded at 2.6 percent. The Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea (hereafter 
PPFK) created in 1961 with assistance from the IPPF, was an influential advocate of the 
family planning program.  In 1962, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction 
(SCNP) consisting of the leaders of the military junta, appointed Yang Jae Mo, a medical 
doctor and one of the founding members of the PPFK to formulate population control 
initiatives. Yang presented statistical data to policymakers that pointed to a figure of $2 
billion that could be gained by 1971 through successful family planning (Yang 1966: 
307). Not only would family planning bring economic gains, Yang (1977: 64) argued it 
would improve maternal and child health, the welfare of the family, and overall social 
stability. Soon thereafter, the members of the Supreme Council unanimously accepted 
family planning as a strategy of economic development. Family planning was adopted as 
official policy in December 1961 and it became integrated into the 2
nd
 Five Year 
Economic Plan in 1967.   
Under authoritarian rule, family planning represented the “single most important 
policy for women” (S. Moon 2005:81). The goal of the family planning program was 
quite simply to reduce the natural increase in population by imposing widespread 
contraceptive use on the population, primarily women’s contraceptive use. Beginning 
with a population growth rate of 3 percent in 1961, the PPFK aimed to reduce the 
population growth rate to 2.5 percent (1966), 2 percent (1971), 1.5 percent (1976), and 
1.3 (1981). The PPFK set yearly quotas for how many couples would have to comply 
with contraceptive use to reach the targeted population growth rate. In 1966, proclaimed 
by the government as the “Great Year of Family Planning,” state planners set the goal at 




years, contraceptive use and sterilizations were coupled with incentives such as housing 
loans, monetary support and subsidized health costs to families with one or two children. 
Mobilizing women to implement and monitor contraceptive use lay at the crux of 
the family planning program. In particular, “family planning agents” (kajok kyehoek 
yowŏn) enabled the state to monitor citizens’ contraceptive use down to the level of the 
smallest administrative unit. Recruited by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
(MHSA) beginning in 1964, these agents were often local residents in the towns and 
villages to which they were assigned. While some had training as nurses’ aides, a 
considerable number was without experience or qualifications (Yang 1977:70). 
Nevertheless, these women were dispatched to local health clinics (pokŏnso) across the 
nation to introduce the idea and practice of contraception and to monitor their use by 
interacting intimately with the local residents. Each agent was given a quota of residents 
whose contraceptives use had to be reported through regularly attended meetings with the 
county manager, an employee of the MHSA. Issuing free IUD insertion coupons that 
could be claimed at the local health clinic, and holding demonstrations of how to use a 
condom, these family planning agents promoted contraception as a form of “patriotic 
duty,” where contraceptive use constituted a performance of civic duty (Yi 1989). 
Throughout the 1970s, the state continued to recruit the family planning agents and by 
1975, the central government had dispatched nearly 2,570 family planning agents around 
the country (Yang 1977:70).  
Family planning agents were critical to securing compliance from rural families 
who were unfamiliar with the idea of contraception. The 2006 Korean film, “Mission Sex 
Control,” (Jal salabose) which chronicles the travails of a young family planning agent 




from the population. The protagonist Hyun-joo is sent from Seoul to a remote rural 
village that has been the most resistant to family planning directives. In her first town hall 
meeting with the local residents, Hyun-joo attempts to explain what family planning is 
only to be met with blank stares from the villagers. When they finally understand why 
she has come to their village, the audience erupts in unruly indignant anger. One livid 
elderly woman points to her pregnant daughter-in-law asking Hyun-joo, “with only two 
granddaughters in my family, who will honor the ancestors?”
12
 Despite Hyun-joo’s 
attempts to convince the villagers that family planning is a state project, the villagers 
disperse to their homes, refusing to believe that the state would make such absurd 
demands on the people. Over time however, Hyun-joo is able to secure the trust of the 
villagers who begin to practice conception for various different reasons. The film thus 
demonstrates the critical role played by the family planning agents as intermediaries 
between the state apparatus and the rural population. 
Furthermore, family planning programs mandated that rural women be organized 
in Family Planning Mothers’ Clubs (hereafter Mother’s Clubs) which unexpectedly came 
to serve as the basis of rural women’s participation in their communities. Recognizing 
that many of the family planning agents were overburdened because each agent was 
responsible for serving approximately 2,200 couples, the PPFK with authority from the 
MHSA began organizing rural women into collectives in 1968  (Park 1976). These 
collectives called Mother’s Clubs aimed to better utilize existing interpersonal 
communication networks and local leadership to legitimize family planning practices 
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among rural communities. Initially, the village leader appointed the women who would 
participate based on their standing and repute within the village, and the clubs were 
limited in size to approximately ten to twelve members. By the end of 1968, the first year 
of creating Mothers’ Clubs, there were over 12,650 clubs; by 1975, the number had 
grown to over 28,000, involving over 700,000 women from Korea’s rural villages (H. 
Park 1976:276).   
While Mother’s Clubs were organized in the urban areas, their roles were not as 
prominent as in the rural communities, where women had rather limited opportunities to 
participate in public life. The Mother’s Clubs met at least once a month to report on any 
notable changes, to gather information and receive training. As with the family planning 
agents, the clubs did not take part in any decision making, but served to implement 
directives from male county and provincial managers. 
Contrary to the expectations of state planners, the Mothers’ Clubs did not focus 
solely on monitoring family planning, but they engaged in local development by re-
directing some the allocated funds acquired through local sales of IUDs into development 
projects, such as the construction of village meeting halls, holding festivals for the elderly, 
and maintaining public facilities.
13
 The successful mobilization of women’s voluntary 
labor into rural development through the Mother’s Clubs served as the inspiration for the 
New Village (Saemaul Undong) Movement which President Park launched in 1972 to 
mobilize voluntary labor for the purposes of rural development.
14
 In order to more 
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 The New Village Movement was an initiative begun by Park Chung- Hee which aimed to revitalize and 
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efficiently coordinate these women’s mass organizations, the Park regime merged the 
Mothers’ Clubs with the New Village Women’s Association in 1977, which become the 
most influential state-administered women’s organization in the period leading up to 
democratization. These mass organizations were used for not only implementing state-led 
initiatives but also for “inculcating political loyalty to the authoritarian regime” (Chung 
and Gupta 2007: 763, S. Moon 2002: 489). Family planning programs that relied on the 
mass participation of women thus highlight “the importance and effectiveness of 
women’s organization as a channel through which to accomplish national projects” (J. 
Lee 2014: 284).  
In 1988, the family planning program achieved its primary objective of reducing 
the fertility rate when total fertility rate (TRF) was recorded to be below that of the 
replacement level (S. Lee 2009: 62). Since then, the fertility rate has continued to remain 
below replacement level dropping to one of the lowest in the developed world [see Table 
3.1 below]. In the 1990s, the successful realization of population control objectives and a 
transition to democracy in 1987 which constrained the state’s ability to mobilize the 
population through coercive means prompted the Korean government to re-evaluate its 
family planning policies. A Population Policy Deliberation Committee was established in 
1994 to review the status of population policy which led to the officially phasing out of 
family planning in 1996 and the adoption of a new policy that emphasized reproductive 
health care services, as opposed to sterilizations.  
State planners thus sought to facilitate economic growth by decreasing the birth 
rate through population control. Whether as individual family planning agents or 
organized groups of mothers, women disproportionately took on the burden of 




women made possible the attainment of state-directed goals, but also contributed to rural 
and local development by providing opportunities for women to direct resources into 
community projects. 
TABLE 3.1 TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (TFR), 1960-1995 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 
Total Fertility 
Rate (average) 
6.00 4.51 2.73 1.7 1.64 
Source: National Statistics Office, Korea 
 
The Expansion of Women’s Rights and the Family in “Crisis”  
The 1980s and 90s were marked by two contrasting shifts that shaped state efforts 
to incorporate women. The first was the growing recognition of women as citizens with 
equal rights which was fueled by the demands of the grassroots women’s movement. 
Beginning in the 1970s, women factory workers began to form grassroots organizations 
that protested against the exploitation of factory workers, and by the late 1980s, women’s 
groups formed an inter-class coalition that joined forces with other labor and student 
groups to participate in mass protest against the authoritarian regime (S. and K. Kim 2011, 
S. Moon 2005, Louie 1995). Meanwhile, Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-88), Park Chung-Hee’s 
successor began to bend to international pressures to acknowledge rights for women by 
ratifying the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) in 1984. With the onset of civilian rule in 1993 under Kim Young Sam and 
the first progressive candidate Kim Dae Jung, to come to power in 1998, the Korean 
government continued to oversee the expansion of a women’s policy aimed at fostering 
gender equality.  
The second shift came from the political need to weather the social impact of 
economic liberalizations that registered widely as families in “crisis.” In particular, the 




care provision onto women and families and the emergence of a socially conservative 
coalition that increasingly voiced the need for state intervention in supporting families. 
By the early 2000s, the focus had shifted away from women’s policy aimed at the 
attainment of gender equality to family policies that worked to reassert families and 
women as the primary providers of care and individual welfare. 
The Growth of Women’s Policy 
The military regime under Chun Doo-Hwan whose legitimacy was increasingly 
questioned by international society found it difficult to avoid international pressures for 
economic liberalization as well as integration into the international community (K. Kim 
2002). Under Chun and his successor, Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1993), the Korean state 
adopted a women-in-development (WID) approach that had been propagated by the UN 
since it declared 1975 the International Women’s Year (S. and K. Kim 2014). The WID 
approach paid attention to the role of women alienated during the course of economic 
development by focusing on women’s welfare, health, and relief from poverty. Attention 
to women’s concerns led to the establishment of the Korea Women’s Development 
Institute (KWDI) in 1983, a government-operated research think-tank which continues to 
work closely with government agencies to formulate policies related to women (S. Moon 
2000).  
During this time, grassroots women’s movements began to coalesce in opposition 
to the authoritarian regime and to demand social and political transformation. In contrast 
to the administered mass organizations (AMOs) like the National Association of Korean 
Wives, the Federation of Housewives’ Clubs and the New Village Women’s Association 
that dominated women’s civic participation in the 1970s, these organizations increasingly 




towards women. One of the first attempts to create an independent women’s organization 
came with the establishment of Womenlink (yŏsŏng pyungwuhoe), which was founded by 
feminist intellectuals in 1983.
15
 In its founding speech, Womenlink members stated, “Our 
movement addresses the suffering of all women, including urban and rural women, 
workers, housewives, and youths. Our sufferings may differ by class but these problems 
facing women can only be solved by forging a genuine democratic society” (Womenlink 
1983). Under this grassroots organization, different groups of women with different 
interests were united in their push for democratization. Women’s groups formed an even 
bigger coalition with the founding of the Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU, 
or Han’guk yŏsŏng danche yonhap hoe) in 1987. After transition to formal democracy in 
1987 when president-elect Roh Tae-Woo adopted an eight-point reform package that 
included direct presidential elections, the women’s movement began to diversify and 
address a broad range of issues aimed at expanding rights for women based on women’s 
specific needs and interests. As Kim Kyounghui (2002:20) notes, the women’s movement 
during this time began to break away from previous frames that focused on the 
oppression of women to one where women were situated as those who actively 
“transform and create a new society.”  
Increasingly, women’s policy moved away from narrow questions of women’s 
welfare in relation to development to focus on broader questions of gender equality, 
which led to the passage of legislation that sought to abolish discrimination against 
women and to include women into the state machinery. The first civilian government 
under the leadership of Kim Young-Sam (1993-98) responded to grassroots pressures 
from the women’s movement by incorporating more women into positions of power. 
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Under Kim’s tenure, a record number of women were appointed to cabinet-level posts: 
Hwang San-seong (Ministry of the Environment), Park Yang-shil (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare), and Kwon Young-ja (Ministry of Political Affairs). Kim further went on to set 
up a bureau for women’s affairs under the secretariat of the President and to establish a 
special committee on women’s affairs in the National Assembly which was assigned with 
deliberating on legislation involving women. For instance, the passage of the Framework 
Act on Women’s Development (Yŏsŏngbalchŏn'gibonbŏp) in 1995 outlined the basic 
objectives of women’s policies as “the realization of gender equality, the promotion of 
women’s participation in society and the enhancement of women’s welfare (Article 3).”  
The women’s movement and the state found points of convergence in their joint 
promotion of gender mainstreaming beginning in 1995, which was a strategy promoted 
by the United Nations to mainstream women’s policies in all areas of social, political and 
economic life. In short, the 1990s was marked by a shift in the relationship between the 
state and the women’s movement from one of opposition and contestation to cooperation 
and negotiation, resulting in a women’s policy that increasingly focused on gender 
equality and women’s rights (S. Moon 2002).  
Women’s policy continued to expand in the latter half of the 1990s as the 
women’s movement became further institutionalized through close relations with the 
state (S. and K. Kim 2011). In 1998, Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003) became the first 
progressive candidate to assume the Presidency and his administration prioritized gender 
discrimination as a matter of the national agenda. Upon taking office in 1998, Kim 
established the Presidential Commission on Women’s Affairs (PCWA) as a new 
government institution in charge of coordinating women’s policies, which marked the 




dispatched an officer in charge of women’s policies to all the different ministries. Under 
Kim, a record number of women including intellectuals who majored in women’s studies 
and activists with experience in the women’s movement entered formal politics as 
political appointees, members of political parties, and leaders in local governments. In 
2001, Kim elevated the PCWA to a cabinet-level ministry, and established the Ministry 
of Gender Equality (MGE). To head the ministry, Kim appointed Han Myeong-sook a 
former women’s activist who later became Korea’s first female Prime Minister in 2006. 
For the women’s movement, the creation of the Ministry provided an institutionalized 
channel to articulate women’s concerns and needs.  
From Women to Family Policy  
Even as women’s policy expanded, there was a growing public discourse that 
increasingly brought political attention to the family as an institution under crisis. Three 
different factors contributed to this growing sense of crisis. The first came in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis during which time the discourse of “family breakdown” 
came to explain all the social ills that manifested during economic instability and 
financial hardship. A second factor was the broad demographic changes that the entire 
society was experiencing, including low marriage rates, high divorce rates, the delay or 
postponement of marriage, and low birth rates. The third facet of the crisis came from a 
backlash against a monumental reform to family law that abolished the decades-old 
family-head (hoju) system, one that mobilized powerful social conservatives to defend 
the family as a socio-cultural institution.    
First, the 1997 Asian financial crisis (known as the IMF crisis in Korea) and the 
structural reforms demanded by the IMF in exchange for the $55 million bail-out package 




resources and escalating the trend toward privatization (S. Moon 2002:128). The 
neoliberal policy measures instituted by the Korean government following the crisis saw 
the increase in irregular jobs, unemployment and increases in poverty rates that conflicted 
with the calls from the women’s movement to prioritize equal employment. From 1996 to 
1998, the unemployment rate more than tripled from 2 to 6.8 percent, while poverty rates 
in urban areas went from 7 to 21 percent (Kwon 2001:220). During the period of 
economic retrenchment following the crisis, the government re-privatized many public 
services for women, cutting back for instance on programs for unemployed women and 
support for victims of sexual violence (K. Kim 2002:31). Although the Kim Dae-Jung 
government expanded welfare provisions overall by expanding social insurance coverage 
and implementing new public assistance programs, it ultimately adopted a “productive” 
welfare policy which in effect “re-privatized” women’s roles as the main providers of 
individual security and welfare (J. Song 2006:40). 
16
 
During this period of economic hardship, the seeds of the discourse on “family 
breakdown” which problematized women’s employment and economic independence 
emerged. In her study of the social impact of the financial crisis, anthropologist Jesook 
Song (2009:52) argues that the discourse on “family breakdown” (kajeong haech’e) 
presumes employed men as the breadwinners of the family, women as keepers of the 
hearth, and the nuclear heterosexual family as the core of social well-being.” It 
denounced homosexuality, marital discord, illicit and extra-marital sexual relations, as 
well as women’s labor participation as sources of this breakdown. Yet, the financial 
needs of households demanded that women, including housewives seek employment in 
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order to support their families, sometimes replacing men as the main breadwinners of 
families (Kim and Finch 2002). These financially successful women were denounced as 
irresponsible mothers who abandoned their children in favor of “selfish” desires to work 
and seek personal achievement. Furthermore, the conservative ideology of family even 
manifested in the treatment of homeless women as “undeserving” of public protection 
driven by the notion that they were “bad” mothers who had left their homes and thus 
abandoned their children (J. Song 2006).  
Second, the discourse on family breakdown did not end with the recovery from 
the financial crisis but has remained and expanded in response to reported demographic 
trends. For one, public attention has focused on the number of divorces as a sign of the 
family in distress. While divorce was almost unheard of in the 1970s, the divorce rate 
increased over 250 percent from 1993 to 2003, spiking in the aftermath of the 1997 
financial crisis (NSO 2005). In 1970, the crude divorce rate was 0.4 and by 2004, it had 
risen to 2.9, fast becoming one of the highest in the world. Not only had the divorce rate 
increased, Korean women and men were overall found to be marrying later with a 
growing proportion of people foregoing marriage altogether (Tsuya 2004). Between 1970 
and 2004, the crude marriage rate had dropped from 9.2 to 6.4 marriages per 1,000 people 
(NSO 2005).  
Koreans have not only been marrying less, but also postponing marriage, where 
the average age of marriage for men has risen from 26.7 to 30.6 years of age between 
1972 and 2004, while for women it rose from 22.6 to 27.5 years of age during the same 
period. While marriage rates have declined, co-habitation as well as single-person 
households have increased significantly. In 2010, the National Statistics Office reported 




household (NSO 2014). These statistics have been constructed as indicators of the family 
as an institution in “crisis.”  
Third, the efforts of the women’s movement to abolish the family-head (hoju) 
system which had long posed as a barrier to gender equality triggered a conservative 
backlash from those who sought to preserve the system. Established as part of the Civil 
Code in 1912, the family head (hoju) system assigned the position of family head to 
males who inherited their positions through primogeniture (Nam 2010). As the basis for 
identifying citizens, the system defined the family in terms of the family members’ 
relationships to the male hoju and gave him authority over the family in matters of 
inheritance and other legal issues. Because women could not become a family head, their 
rights within the family were dependent on the male hoju, whether it was her father 
(before marriage) or husband. The system meant that women were denied civil rights in 
marriage and denied an equal status as citizens, whose rights were always subordinated to 
male kin.  
While women’s activists had engaged in efforts to reform the family law since the 
1960s, it was only after a landmark revision to the Nationality Law in 1997 that the 
women’s movement gained momentum to push for abolishing the family-head system 
(Nam 2010, S. and K. Kim 2014). The revision to the Nationality Law granted nationality 
to the children born to Korean mothers and foreign-born fathers, allowing citizenship to 
be inherited both through patrilineal and matrilineal lines (Chung and Kim 2012, H. Yang 
2011). In 1998, a women’s activist named Ko Un established the Citizens for the 
Abolition of the Family Head System (hojuje p’yejirul wihan siminui moim), a civic 
organization which engaged in coalition building with other women’s organizations over 




engaged in active grassroots campaigning and petitioning to secure popular support for 
abolishing the family head system. Due to these efforts, the Constitutional Court made a 
historic ruling in February 2005, that the family head system was unconstitutional which 
provided the political momentum needed for the National Assembly to pass the new 




Yet, the relentless efforts of the women’s movement in conjunction with the MGE 
to abolish the family head system provoked fierce opposition from conservative members 
of society, especially Confucian scholars who sought to defend the system by insisting on 
its value as a cultural institution. These conservatives waged sit-in protests in front of the 
MGE and the National Assembly to express their opposition to the abolition (Kim and 
Nam 2003). Feminists however, provided an alternative narrative, arguing that the hoju 
system was a product of Japanese colonial rule. By doing so, they were able to secure 
additional popular support from progressive legal scholars who joined the feminists in 
their struggle (Nam 2010:70). Although the women’s movement was ultimately 
successful in getting the hoju system abolished, the abolition of the system did not quell 
conservatives’ concerns that the family was under attack. Rather, conservative groups 
remained mobilized around a traditional ideology of the family that supported the push 
for the establishment of family policies.  
Instituting Family Policy: Making Families “Healthy”  
As the public fiercely debated the abolition of the hoju system, the NSO reported 
that the fertility rate had reached an all-time low of 1.17 children per woman in 2002, a 
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10 percent decrease from the previous year [see table 3.2 below].  Within Korea, 
researchers and media commentators widely referred to this phenomenon as the “1.17 
shock” (J. Lee 2004). Not only was the fertility rate in Korea below that of replacement 
level, it was the one of the lowest among OECD countries.
18
 Referring to fertility decline 
as the “greatest threat” to the country, newspapers reported that “population and fertility 
trends are a warning that the country is on the brink of decline. We will miss the 
opportunity to put the brakes on this national decline if we do not act fast and institute 
proper measures” (Chosun Ilbo, 24 September 2004).  Low birth rates were thus framed 
as threats to the very existence of the nation which require immediate and extensive state 
intervention.   
TABLE 3.2 TOTAL FERTILITY RATES (TFR), 1997-2007 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1.54 1.47 1.42 1.47 1.30 1.17 1.19 1.16 1.08 1.13 1.26 
Source: National Statistics Office, Korea 
Perceiving the revision of the family law and extremely low fertility rates as signs 
of the family under distress, several conservative groups mobilized to form a formidable 
coalition composed of the Korea Home Economics Association (Daehan kajeong 
hakhoe), the Korea Senior Citizens Association (Daehan noinhoe) and the Korea Healthy 
Family Action Campaign (Gungang gajeong silch’on undong ponbu). The Korea Home 
Economics Association (KHEA), established in 1947 has been a major promoter of home 
economics, a professional field that has been dominated by women. In the 1970s, the 
KHEA partnered closely with the state to support family planning initiatives through 
research and to disseminate information and provide training to women and housewives. 
In recent years however, home economics as an academic field had experienced a steep 
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decline in enrollment with the rise and expansion of women’s studies. The professional 
organization thus eyed the institution of family policy as an opportunity to rejuvenate the 
dying field (S. and K. Kim 2014:113).  
The Korea Healthy Family Action Campaign is a non-profit organization created 
in 2002 as a part of the ‘Christian Ethics Movement’ (kidokkyo yull’ri silchon undong) 
that was established in 1987 as a Protestant faith-based movement to strengthen Christian 
values in Korean society. The coalition also had the strong support of the Korea Senior 
Citizens Association which had been mobilized around strengthening the institution of 
family which was no longer a reliable source of elderly care. Led primarily by the KHEA, 
the coalition secured the support of the Ministry of Health and Welfare to propose the 
Framework Act to Support Healthy Families (Kŏn'ganggajŏnggibonbŏp) in the National 
Assembly in 2003.   
Although feminists regarded family policies as potentially beneficial for women, 
the Korea Women’s Association United (KWAU), the largest umbrella organization for 
women saw the proposed bill as a thinly disguised effort by conservatives to impose a 
normative ideology of a “healthy” family. These opponents called for a more expansive 
definition of the family, arguing that the legislation was based on promoting the 
heterosexual normative family linked by blood and adoptive ties as the main provider of 
care to individuals. The proposed bill defined the family (kajok) as the “social unit 
formed of marriage, blood-ties and adoption” and the household (kajeong) as “the 
community formed of members who participate together in the daily activities of 
subsistence, childcare, protection, and education (Article 3).” Pointing to different family 
arrangements that included single parent households, cohabitation, and children born out 




normative ‘healthy family’ rather than accommodate the changes to families and thus 
cannot properly address the myriad problems facing families today” (KWAU 2003). By 
imposing a normative and biased definition of a “healthy” family, Koreans feminists 
argued that the law would discriminate against “unhealthy” families (J. Lee, 2004).   
Furthermore, activists in the women’s movement argued that the various changes 
- low birth rates, rapid aging, and shifting family arrangements- should not be regarded as 
national “crises” requiring heavy state intervention, but acknowledged as changes that 
need to be accommodated through the expansion of appropriate welfare provisions. 
Opponents thus viewed the proposed bill as an attempt by conservatives to re-impose the 
traditional ideal of a patriarchal family onto society. Instead, feminists along with 
progressive-leaning social welfare professionals rallied to oppose the proposed bill by 
insisting that “family-related legislation embrace a new paradigm of the family whose 
policy content includes a gender-equal perspective” (KWAU 2003). 
Yet, the women’s movement was not united in its stance towards family issues 
and opposition to the bill did not fully coalesce until after the bill had already passed (S. 
and K. Kim 2014:95). The slow reaction from the women’s movement reflects the 
movement’s conflicted views on the family. One activist characterized family issues as 
the “Achilles heel” of the women’s movement, noting that: “women's activism has 
traditionally been separated into different fields such as environmental issues, gender 
policy, or women’s employment and have tended to stray away from the family because 
women haven’t been able to forge a united stance on the family (interview with Kang 
Seong-euy, 3 October 2012, Seoul).” Another women’s activist noted, “We feel 
uncomfortable discussing family issues. There have also been discussions about whether 




and K. Kim 2014: 95). Although the women’s movement had rallied to reform family law, 
they have remained divided as to whether the family should be a focus of the movement. 
The initial indecision and hesitation from grassroots activists meant that women’s 
organizations were unable to mobilize quickly to oppose the proposed legislation on 
healthy families. Without significant opposition, the National Assembly passed the 
Framework Act on Healthy Families on December 2003 [Act No. 11045]. Going into 
effect on January 1, 2005, the Framework Act has been regarded as the first effort by the 
state to directly intervene in family life since family planning policies, and it has set the 
precedent for the direction of future family policy (M. Chin 2012, H. Lee 2012).  
The Framework Act adopts a preventive approach to families in “crisis” by 
promoting social responsibility for fostering families and communities that are friendly to 
families. According to the Framework Act, healthy families are “families that satisfy 
family members’ needs and protect family members’ quality of life as human beings 
(Article 3).” The definition highlights the assumption that the family, rather than the state, 
is to remain the primary unit responsible for individual care and well-being. Furthermore, 
the Framework Act mandates local governments to provide comprehensive preventive 
family-based counseling and welfare services through “healthy family support centers 
(Article 35).” By regulating women’s access to social rights, family policies thus 
reinforced the state’s efforts to keep the burden of social care relegated to the realm of the 
family.  
Meanwhile, the timely transfer of administering family policy from the Ministry 
of Health and Welfare (MHW) to the Ministry of Gender Equality (MGE) in May 2005 
meant that the implementation of this act along with other landmark social policies, 




was newly named the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (Yŏsŏnggajokpu).
 19
 The 
unprecedented move was the culmination of lobbying efforts by the women’s ministry 
and the Roh government’s political willingness to support the expansion of women’s 
policies. With the transfer of the family division, the budget of the ministry grew more 
than ten-fold between 2004 and 2005 [see Table 3.3 below]. 
TABLE 3.3. MINISTRY OF GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY  














Source: Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, Korea.  
 
Because of their discomfort with issues concerning the family and their opposition 
to the Framework Act however, the response from the women’s movement was divided 
over the expansion of the women’s ministry. While the KWAU expressed its support for 
the entrusting of family policies to the women’s ministry, a younger generation of 
feminists led by the Sister Network (Ŏnni net'ŭwŏk'ŭ) waged a widespread petition 
campaign to oppose the change. Sister Network was established in 2004 by women’s 
activists in their 20s and 30s who found their interests underrepresented within the 
broader women’s movement led by an older generation of women seasoned by their prior 
struggles for democratization. The leaders of the Sister Network argued that “women 
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should have the right to choose different kinds of lifestyles not as members of families 
but as individuals and that entrapping women in the boundary of family invites another 
form of discrimination against them” (KASW 2005:6). Furthermore they argued that the 
very fact of using the family as a site of government intervention would strengthen the 
discourse of a family “crisis” constructed by social conservatives. Yet, these interests 
were subsumed by the fact that both the ministry and the leaders of the mainstream 
women’s movement regarded the expansion of the ministry as an opportunity to expand 
the policies for women.  
 Yet, the newfound increase in status for women’s ministry was short-lived. 
Despite its initial high hopes, the failure of MGEF to deliver on a promise to expand 
public childcare facilities led to the replacement of Minister Chi Eun-hee a former 
grassroots activist from the KWAU by Jang Ha-jin in 2005. A life-long academic with 
ties to the KWDI, Minister Jang was less willing to accommodate the demands of 
progressive feminists, marking the end of the short honeymoon period between the 
Ministry and the women’s movement (S. and K. Kim 2011). The election of conservative 
leader Lee Myung-bak to the presidency in 2007 further hampered feminists’ efforts to 
seek a repeal of the Framework Act. 
In the end, the progressive Roh government oversaw the passage of controversial 
legislation that espoused conservative ideals regarding the family and contradicted the 
gains made by women’s activists to secure gender equality in the family through the 
abolition of the family-head system. The influential conservative coalition whose 
interests lay with revamping the institution of the family was pivotal in the institution of 
policies that reinforced the family, not the state, as the primary unit responsible for care-




extended parental leave and expanded childcare support, Korean family policies have 
regulated women’s access to social welfare rights by demanding the maintenance of 
“healthy” families that demands that women continue to provide the brunt of care labor to 
families. 
Multicultural Family Support Policies: Incorporating Marriage Migrants into 
Families 
As the state implemented the newly instituted family policy, public fears 
surrounding low fertility rates continued to grow; these fears were partly exacerbated by 
the fact that as Korean women were having fewer babies, the number of so-called 
multicultural children born to immigrant women was growing. Multicultural children” (or 
tamunhwa kajŏng janyŏ) refer to the mixed-race children born to marriage migrants and 
their Korean spouses. Due to the increase in the number of cross-border marriages which 
began to escalate during the early 2000s, the number of multicultural children had grown 
several-fold in the past several years. In 2006, an estimated 7,998 multicultural children 
were enrolled in Korean schools, a number that grew nearly eight-fold to 55,780 school-
aged multicultural children in 2013 [see Table 3.4 below].
20
 In 2013 alone, 21,290 
children were born to multicultural families, amounting to a total of over 190,000 
multicultural children (NSO 2013). 
TABLE 3.4. NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN MULTICULTURAL FAMILIES  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
44,258 58,007 107,689 121,935 151,154 168,583 191,328 
Source: Ministry of Public Security & Administration, 2013 
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beginning in 2009, the data included the information provided by the spouses of marriage migrants, leading 




As more multicultural children entered schools, media reports focused on the 
difficulties experienced by these children due to social isolation and discrimination. In the 
first National Survey on Multicultural Families conducted in 2009, the MGEF reported 
that 74 percent of multicultural families with elementary school-age children experienced 
difficulties in school (S. Kim 2010:12). Moreover, it was reported that they experienced 
delays in linguistic development compared to their peers and had difficulty in completing 
their homework. The newspaper daily, the Donga Ilbo ran a series on multicultural 
families in which one of the articles focused on the psychological and emotional stress 
experienced by multicultural children: “many multicultural adolescents experience 
alienation and refuse to go to school because they are unable to keep up with the 
coursework or have developmental disabilities that are left untreated” (S. Lee 2011). 
Increasingly, public concerns also began to focus on the experiences of previous 
generations of mixed-race people, also known as honhyorin, who had been regarded as 
social outcasts as an indicator that greater efforts need to be made to include the present 
generation of multicultural children. 
Mixed-race people have had a presence in Korea since the ceasefire to the Korean 
War in 1953, but until the early 2000s there was an absence of serious public discussions 
about them (M. Lee 2008, E. Kim 2007). Born to Korean mothers and foreign fathers in 
the aftermath of the Korean War, honhyorin (literally, mixed-blood) were regarded as 
“shameful” reminders of Korea’s continued reliance on American and UN military 
prowess (M. Lee 2008: 57). In the early years of the Republic following the end of the 
Korean War, the first President of the Republic, Syngman Rhee (1948-60) adopted a 
policy of sending honhyorin for overseas adoption, based on the belief that these children 




7,398 mixed-race children were sent for adoption overseas according to official estimates 
(K. Park 2013). The passage of the Amerasian Act in 1982 by the U.S. Congress which 
granted residency, but not citizenship to the Asian children fathered by U.S. citizens 
further facilitated the departure of honhyorin from Korea.  
Despite the steady decreases in the honhyorin population, the number of mixed-
race children began to increase yet again throughout the 1990s and 2000s due to 
international marriages between Korean men and marriage migrant women.  In response 
to the growing number of mixed-race children, civic organizations began to organize 
against Korea’s exclusionary and discriminatory treatment of mixed-race people. In 2003, 
activists from Durebang (also known as My Sister’s Place), a support organization for 
camptown (gijich’on) prostitutes conducted the first comprehensive fact-finding study of 
honhyorin for the National Human Rights Commission.
21
 Extrapolating from estimates 
provided by the Pearl Buck Foundation and an informal honhyorin support group, the 
commission reported that there were approximately 433 to 613 honhyorin residing in 
Korea as of 1999 (D. Kim 2003:41). 
22
 This study served as the basis for conducting 
further research and formulating policy measures for honhyorin. In the same year, 
HiFamily, a faith-based organization engaged in promoting family values organized a 
petition to abolish the term “honhyorin” from official documents, arguing that the stigma 
associated with the term constitutes a human rights violation (Hankyoreh 23 December 
2003). Furthermore, HiFamily suggested that honhyorin be replaced with the term 
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“children of multicultural families,” hence introducing “multicultural family” into official 
lexicon for the first time (H. Kim 2010). Such civic organizations hence paved the way 
for heightened public discussions on the problem of mixed-race children in Korea. 
Meanwhile, the outbreak of the 2005 race riots in France and in Australia later 
that year impressed upon Korean policymakers and intellectuals the need to properly 
address the question of mixed race and immigrant youth (Paik 2010:65). In October 2005, 
riots erupted in the French suburbs after two youth, Bouna Traore and Zyed Benna died 
of electrocution while fleeing from the police. Nearly three weeks of rioting left “some 
10,000 cars burned, hundreds of public buildings damaged, around 3,000 people arrested 
with a state of emergency imposed in many areas surrounding major French cities” 
(Crumley 2012).  
In Korea, the incident invoked fears of the high social costs associated with the 
failure to incorporate immigrant youth. In an op-ed, a sociology professor from Korea 
University wrote, “[o]ther countries should not view the riots in France as a matter of 
irrelevance…is there no possibility of a race riot in Korea? There is. It is time to review 
whether migrants in Korea are properly adjusting in Korea” (Hyun 2005). Similarly, a 
researcher of multicultural families from the KWDI notes, “[r]ight now there is a lot of 
excitement and relief that the rural areas are witnessing more children and schools 
reopening, but there are also worries about the long-term possibility that these children 
will not make it as far as college. This means that the rioting of dissatisfied immigrant 
youth that we saw happening in France as not a far-fetched possibility in Korea” 
(interview with Chang Mi-hye, 4 November 2011, Seoul). In short, the race riots in 
France and also in Australia that same year prompted public attention to issues of 




During this time of increasing anxiety over issues of mixed-race immigrant youth 
and the possibility of future social conflict, the Korean government orchestrated a highly 
publicized media event around the visit of American football star Hines Ward in early 
April 2006. Hines Ward who had been born in Korea to an African-American father and 
a Korean mother was invited by the Korean government to visit Korea for the first time 
since he left as a baby. His visit came just after his team, the Pittsburgh Steelers had won 
the Super Bowl XL, and Ward had been named the Most Valuable Player (MVP). As the 
Korean media covered his every move during his visit, Ward was enthusiastically 
embraced as a national hero who served as a living example of what mixed-race children 
could achieve for Korea.  
The media discourse surrounding Ward’s visit reflected a particular way that the 
state and media envisioned a multicultural Korea, one that sought to re-fashion the public 
image of mixed-race people as “one of our own” (Ahn 2014:396, Seol 2005: 141). 
Ward’s visit triggered widespread discussions that linked the past experiences of mixed-
race people to the current generation of multicultural children in Korean society. Through 
Ward’s visit, the Korean public was forced to remember and reflect on its past 
mistreatment of honhyorin on the one hand, and to imagine a future where they could 
imagine more Hines Wards that Korea could proudly claim as her own on the other hand. 
By fostering positive popular sentiment towards mixed-race people, Ward’s visit 
provided the political momentum required to introduce policy measures for incorporating 
mixed-race children (M. Lee 2008).  
Riding the wave of popular public opinion, the Presidential Committee on Social 
Inclusion (hereafter PCSI) under the Roh government announced two measures: the 




Socially Integrate Mixed-Race Individuals and Migrants” on April 26, 2006 a few weeks 
after Ward’s media-frenzied visit. These two policy plans represent the Korean 
government’s blueprint for promoting an “open multicultural society” and “eliminating 
discrimination and promoting welfare” (H. Lee 2008). Although the aim of the policy 
was to promote a multicultural society, the policy itself did not embrace principles of 
multiculturalism, such as anti-discrimination and cultural rights for minorities. Rather, the 
focus was on preserving families by providing various educational and welfare services 
to the families of marriage migrant women and to mixed-race children. Because these 
policy measures have served as the foundational framework for incorporating marriage 
migrants and their children, they have been referred to as the “Grand Plan” (Ibid).  
Although the Grand Plan is often regarded by many as a policy that represents the 
onset of multicultural policies in Korea, what is often overlooked is that the primary 
underlying purpose of the Grand Plan was to address the crisis of family by providing 
family-based welfare to marriage migrants and their children (H. Lee 2012). As early as 
2004, the Committee on Population Aging and Fertility which was established by 
President Roh to formulate a policy response to aging and low fertility first suggested that 
integrating marriage migrants and their children into Korean society may serve to 
mitigate demographic problems (B. Lee 2009:786).  
Another widely-cited report that was commissioned by the MHW in 2005 urged 
the need for a policy to incorporate migrant women, stating that “[e]specially at a time 
when the low birth problem has become a societal problem, marriage migrants are 
contributing significantly to the continued survival of Korean society by giving birth to 
and raising a future labor force [my emphasis]. Therefore, there is a need to devise a 




they can maintain a basic livelihood (Seol 2005: 336-7). ”
23
 While policymakers did not 
actual believe that the influx of marriage migrants would compensate population decline, 
the demographic problem convinced policymakers that incorporating marriage migrants 
could be politically viable. According to Nora Kim (2007:74), “if the low fertility, rapid 
ageing problem did not exist, the Korean government would not have had the incentive to 
adopt a social integration support policy for marriage migrants and their mixed-race 
children.” In other words, policymakers justified the incorporation of immigrant women 
based on their capacity to contribute to Korean society by socially reproducing families 
and thus alleviate the population decline.   
The Plan outlined the central and local governments’ commitment to addressing 
the social welfare needs of migrant women. These welfare provisions include basic 
livelihood assistance for families subsisting on income below the poverty level and 
monetary support for childbirth and childcare for low-income families. Furthermore, it 
aimed to foster the labor participation of marriage migrants by providing support for job 
training and employment skills, including computer education. It also aimed to develop a 
field where marriage migrants could be utilized as a professional labor force, specifically 
through a human resources and employment programs for multicultural education and 
welfare (PCSI 2006b:49). In addition to welfare support, the Grand Plan emphasized the 
development of education and information delivery programs for marriage migrants by 
strengthening collaborative efforts between government agencies. It also sought to 
                                                 
23
 The Ministry of Health & Welfare (MHW) commissioned the first national survey on marriage migrant 
women in 2005, which was based on in-depth interviews with marriage migrants, detailed how they arrived 
in Korea, their economic activities, marital and family relations, demands for social welfare, poverty levels, 
physical health and included comparative case studies of marriage migrants in Japan and Taiwan (Seol et al 






increase public receptiveness to marriage migrants and their children through changes to 
public education curriculum that would foster the embrace of cultural diversity. 
A second underlying purpose of the Grand Plan was to respond to pressures from 
civil society, mostly women’s organizations that had been lobbying for policies to 
address the human rights abuses faced by marriage migrant women. A coalition of 
organizations supporting migrant women, including the Solidarity Network for Migrants’ 
Human Rights and the Korea Women Migrants Human Rights Center, had been urging 
government officials for policy measures to protect women who had become victims of 
trafficking and gender violence through the marriage brokering process (I discuss this in 
more detail in the next chapter). Media coverage of the violence experienced by marriage 
migrants, such as the 2003 death of a Filipina woman Bibi Rey Algana, who fell from her 
tenth-floor apartment after being beaten by her husband, had heightened public concern 
for the well-being and safety of migrant women (M. Kim 2010: 233). In response to these 
efforts, the Grand Plan called for the regulation of the marriage brokerage industry, 
including transparency and accountability in the process of marriage migration. It 
mandated the passage of legislation that would regulate the activities of brokers and 
revamped government efforts to crackdown on illegal activities that constitute human 
rights abuses against migrant women (PCSI 2006b:21). Not only would the state protect 
human rights by regulating the marriage migration process, it called for strengthening 
public support services for marriage migrants who are victims of domestic violence by 
providing funding support for the expansion of shelters and counseling services for 
marriage migrants.  
Despite the public and media fanfare surrounding mixed-race children, the policy 




on the children of marriage migrants, and signaling that the attention paid to honhyorin 
had merely served as a front to introducing social integration programs for multicultural 
children. The ‘Measures to Socially Integrate Mixed-Race Individuals and Migrants’ 
outlined separate measures for honhyorin, depending on their residential status, 
nationality, and perceived welfare needs. The plan distinguished honhyorin people 
according to three categories: 1) nationals and residents; 2) non-national overseas 
residents; 3) resident foreigners.  
For honhyorin who are nationals and presently residing in Korea, policy measures 
stipulated expanded social welfare assistance to improve livelihood support. Overseas 
resident honhyorin refer to the children of Korean soldiers born to Vietnamese mothers 
during the Vietnam War, and the children of non-citizen Korean émigrés.  Because they 
are non-citizens, these policy measures sought to explore the possibility of granting 
nationality and citizenship rights to this group. The last category referred to honhyorin 
residents with foreign nationality, namely mixed-race children whose parents are both 
foreign citizens.  This category includes the children of foreign camptown sex workers as 
well as migrant workers.
24
 Without revising citizenship policies but acknowledging 
statelessness among migrant children as a serious problem, the measures formally 
recognized the right of all children, regardless of legal status, to an education (PCSI 
2006a:12).  
The Act to Support Multicultural Families (Tamunhwa kajok chiwŏn bŏp) 
These social integration policy measures created opportunities for Korean civic 
organizations to lobby for the proposal of three separate bills that would institutionalize 
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support for marriage migrants, honhyorin, and migrants. On June 26, 2007, a little over 
one year after the announcement of the Grand Plan, the Committee on Women and 
Family within the National Assembly convened a public hearing to discuss three different 
proposals: the Act to Support Honhyorin Families, the Act to Support Multicultural 
Families, and the Act to Support and Protect Migrant Families.  
First, the Korea Federation of International Families, a honhyorin organization 
had lobbied for legislation that would provide restitution to honhyorin and their mothers 
for the decades of exclusion and discrimination they had experienced. In providing 
testimony before the legislative committee, Bae Ki-cheol, the leader of the Federation 
depicted honhyorin as victims of the state’s policies and demanded compensation. In his 
testimony, Bae argued, “we [honhyorin] have lived in this country: we were born here, 
with voting rights, and received an education here. Regardless of personal circumstances, 
whether material or personnel, we were born out of exchanges between two different 
countries.  So we believe that it is time for the state to pay attention to our needs” 
(National Assembly 2007:17). While the legislators expressed their sympathies, they 
were uncomfortable with the idea of restitution and preferred to refer the issue to a 
separate committee that deals with matters involving historical reconciliation” (National 
Assembly 2007:20). Without significant public support, the bill for honhyorin failed to 
pass, and public attention to honhyorin declined thereafter.  
Second, the other two proposed acts: the Act to Support Multicultural Families 
and the Act to Support and Protect Migrant Families had much in common except for the 
fact that the latter sought to include institutionalized support for all migrants, including 
undocumented migrants. Jung Gwi-soon from the Foreign Workers Human Rights 




legislation for all migrant families pointed out that a strict definition would not be able to 
“realistically take into consideration all the problems of social integration faced by 
different migrants” (Ibid: 12). Instead, Jung pushed for a version of the support act that 
would include the families of undocumented workers, arguing that “to exclude illegal 
migrants entirely from any law is to lose the very human rights ideal contained in the law” 
(Ibid: 12- 13).  Legislators however, were hesitant to include undocumented workers into 
the law, suggesting that there would be too much opposition against such a law.  
As attention narrowed on the Act to Support Multicultural Families (hereafter 
Support Act), the legislative debates focused on how to legally define the multicultural 
family. The director of the family policy division within the Ministry, Yang Seung-joo 
articulated the Ministry’s position that the multicultural family is a family comprised of 
marriage migrants and their Korean spouses. Meanwhile, representatives from the 
Solidarity Network for Migrants’ Rights (iju in'gwŏn yeondae), an umbrella organization 
of pro-migrant groups argued that the definition was too restrictive and that such a law 
would prove to be discriminatory rather than beneficial to different migrant groups in the 
long-term. 
The bill had the strong support of the MGEF as well as the Home Economics 
Association which had supported the Framework Act on Healthy Families. According to 
a staff member of Assembly member Koh Kyung Hwa who sponsored the Support Act, 
the MGEF saw the bill as an opportunity to expand the scope of family policies of which 
it was in charge (interview with Ha Mi-young, 26 April 2014, by phone). As of 2007, the 
Ministry was already operating 38 support centers for marriage migrants with the 
cooperation of civil society organizations, and it aimed to secure more funding that would 




Amid unresolved disagreements over the definition of the multicultural family, 
the National Assembly passed the Act to Support Multicultural Families [Act No. 8937] 
on March 21, 2008 under a newly inaugurated government under President Lee Myung-
bak.  Similar to the Framework Act for Healthy Families, the purpose of the Support Act 
is “to ensure the stable family life of multicultural families and in doing so to foster their 
social integration” (Article 1). With a focus on preserving families and by extension, 
women as the main provider of social care and well-being, the legislation places heavy 
emphasis on providing counseling, education and informational support for migrant 
women. The underlying aim of the legislation is to sustain families formed of 
international marriages by providing various forms of public assistance, such as 
counseling and livelihood assistance to migrant women. Like the Framework Act for 
Healthy Families, the Support Act stipulates the creation of “multicultural family support 
centers,” as one-stop service centers for multicultural families.  
Rather than invest in expanding welfare provisions through universal policies that 
extend entitlements to all multicultural families, such as childcare facilities and work-
family policies that support women’s labor force participation, the Korean government 
instead opted to target foreign women by incorporating them into a new legal category 
called “multicultural families” (tamunhwa gajok). This strategy of incorporating women 
has resembled the state’s family planning programs which were executed by mobilizing 
the “voluntary” labor of women for rural development and population control. In 
explaining why the solution to the family crisis focused on the social integration of 
migrant women, anthropologist Kim Hyun-Mee (2007: 106-8) argues that it is because 
“foreign women are perceived (by policymakers) as the most easily mobilized resource to 




Grand Plan and the Support Act reveal policymakers’ normative assumption that 
marriage migrant women are to provide the brunt of care work and reproductive labor for 
families in Korea. 
Although the Lee Myung-bak government (2008-2013) sought to downsize the 
women’s ministry, it nevertheless continued to expand multicultural family policies. 
Espousing the “747 plan,” the Lee government focused on economic revival and 
ambitious development projects such as the Four Rivers Restoration Project, reminiscent 
of authoritarian governments of the past, and away from issues of social welfare and 
human rights, in contrast to his immediate predecessors.
25
 Before taking office, Lee’s 
transition committee announced in January 2008 that the new administration would 
abolish “leftist” agencies, such as the MGEF as well as the Ministry of Unification. 
President-elect Lee justified his decision to abolish the women’s ministry that “based on 
statistical surveys, women themselves see the ministry as dominated by those who are 
only interested in women’s power” and instead argued that women’s interests would best 
be served if it were consolidated with the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Choi 2008).  
Due to fierce protests from the opposition parties as well as from women’s 
movement organizations, Lee soon recanted his decision, instead opting for a significant 
downsizing of the ministry that left its status within the government a precarious one. The 
downsizing resulted in the transfer of the family affairs division to back to MHW which 
was again renamed the Ministry of Health Welfare and Family (MHWF). The MHWF 
thus administered the Support Act for Multicultural Families from 2008 to 2010, and 
oversaw the initial expansion of multicultural family support centers. Meanwhile, 
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continuing lobbying efforts by women’s groups led to the reinstatement of the MGEF in 
January 2010, and the MGEF was once again assigned the task of implementing family 
policies, including multicultural family support policies. Since its reinstatement, the 
MGEF continues to remain the main government agency in charge of implementing 
family policies. Despite the downsizing of the MGE, the budget allocated for 
multicultural family support programs has continued to grow, experiencing an almost 
five-fold increase since 2008 [see Table 3.5 below]. 
TABLE 3.5.  BUDGET FOR MULTICULTURAL FAMILY POLICIES, 2008-2014  
(IN MILLION WON) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
28,493 42,698 59,690 94,081 92,521 93,312 103,351 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, 2014 
 In sum, multicultural family support policies as an extension of family policies 
aim to incorporate migrant women as members of families through family welfare 
provisions aimed at preserving families. Unlike family policies that are concerned with 
women’s employment, childcare, and work-family balance, healthy family policies in 
Korea focus on sustaining the normative ideal of family by regulating women’s access to 
social services and benefits. In a similar vein, the underlying purpose of multicultural 
family support policies is to mold multicultural families into normative ones that are able 
to contribute to Korean society. Family policies have thus provided the institutional basis 
for incorporating immigrant women and their mixed-race children. Growing public 
awareness about racial and ethnic discrimination raised by civil society organizations 
focused on the experiences of previous generations of mixed-race children or honhyorin 
to foster a favorable political environment for policymakers to introduce policy measures 
to incorporate immigrant women and their children as members of families. At the same 




based on a narrow definition of “multicultural families” that has excluded the provision 
of public services to other migrant categories, including migrant workers whose families 
are not acknowledged as multicultural.  
Mobilizing Women as Providers of Family Welfare 
Through private-public partnerships between local governments and civil society 
organizations, healthy family and multicultural family support policies have demanded 
the participation of Korean women in providing family-based welfare for families. Both 
the Framework Act on Healthy Families and the Act to Support Multicultural Families 
delegate the duties of providing social services for families to civic organizations.
26
 
While these organizations are at liberty to develop initiatives specifically catered to the 
needs of local residents, they are required to provide the following services in exchange 
for government funding: 1) language education; 2) family education; 3) migrant women 
support groups; 4) counseling; 5) career development.  In short, these support centers are 
meant to be “one-stop, full service” institutions that cater to the local communities while 
meeting nationally mandated objectives (KIHF, 2011).   
Due to the government’s proactive support for multicultural families, the number 
of the centers has expanded rapidly since the first support centers were established by the 
MGEF in 2006. The Korea Institute for Healthy Families (KIHF), a quasi-governmental 
organization under the authority of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family has been 
in charge of overseeing the operation of multicultural family support centers since 2010. 
Between 2009 and 2011, the number of centers doubled from 100 to 201 (KIHF 2011). 
Five years into the operation, there was a near ten-fold increase, defying the initial doubts 
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of critics who expressed concerns that the MGEF lacked the capacity to execute such an 
expansion. As of 2014, there were 214 support centers located nationwide [See Table 3.5].  
Table 3.5 Multicultural Family Support Centers, 2006-2013 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
21 38 80 100 159 200 200 212 
Source: Korea Institute for Healthy Family (KIHF), 2013  
 
While the policies do not specifically point to women’s organizations, many non-
profit civic organizations that operate the multicultural family support centers have been 
women’s organizations. These organizations range from academic institutes to social 
welfare organizations to faith-based charitable groups. The Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA) Korea for instance, has been a major partner entrusted with 
operating the support centers, and it was in charge of running 8 out of the 201 centers in 
2011. Some centers are affiliated with major women’s universities, such as Sungshin, 
Ewha, and Sukmyeong Women’s Universities, which are all located in Seoul. Others are 
operated by women’s movement organizations, including the Women’s Hotline United, 
the Korea Family Legal Counseling Center, and the Women Migrants Human Rights 
Center. Women’s organizations affiliated with the city or local government also operate 
the centers, such as the Women’s Community Welfare Center (Yŏsŏng bokchi sent'ŏ), 
Women’s Cultural Center (Yŏsŏng munhwa wŏn), and the Women’s Human Resource 
Development Institute (Yŏsŏng ilyŏkkaepalwŏn).
27
  
Reminiscent of family planning agents who implemented the state’s birth control 
directives at the ground level, social welfare providers have served as foot-soldiers who 
fulfill the aims of the state’s family policies. Increasingly, the Korean government has 
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demanded the professionalization of the support centers by treating the centers as official 
social welfare organizations since 2009, and as a result, these centers have become 
staffed primarily by social welfare professionals. Social welfare as an academic and 
professional field in Korea, like it is elsewhere, has historically been dominated by 
women, where women compose approximately 75 percent of all social workers (KWDI 
2011).  
As of 2014, the KIHF reported that there were a total of 4,413 service providers 
working in the multicultural family support centers (Yonhap News 4 February 2014).  The 
vast majority of these or 2,675 providers are home-visit tutors who teach Korean 
language to marriage migrants through regular visits to their homes. Regardless of which 
organizations are selected and funded to operate the support centers, women across the 
board constitute the vast majority of the 911 staff members and volunteers who make the 
day-to-day operations of the centers possible. Each center has approximately 4-5 full-
time staff that provides care to multicultural families, along with a coterie of part-time or 
volunteer workers. Marriage migrant women are occasionally hired by the centers on an 
as needed, part-time basis as tutors and interpreters/translators for other migrant women 
(interview with a support center staff member, 7 September 2012, Geumcheon). 
Recently, the Korean government has shown signs that it is moving towards 
consolidating the healthy family and multicultural family support centers into a combined 
center for all families which indicates a sign that the government does not intend to 
expand funding for family policies in the long-term. In 2013, 143 out of 207 centers were 
joint centers, an increase from 49 joint centers in 2011 (KIHF 2013). These combined 
centers rely on the manpower of “healthy family experts” (kŏnkangkachŏngsa), who are 




depth study of healthy family support centers in Kyeonggi Province, which has the 
largest concentration of centers estimated that each center is staffed by about 4-10 people. 
Eighty-seven percent of these staff members are married women between the ages of 30 
to 54 (J. Yang 2010:221). These staff members provide family counseling and support to 
families in need, and thus make it possible for local and central government agencies to 
monitor and intervene directly in the lives of individual families, monitor their 
reproductive activities and deliver services to families. In short, both healthy and 
multicultural family policies have structured opportunities for women to participate in the 
public provision of family welfare.  
Women participate in sustaining the nationwide network of multicultural support 
centers not only as staff members but also as civic volunteers. Each support center works 
with a group of local volunteers through the Multicultural Nanum (Sharing) Volunteer 
Corp which fosters neighborly ties between marriage migrants and local residents by 
coordinating community building projects. In 2011, nearly 55,051 individuals 
participated in the activities of the volunteer corps (KIHF, 2011:24). Although there are 
no official figures by gender, many of these volunteers are middle-class housewives who 
are interested in helping migrant women adjust to life in Korea by serving as mentors to 
migrant women. Thirty-year-old Min-ju, a stay-at-home mom with a two-year old son 
decided to volunteer at the local multicultural family support center in Guri city 
(Kyeonggi Province) as a language tutor while her son was at daycare. Although she met 
with her tutee- a Vietnamese woman-only once every two weeks because of their busy 
schedules, she said “I enjoy volunteering because I am good friends with my tutee and we 
share many similarities including the fact that we enjoy being out rather than being holed 




A prominent ad campaign run by the Korea Broadcast Advertising Corporation 
(KOBACO) illustrates how public campaigns have mobilized women to support migrant 
women by appealing to their role of providers of maternal care.
28
 In the ad, an older 
Korean woman (“Min-jae’s mom”) helps a Vietnamese neighbor (“Jun-ho's mom”) read 
an announcement flyer sent from Jun-ho’s school. The ad ends by saying, “Because of 
your love, Jun-ho can grow up to be a proud son of Korea." The message contains highly 
gendered scripts: an older Korean woman who through her maternal care and sense of 
civic duty helps a much younger Asian woman to learn the language and become Korean. 
Through neighborly maternal love, from one woman to another, a multicultural society 
can be realized. The take-away message is that the burden of incorporating migrant 
women rests with Korean women who are called upon to provide voluntary and 
underpaid care labor as neighbors, volunteers, and social welfare providers to ensure that 
the immigrant women are properly integrated into Korean society. In short, women have 
made the rapid expansion of family policies possible, and they have shouldered the 
burden of assisting migrant women so that these migrant women can become future 
providers of care for their families. 
This chapter has discussed how previous patterns of incorporating Korean women 
into the nation through family planning programs have shaped the Korean state’s 
successive attempts at incorporating marriage migrant women as a response to population 
concerns. Despite the growth and expansion of the women’s movement and the 
institution of women’s policies, family policies in Korea have been adopted as a response 
to the national anxiety associated with the breakup and transformation of the family from 
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economic distress, changing social attitudes about marriage and revisions to the family 
law. In previous decades, the Korean developmental state placed the burden of welfare on 
women who were expected to engage in contraception and to provide child and elderly 
care. Like family planning, family policies have been formulated to regulate women’s 
access to welfare and social rights through their roles as care providers for families.  
Despite the expansion of women’s policy aimed at gender equality, the women’s 
movement was unable to effectively oppose the push by conservative groups, including 
faith-based citizens groups focused around reviving the traditional family, for family 
policies that mandating the state provision of family-based welfare. Soon after the 
institution of family policies, the Korean government extended family policies to include 
welfare support for multicultural families. As part of family policy, the multicultural 
family support policies serve to alleviate an impending demographic crisis by 
incorporating immigrant women in ways that demand their reproductive labor. In sum, 
the evolution of family policies from family planning in the 1960s and 1970s to healthy 
and multicultural family policies in the present-day reflects long-standing patterns of state 
attempts to regulate women’s access to rights through their roles as primary care 











Advocating migrant women: negotiating citizenship through human rights  
 
 
“If there is one message that echoes forth from this conference, let it be that human rights are 
women’s rights and women’s rights are human rights once and for all. Let us not forget that 
among those rights are the right to speak freely -- and the right to be heard.”   
- The First Lady of the United States, Hillary Rodham Clinton,  
1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing  
 
 
Women’s activism, similar to women’s movements in Brazil and Argentina, 
played an important role in shaping the emergence of women’s democratic citizenship in 
Korea (S. Moon 2005, Jaquette 1994, Alvarez 1990). In the 1970s, Korean women 
participated in grassroots opposition to authoritarian rule and pushed for democratization. 
Since emerging as an independent autonomous movement following the transition to 
democracy in 1987, the Korean women’s movement has rallied around greater social, 
economic, political and civil rights for women (A. and H. Lee 2013, S. and K. Kim 2014). 
In particular, the integration of human rights into the movement’s agenda especially in 
the period after the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993 and the 
4
th
 World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 has been one of the primary 
ways by which Korean women have sought to expand women’s rights (Peters and Wolper 
1995, Keck and Sikkink 1998). The quest for women’s human rights in Korea has 
evolved around campaigns against sexual violence, domestic violence, prostitution, and 
most recently, in support of the rights of migrant women. 
Not only in Korea, but women’s organizations elsewhere have been prominent 
advocates of immigrant women. In the U.S., women’s organizations such as the National 
Organization for Women (NOW) and the National Immigrant Women Advocacy Project 




citizenship for undocumented women.
29
 In Asia, organizations like Bethune House in 
Hong Kong and the TransAsia Sisters Association in Taiwan have supported migrant 
domestic workers and immigrant wives through legal counseling, advocacy and support 
services such as the provision of shelters for women who have been battered and abused 
(Hsia 2008). 
30
 Similarly, grassroots women’s organizations in Korea like the Women 
Migrants Human Rights Center have advocated on behalf of migrant women since the 
early 2000s (H. Lee 2003).  
In this chapter, I analyze the role of Korean women’s organizations as 
intermediaries between the state and migrant women and their efforts to secure human 
rights protection for migrant women. On the one hand, by utilizing human rights, 
seasoned women’s activists who had led prior campaigns against sexual and domestic 
violence, prostitution and trafficking were able to effectively push for government 
policies that integrated human rights concerns into the agenda. On the other hand, I argue 
that claiming human rights has had distinct consequences for women because they 
require articulations of gender and nationhood that work to reinforce gender hierarchies 
even as they provide protections and rights for women. In consequence, women’s 
organizations have found themselves implicated in state efforts to incorporate women as 
mothers and wives in ways that reinforce the gendered ideals of motherhood and family 
that they have long sought to oppose.  
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The first section historically traces the institutionalization of women’s human 
rights in Korea by discussing three defining campaigns in the broader women’s 
movement where women’s organizations have bargained for institutional and legislative 
change to enhance women’s rights: sexual violence, domestic violence, and prostitution. 
In the second section, I situate the movement for migrant women’s human rights as a 
continuation of the ongoing negotiations by the state and women’s organizations over 
women’s human rights. The following section examines the “price,” or consequences 
associated with claiming human rights. Lastly, I revisit my theoretical framework to 
highlight the tensions between the promotion of human rights and a more inclusive, 
gender equal citizenship for women.  
The Women’s Human Rights Movement (Yŏsŏng inkwŏn undong)  
In this section, I highlight the achievements as well as the setbacks of the 
women’s human rights movement by focusing on the politics behind three major 
legislative developments: sexual violence (1994), domestic violence (1997), and 
prostitution (2004). Each of these campaigns reveal how the assertion of women’s human 
rights has been contested by activists who have struggled to define what constitutes 
human rights and to determine the role of the state in preventing and punishing such 
abuses. In the case of domestic violence and anti-prostitution legislation, unresolved 
disagreements among activists have left deep scars and divisions that demonstrate the 
fragility of the consensus on women’s human rights. Nevertheless, these earlier 
campaigns contributed to the institutionalization of human rights as women’s rights in 
Korea which paved the way for integrating migrant women’s human rights issues into the 





The Campaign against Sexual Violence (Sŏngp'ongnyŏk) 
Women’s organizing against sexual violence began when a group of women 
founded the Korea Women’s Hotline (Yŏsŏngŭi jŏnhwa; hereafter KWH) in 1983, which 
along with Womenlink is regarded as one of the first grassroots women’s organization.
31
 
At the time of the founding, the KWH provided counseling to women workers on matters 
related to sexual violence, labor exploitation, and domestic abuse. The topic of sexual 
violence came to the forefront in the summer of 1986 after a student labor activist Kwon 
In-Sook was tortured, raped, and sexually assaulted by a police detective named Moon 
Gwi-dong, while being held in detention at the Pu’chon police station in Kyeonggi 
province (J. Nam 2000). Kwon, a college student from the elite Seoul National University 
had been arrested for working in a factory under a false alias.
32
 Known as the Pu’chon 
Sexual Torture Incident (Bucheon sŏng gomun sagŏn), this incident became the focus of 
public outrage because the detective who had raped and tortured Kwon was initially left 
unpunished.  
The government’s refusal to indict the accused policeman provoked women’s 
groups led by the KWH, along with lawyers and religious organizations, to protest 
against the state’s violence toward women and students. In response to the incident, 
women’s groups formed two major coalitions, the Women’s Council against Sexual 
Violence and the Joint Committee against the Pu’chon Sexual Violence Torture Incident 
that served as umbrella organizations in charge of coordinating protests against the 
authoritarian state’s indiscriminate use of violence toward women. Korean women’s 
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organizations recognized that the elimination of sexual and physical torture was closely 
intertwined with the need for democratic principles and institutions (J. Nam 2000:99). 
Backed by popular support, women’s groups were successful in securing a trial for Kwon 
who was released in 1989 after serving thirteen months in prison. Upon her release from 
prison Kwon received monetary compensation from the government while her perpetrator 
was sentenced to five years in prison.  
Despite the mobilization of women over sexual violence, the greater concern for 
activists at the time was not women’s rights, but democratization. According to 
researcher Min Kyeong-ja (2013:25) who was an activist in the KWH during the 1990s, 
the KWH prioritized the pro-democracy movement like other women’s groups at the time: 
“as the political situation and labor issues became problematized, issues related to women 
were regarded as one aspect of the wider structural problems confronting society at the 
time.” In 1987, women’s groups that had protested sexual violence joined together with 
other women’s groups to form the Korea Women’s Associations United (Hankuk yosong 
danche yonhap, hereafter the KWAU). The KWAU was formed of a coalition of twenty-
eight organizations comprising women who were workers, religious leaders, researchers, 
housewives, rural women, and human rights advocates. Despite forming the coalition, 
member organizations within the KWAU were conflicted over whether women’s issues 
should be subsumed under the cause of democratization.  
On the one hand, defenders of “minjung feminism” argued that democratization 
aimed at social and political transformation was the only means to women’s liberation, 




democracy (Louie 1995, Hur 2011).
33
 On the other hand, others were critical of the 
nationalist and male-centric character of the pro-democracy movement and argued that 
women’s issues should be prioritized above all else (Kim 1996: 72). When the KWAU 
made the conflicted decision to join the democratization movement by becoming a 
member of the National Federation of Nationalist and Democratic Movements (NFDM; 
Chun’guk Minjok Minju Undong Yonhap) in 1989, a coalition to end the remnants of 
authoritarian rule, three member organizations withdrew from the women’s coalition as a 
response to the controversial decision (S. Moon 2002:482). These conflicts reflect the 
growing divisions between reformists and militants within the nascent women’s 
movement.  
In the wake of the democratic transition in 1987, the issues of sexual violence 
continued to remain central to the women’s movement. In 1991, feminist academics 
composed of professors and graduate students in the Women Studies program at Ewha 
Woman’s University, the first and largest women’s educational institute in Korea, 
established the Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center (Hankuk sŏng p'ongnyŏk sangdamso, 
hereafter KSVRC). According to feminist scholar Kyungja Jung (2013), the KSVRC was 
the first sexual violence counseling center founded specifically with a feminist purpose. 
This organization along with the KWH and the KWAU were pivotal in the establishment 
of legislation to prevent and punish crimes of sexual violence. 
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In the early 1990s, two highly publicized cases triggered the formation of a broad 
coalition of women’s groups led by the KWH to push for legislation that would prevent 
and punish sexual violence. The first case occurred in January 1991 and involved a thirty-
one-year-old housewife named Kim Bu-nam who was indicted for killing her neighbor, a 
man who had sexually assaulted her when she was nine. Depicting Kim Bu-nam as a 
victim of child sexual abuse rather than a murderer, various women’s, human rights and 
faith-based organizations mobilized to campaign for Kim’s exoneration, thereby bringing 
the issue of child sexual assault into the public gaze (Jung 2013:20). The second case 
took place a later year when Kim Bo-eun a twenty-one-year-old university student and 
her boyfriend Kim Jin-kwan, killed her stepfather who had repeatedly raped her since she 
was a child. Occurring shortly after the Kim Bu-nam case, this case led to a mass public 
campaign by those who supported the couple’s exoneration of Kim and her boyfriend, 
including the mobilization of student groups.  
While mass public support invigorated women’s groups to push for legislation, 
they were highly conflicted over how to define sexual violence. On the one hand, the 
KWH which initiated the movement for legislation sought an expansive definition of 
sexual violence as any and all violence against women, including domestic violence. In 
other words, they sought to define sexual violence expansively as all gender violence. On 
the other hand, the KWAU and the KSVRC were hesitant about including domestic 
violence in the legislation out of practical concerns that doing so would detract public 
support given that mainstream society regarded domestic violence as an issue confined to 
the privacy of the family which the state should not meddle in (Min 2013:58, Heo and 
Rakowski 2014:228). Ultimately, the KWH gave into pressures to leave out domestic 




the Act on the Punishment of Sexual Assault Crimes and the Protection of Victims in 
December 1993. Considered the first piece of legislation aimed at protecting women’s 
human rights, this legislation contributed greatly to strengthening punishment for crimes 
related to sexual violence, expanding the definition of sexual violence, and establishing 
programs and policies, including counseling centers (or sexual assault centers) and 
shelters for victims of sexual violence. 
The Campaign against Domestic Violence (Kajŏng p'ongnyŏk) 
As soon as the National Assembly passed the legislation on sexual violence, 
women’s activists led by the KWH organized around the unresolved issue of domestic 
violence, launching a three-year campaign beginning in 1994 to secure widespread public 
support. Jung Choon-suk, the policy director within the KWH helped to orchestrate a 
mass petition campaign that secured more than eighty-five thousand signatures in support 
of anti-domestic violence legislation (Kim 2013). Securing public support was not easy 
however. Jung recalls, “When we first held anti-wife beating campaigns in the streets, 
people’s most common responses were that “battered women deserve it” or “people like 
that don’t exist in this country” (quoted from Heo 2010:228).  
Second, the framing and wording of the anti-domestic violence legislation posed a 
bigger point of contention for women’s activists. Min Sook Heo (2010:229) argues that  
“Korean feminist activists knew that they had to find realistic and practical 
strategies that did not revolve around unfamiliar philosophical positions or 
ideological definitions. For this reason, feminist activists deliberately decided to 
reinterpret the problem to make it more politically and culturally acceptable.”  
 
The reinterpretation of the problem resulted in the framing of domestic violence by 
activists as a threat to the family, where eliminating domestic violence served to preserve 




of family paved the way for the passage of two landmark acts by the National Assembly 
in 1997: the Act on the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim Protection, and the 
Special Act for the Punishment of Domestic Violence Crimes. The prevention act 
provides support services such as counseling for victims, while the special act stipulates 
punitive measures to perpetrators of domestic violence.   
At the implementation stage however, women’s activists were sorely disappointed 
to find that the legislation had significant shortcomings when it came to preventing and 
punishing domestic violence. For one, some activists criticized the legislation for its 
inability to properly punish and incarcerate the perpetrators of violence because the 
preservation of the family was prioritized over women’s individual rights. By providing 
counseling and protection for perpetrators, the law aimed to reintegrate them into the 
family rather than focus on exacting punishment for criminal behavior (Heo 2010, Heo 
and Rakowski 2014).  
Another shortcoming was that the legislation led to the proliferation of 
government-funded agencies and shelters that aimed primarily to dole out services to 
women according to government guidelines rather than seek creative ways by which to 
empower or protect women. Organizations like the KWH were being bypassed and 
denied funding over non-feminist organizations that sought to implement government 
programs without a feminist purpose. To this day, the elimination of domestic violence 
continues to be a prevalent social issue that has remained at the top of women’s 
movement agenda. In 2010, the MGEF reported that more than 53 percent of married 
couples between the ages of nineteen and sixty-five experienced some form of domestic 





The Anti-Prostitution Campaign (Sŏng mae mae) 
Beginning in the early 2000s, the focus of the women’s human rights movement 
shifted away from domestic violence to the issue of abolishing prostitution. Although the 
Korean government has formally outlawed prostitution since 1961, it has been no secret 
that Korea has a sizable sex worker industry, much of it associated with military 
camptowns, both American and Korean (Lee 2008, K. Moon 1997, Lie 1995). Although 
local women’s groups have supported prostitutes working in the military camptowns, 
there was no concerted effort by the women’s movement to seriously confront the 
problem of prostitution until this time.  
Two factors emerged to bring prostitution to the forefront. The first was a series 
of brothels fires from 2000 to 2002 that led to the tragic deaths of brothel workers who 
were trapped inside the buildings when the fires broke out. In 2000, five sex workers who 
were locked inside a brothel were killed when the building caught fire in Gunsan city (S. 
Cheng 2011). A year later a second fire broke out in Busan, killing three women, and in 
2002, another accidental brothel fire in Gunsan killed 13 people, including 11 sex 
workers. In the wake of these tragedies, the personal stories of these women became 
known when the media published excerpts from the diaries of the women that were found 
in the ashes left from one of the fires, sparking public interest in the problem of 
prostitution. 
The second factor that brought public attention to prostitution in Korea at the time 
was the U.S.-led initiatives against global human trafficking (Cheng 2011). Around the 
time of the brothel fires, the U.S. Department of State released the 2001 Trafficking-in-
Persons (TIP) Report. This report accorded a Tier 3 ranking to Korea based on its failure 




2008), the Korean government which touted human rights as a part of the national agenda 
regarded the low ranking as an embarrassment and sought to rectify the problem by 
actively supporting grassroots women’s struggles against prostitution. In 2001, the 
KWAU in conjunction with several other civic organizations including Saewoomtuh, an 
organization formed by ex-student activists in 1996 to provide support services for 
prostituted women, formed the National Solidarity against Prostitution (hereafter 
National Solidarity). This movement worked closely with the MGEF to lobby for anti-
prostitution legislation by introducing new discursive frames to understand women’s 
victimhood in prostitution. Interestingly, activists articulated prostitution by equating it 
with trafficking (insin mae mae) and therefore depicted it as a self-evident violation of 
women’s human rights (Cheng 2011:485). Once it was framed as anti-trafficking, 
widespread support for abolishing prostitution gained momentum among a broad range of 
social activists. 
This convergence between women’s activists who framed prostitutes as victims of 
trafficking coerced into prostitution by pimps, traffickers and criminals on the one hand, 
and state leaders who desired to improve Korea’s standing on anti-trafficking on the other, 
led to the swift passage of the Act on the Punishment of Procuring Prostitution and 
Associated Acts and the Act on the Prevention of Prostitution and Protection of Victims 
Thereof in March 2004. The legislation stipulated the creation of a Center for Women’s 
Human Rights (yosŏng in’kwon sentŏ) and counseling centers for victims of prostitution 
which aimed to foster the prostitutes’ “re-integration” into society. Regarded as a major 
achievement in the women’s movement, the acts were introduced with the explicit goals 
of protecting women’s human rights and of meeting global initiatives against the sex 




To the surprise of women’s activists however, the passage of the law resulted in 
major prolonged protests by sex workers who demanded an immediate repeal of the law. 
As the Korean government engaged in mass crackdowns on red-light districts leading to 
the arrest of thousands of sex workers and their clients, sex workers began to organize 
protests and hunger strikes in front of government buildings (Jukan Korea 22 December 
2004). In October 2004, nearly 3,000 sex workers staged a demonstration outside the 
National Assembly building opposing the anti-prostitution legislation. Demanding the 
right to work, these sex workers protested against punitive measures within the legislation 
that treated them like criminals who deserved punishment and like victims of trafficking 
who needed state protection. Furthermore, they argued that the law would be detrimental 
to them by forcing the industry further underground. In response, sex workers organized 
to create the National Solidarity for Sex Workers (Hanyeoyeon) which demanded 
recognition of the problems they faced as issues of labor rights rather than trafficking.  
Despite these mass protests by sex workers, neither the women’s movement 
organizations nor the MGEF took the sex workers seriously, dismissing them as 
“misguided” and as women who were being manipulated by their pimps (Cheng 2011a, 
2011b). Yet, the unwillingness of the women’s movement to engage the demands of sex 
workers contributed to a growing divide between abolitionists and more radical feminists 
who supported the sex workers’ cause (S. and K. Kim 2014:55). A younger group of 
feminists, the Sister Network, saw these protests by the sex workers as an opportunity to 
shift the debate on prostitution away from criminalization and trafficking to discussions 
about how to empower sex workers. Although these feminists pushed to seek a new 
frame for discussing prostitution, mainstream women’s activists have refused to 




repealing the anti-prostitution legislation (S. and K. Kim 2014, Cheng 2011). The 
divisive and unresolved debates among feminists in Korea over whether regulation or 
abolition is the best approach to the problem of prostitution echoes debates elsewhere, 
including in the U.S. Since the passage of the law, the sex industry has continued grow 
and even diversify since the institution of the anti-prostitution law. While the number of 
red-light districts has decreased, the MGEF reported in 2010 that the number of hostess 
bars and room salons
34
 increased to 31,623 from 28, 757 in 2007 and the number of 
massage parlors also increased to 5,271 from 3,360 in 2007 (Joongang Ilbo 10 December 
2012). 
In short, the backlash against the anti-prostitution legislation and the subsequent 
growth of the sex industry signals major unintended consequences of women’s 
organizing against prostitution in the name of human rights. While women’s activists 
sought to improve human rights for women in prostitution, by treating prostitutes as 
either victims of trafficking or as criminals without efforts to distinguish between 
prostitution and trafficking have worked to condone state-led crackdowns on prostitution 
which have left women in prostitution more vulnerable than ever. In short, the 
controversy surrounding prostitution demonstrates that claiming human rights has 
consequences that do not necessarily enhance all women’s rights.  
Feminizing Migrant Issues:  
Migrant Women’s Human Rights (iju yŏsŏng inkwŏn undong) 
During the anti-prostitution campaign, women’s organizations first began to pay 
attention to migrant women when activists uncovered that foreign women comprised a 
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growing number of entertainers working in the American military camptowns. Sealing 
Cheng (2004:194), an anthropologist who conducted research on Filipinas in Korea 
estimated that in 1999, there were approximately 600 Filipina women working in the 
camptown sex industry. Furthermore, a study conducted by the MGEF reported that 
5,500 foreign women had entered Korea on an E-6, or entertainer visa in 2002, where 
2,596 were from Russia (Seol 2004:3).  
From the beginning, the Korean government has been involved in regulating the 
influx of foreign women as sex workers. In 1996, the Korea Special Tourism Association 
(KSTA) an association of clubs owners near the U.S. military bases started recruiting 
foreign women and securing entertainer visas for them (Ibid:9). In 1999, the Korean 
government amended the entertainer license system by requiring club owners as well as 
entertainment companies to receive certification from the Korea Media Rating Board, a 
quasi-governmental organization. Through this system, more foreign women arrived in 
Korea, especially from the former Soviet Union, who quickly replaced Korean women as 
the majority of camptown entertainers.   
Migrant women were not only entering Korea as entertainers and sex workers, but 
also as low-skilled industrial and service workers as well as the spouses of rural Korean 
men. According to estimates from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the number of female 
migrant workers regulated by the Employment Permit System (EPS) was 38,788 in 2006, 
or about 36 percent of all migrant workers (J. Jung 2009:36). The number of women 
migrant workers has tended to vary by ethnic group and by sector. For instance, the 
proportion of female workers for Korean-Chinese and Chinese have tended to be around 
45 percent, while only around 35 percent among Southeast Asians (H. Lee 2003:136). 




the service sectors, such a restaurants, domestic work and hospice care. In 2006, among 
migrant workers in the service sector, 74 percent were women (J. Jung 2009:91).  
Beginning in the late 1990s, an increasing number of foreign women arrived in 
Korea as brides of Korean men due to the proactive efforts of local governments and 
commercial brokers in promoting international marriages as a response to the rural 
bachelor crisis. From 2000 to 2008, the number of foreign women marrying Korean men 
grew nearly five-fold, from 6,945 in 2000 to 28,163 in 2008 (NSO, 2008). In 2005, the 
number of international marriages constituted nearly fourteen percent of all marriages 
registered in Korea in that year. The majority of these wives have been from China 
(including ethnic Koreans from China) and Vietnam. In 2012, 42 percent of all marriage 
migrants originated from the People’s Republic of China, while 27 percent were from 
Vietnam (KIS, 2012).  
The entry of foreign women is part of a broader ongoing phenomenon of 
migration into Korea since the late-1980s (Lim 2003, Lee and Park 2005). In the late 
1980s, the Korean economy began to experience acute labor shortages in several labor-
intensive sectors, including but not limited to agriculture/fisheries, manufacturing, and 
construction. As greater numbers of migrant workers entered Korea as “industrial 
trainees,” civil society actors began to raise the issue of nonpayment of wages, 
mistreatment, and exploitation experienced by the migrant workers.
35
 The migrant worker 
advocacy movement began in 1994, when fifteen migrant workers waged a sit-in protest 
for twenty-nine days at the headquarters of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
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(CCEJ), a prominent civic organization, demanding payment of their overdue wages and 
workers compensation for industrial accidents (N. Kim 2012, D. Kim 2011). A year later, 
thirteen migrant workers from Nepal led to another mass protest at Myeongdong 
Cathedral a symbolic site of previous labor struggles during the pro-democracy 
movement. During this protest, migrant workers received the support of thirty-eight 
Korean civic organizations which established an umbrella organization called the Joint 
Committee on Migrants Korea (JCMK), launching the migrant worker advocacy 
movement. The protest led to the growth in the number of migrant labor support 
organizations from about 30 in 1994 to 90 in 2000 (Seol, 2002:4). Since then, a broad 
range of organizations have provided support services, including counseling, language 
classes, negotiating with employers to secure wages and compensation, and advocating 
for policy and legislative change. 
For women’s activists, there was a growing realization that pro-labor civil society 
activists within the migrant advocacy movement were not prioritizing issues of gender; 
thus women’s activists set out to create an independent movement focused solely on 
migrant women. The first of these efforts can be traced back to when the Korea Church 
Women United (Hankuk kyohoe yosong yonhaphui; hereafter KCWU) opened the first 
counseling center for migrant women workers in 1996. In the 1970s, the KCWU had 
been active in protesting against “sex tours” (also known as “kisaeng” tourism)
36
 by 
groups of Japanese men in Korea and it remained involved in protesting sexual violence 
as active supporters of the chongsindae (or so-called comfort women) movement (K. 
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Moon 1997, Lie 1995).
37
 The Women’s Church (yosong kyohui), another faith-based 
women’s organization founded in 1989 to eliminate gender discrimination within 
Protestant churches established a center for migrant women workers in Namyangju city 
in 1997. A coalition specifically for advocating migrant women was created in 2001 
when three organizations, the Anyang House for Migrant Workers (Iju nodongjaeui jip), 
the Gumi Migrant Worker Counseling Center (Oegugin nodongja sangdamso), and the 
Busan Association for Migrant Workers Human Rights (Oegugin nodongja in'gwŏn 
moim) came together to form the Solidarity Network for Migrant Women’s Human 
Rights (Iju yosŏng in'gwŏn yondae, or Solidarity Network).  
The basis for the founding of the Solidarity Network came from the recognition 
that civil society needed to pay special attention to migrant women because in many 
cases the human rights situation for women was far worse than for men. For instance, a 
civic organization, the Action Committee for the Human Rights of Migrant Workers, 
revealed in 2003 that more than 10 percent of migrant women workers had experienced 
sexual harassment or sexual violence in the workplace (Yang 2003). According to the 
Solidarity Network, “[C]ompared to migrant men, women are not aware of their rights. 
They are often dependent on male workers in that they are not proactive in demanding 
their rights and in seeking counseling and help…therefore the support of civil society 
organizations and women’s organizations is essential for improving the situation facing 
migrant women” (Solidarity Network 2002). Thus, what began as attention to foreign 
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the KCWU and the Korea Council on the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan. This movement 
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women in prostitution quickly expanded to addressing the plight of women migrant 
workers and marriage migrants. 
The Korea Women Migrants Human Rights Center 
Founded in 2001, the Korea Women Migrants Human Rights Center (Hankuk iju 
yŏsŏng in'gwŏn sentŏ, hereafter Center) has been the main organization leading the 
coalition for migrant women. Reverend Han Kuk-yeom, the founder of the Center studied 
theology at Hanshin University, a private Protestant university, with the dream of 
becoming Korea’s first female pastor. Upon marriage and after giving birth to her 
daughter, she left for Germany with her husband, the Reverend Choi Eui-pal, in 1988 to 
undertake graduate studies. After returning to Korea three years later, she assisted her 
husband who headed the Cheongam Church in Seoul while serving in leadership 
positions with the Korean Association of Women Theologians (KAWT) and the 
Women’s Committee of the Korean National Council of Christian Churches (KNCC) 
where she was pivotal in raising the issue of sexual violence in the pastoral community 
(interview with Han Kuk-yeom, 29 February 2012, Seoul).  
Han Kuk-yeom’s interest in migrants can be traced back to 1997 when eight 
undocumented Chinese workers, seven of them women, came to her church seeking 
refuge and protection from the immigration police. Han was appalled by how the workers 
had endured terrible working conditions for years: they had been locked up and sexually 
harassed, with no compensation for their labor. This chance encounter led Han Kuk-yeom 
and her husband to create the Seoul Foreign Workers Center (Seoul Oegukin Nodongja 
Sent'ŏ, hereafter SFWC) in 1997. While some advocacy organizations provided refuge 
for migrant workers at the time, there was no separate space where migrant women could 




jip) within the SFWC as a response to the need of shelters for migrant women workers, 
especially pregnant women.  
For Han, the absence of shelters for migrant women was indicative of a larger 
problem: the failure to address gender issues in relation to migration. She was frustrated 
by the fact that most advocates of migrant workers, including her husband lacked 
sensitivity to gender issues when dealing with the problems faced by migrant workers. 
Even though her husband was sympathetic to the feminist cause, Han noted that “there 
were limitations to how much [he] could empathize with and care for the needs of 
migrant women” (interview with Han Kuk-yeom, 29 February 2012, Seoul). As a result, 
Han decided to go her own way when she founded the Women Migrant Human Rights 
Center as an organization independent from the SFWC in 2001. According to Han, the 
organization was named the Women Migrants Human Rights Center in English instead of 
the Migrant Women Human Rights Center because she wanted the emphasis to be on 
women. Increasingly, as more migrant wives arrived throughout the 2000s the clientele 
shifted from workers to marriage migrants. Founded with the purpose of empowering 
migrant women by advancing their human rights, the Center has “served as a model for 
all migrant women support organizations, including those sponsored by the government 
(interview with Han Kuk-yeom, 29 February 2012, Seoul).”  
Over the past decade, the Center has come to be well respected within the activist 
and scholarly community. It has led several campaigns to support the human rights of 
migrant women, including campaigns against domestic violence, racial/ethnic and gender 
discrimination, and commercial marriage brokers. To promote the empowerment of 
migrant women, the Center established a variety of programs, including domestic 




empowering migrant women, the Center has emphasized the importance of counseling, 
leadership and community development. It has operated a domestic violence counselor 
training program for migrant women who are encouraged to become advocates of other 
migrant women. According to its monthly newsletter, the Center receives on average two 
hundred calls per month from migrant women requesting some form of counseling from 
advice on visa issues to assistance in resolving family conflicts. In addition to family and 
domestic violence counseling, the Center has provided legal assistance on matters related 
to naturalization, legal status, and divorce by partnering with public interest law firms 
such as Minbyun and Gonggam.
38
 Annually, the center receives an average of about 
1,500 visitors seeking its services.   
In addition to Seoul, the Center has five regional centers that are independently 
operated by local women’s activists in Busan, Daegu, North Choongcheong (Cheongju), 
South Kyeongsang (Jinju), and North Jeolla (Jeonju) provinces. In order to coordinate 
activities, the directors of the regional offices travel to Seoul at least twice a month to 
meet with the other regional directors; they also hold annual retreats and workshops to 
strengthen the solidarity ties between the regional centers. The Seoul center has eleven 
staff members, with three full-time Korean activists and a migrant activist. Hired on a 
part-time basis, migrant women with training in domestic violence prevention provide 
counseling by phone or in-person. Four Korean activists operate a shelter for women in a 
location that is undisclosed to the public. In terms of total membership, it is estimated 
that there are at least 150 dues-paying members, consisting of women’s activists as well 
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as students and volunteers who are sympathetic to supporting migrant women’s human 
rights. The majority of the Center’s funding comes from the Social Chest of Korea (sahoe 
gongdong mogeumhoe), which is a major grant provider for non-governmental, non-
profit organizations in Korea since 1998.  
In addition to Han Kuk-yeom who continues to serve as the director of the Center, 
the staff members at the Center come from feminist backgrounds with experience 
working from within the women’s movement. Kang Seong-euy who served as managing 
director (samoojang) at the Center from 2008 to 2013, began her career as a sexual 
violence counselor on Jeju Island. She majored in women’s studies in the early 1990s 
when sexual violence consumed the focus of the women’s movement. Upon completing 
her master’s degree in women’s studies, she become a sexual violence counselor and was 
asked to head the sexual violence counseling center by the Jeju branch of Womenlink 
(yŏsŏng minuhoe) where she worked for four years. She then moved to Seoul where she 
worked for about three years at the Seoul Women’s Human Resource Development 
Institute (yŏsŏng nungryok gaebal won) which is a public-private organization that 
promotes job training and women’s employment under the authority of the Seoul 
metropolitan government.  
Kang was recruited to work for the Center by another staff member who was also 
from her hometown of Jeju. When she first began working at the Center, Kang notes: “I 
was surprised by how many migrant women there were in Korea. When I heard of their 
stories, I realized that we were talking about another kind of discrimination here, one that 
went beyond gender. It seemed that there were many layers to this discrimination- it 




became interested in seeing what I could do to make a difference” (interview with Kang 
Seong-euy, 30 October 2012, Seoul). 
The Center has been a powerful force in the migrant women’s movement in part 
because it has worked in coalition with a wide variety of other advocacy organizations. 
For one, the Center has represented the interests of migrant women to the broader 
women’s movement as a member organization of the KWAU. Activists like Han Kuk-
yeom and Kang Seong-euy have relied on their extensive ties to women’s movement 
activists to bring attention to migrant women, including from feminist scholars. Within 
the KWAU, the Center members have participated actively in the annual policy summit 
meeting and Women’s March held every year on International Women’s Day (March 8). 
As a member of the KWAU, the Center contributed to the drafting of the country report 
submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), where it brought attention to human rights issues such as domestic violence, 
marriage brokers, and the unstable legal status of migrant women in Korea (KWAU 
2011). In its protests against domestic and sexual violence, the Center has worked closely 
with organizations like the KWH, which has helped to promote the expansion of 
counseling centers and shelters for migrant women.  
The Center is a migrant advocacy organization (iju danch’e) as well as a women’s 
organization (yŏsŏng danch’e). as a member organization of the Joint Committee of 
Migrants in Korea (JCMK), It has maintained close ties to migrant worker advocacy 
groups such as the Migrant Trade Union (MTU), a labor union organized by migrant 
workers, and the broader Solidarity Network for Migrants Human Rights (iju inkwon 








In 2003 when the progressive Roh Moo-Hyun government came into power, 
migrant women’s advocacy organizations found a powerful ally that was responsive to its 
calls for attention to migrant issues. Committed to continuing on the initiatives begun by 
the previous Kim Dae Jung administration (1998-2003), Roh’s “participatory government” 
(chamyo jeongbu) demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with civil society 
organizations (simin danc’he) by appointing an unprecedented number of former activists 
into the government (S. and K. Kim 2014). Most important to women activists was the 
appointment of Chi Eun-Hee, a former leader of the KWAU to the Ministry of Gender 
Equality in 2003. For the KWAU which historically had been a political oppositional 
force, the appointment marked a historic milestone and a fundamental shift in the 
movement’s relationship with the state to a more cooperative one.  
Notably, the inclusion of former activists and pro-women leaders into the highest 
echelons of power signaled the rise of “femocrats.” Femocrats refer to feminists or 
women activists who enter state bureaucracies as a way of inserting feminist concerns 
into public policy agendas (Eisenstein 1995:69). These feminists-turned-bureaucrats were 
favorably positioned to serve as “brokers” between the state and the women’s movement 
(S. and K. Kim: 12).   
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 TABLE 4.1  
LIST OF MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MIGRANT WOMEN’S 
ADVOCACY COALITION 
 
MIGRANT WOMEN ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS  
 
-Korea Migrant Women Human Rights Center (Hankuk iju yŏsŏng inkwŏn sent'ŏ) 
(South Gyeongsang, Taegu, Pusan, South Cholla, North Cholla, Ch’ungbuk branches) 
-Korea Migrant Women Voters Alliance (Hankuk iju yŏsŏng yukwŏncha yŏnmaeng)* 
-Gangseo Yangcheon Migrant Women’s House (Kangsŏ yangch'ŏn ijuyŏsŏngŭijip) 
-Ansan Migrant Women’s Counseling Center, BlinK (Ansan ijuyŏsŏng sangdamso) 
-Korea Migrant Women’s Association (Hankuk iju yŏsŏng yŏnhaphoe)* 
-Talk to Me* 
-Transnational Asian Women’s (TAW) Network* 
-Migrant Women Human Rights Forum (Iju yŏsŏng inkwŏn porum) 
-Solidarity Network for Migrant Women’s Human Rights (Iju yŏsŏng inkwŏn yŏntae) 
MIGRANT WORKER ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS 
 
-Solidarity Network for Migrant Workers’ Human Rights (Iju nodongja inkwŏn yŏntae) 
-Joint Committee on Migrant Workers (Oekukin iju nodongja taech'aek hyŏpŭihoe) 
-Migrant Trade Union (Iju nodongja nodong johap) 
-Solidarity with Migrants (Iju gongdong haengdong) 
-Association for Migrant Workers Human Rights (Oeguginnodongjain'gwŏnŭrwihanmoim) 
-Window to Asia (Ashiaŭich'ang) 
-Suwon Migrants Center (Suwon ijumin sent'ŏ) 
-Jeju Migrant Peace Community (Chejuoeguginp'yŏnghwagongdongch'e) 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
-Inchon Women’s Hotline, Ulala (Inch'ŏn yŏsŏngŭi chŏnhwa Ullalla) 
-Korea Women’s Hotline (Yŏsŏngŭi chŏnhwa) 
-Korea Council for Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan (Hankuk chŏngsintae munche 
taech'aek hyŏpŭihoe) 
-Womenlink (Hankuk yŏsŏng minuhoe) 
-Korea Women’s Association United (Hankuk yŏsŏng tanch'e yŏnhap) 
-Women with Disabilities Empathy (Changae yŏsŏng kongkam) 
-Korea Disabled Women’s Union (Yŏsŏng changaein yeonhap) 
-National Solidarity Against Trafficking (Sŏngmaemae munje haegyŏrŭrwihan jŏn'gungn yŏndae) 
-Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center (Han'guk sŏngp'ongnyŏk sangdamso) 
-National Association of Domestic Violence Counseling Centers (Chŏn'guk kajŏng p'ongnyŏk 
sangdamso hyŏbŭihoe) 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS 
 
-Human Rights Sarangbang (In'gwŏn undong sarangbang) 
-Korea Center for UN Human Rights Policy (KOCUN) (UN in'gwŏn jŏngch'aek sent'ŏ) 
-Gonggam (Kongik inkwŏn pŏpchaetan gonggam) 
-Apil (Kongik pop sent'ŏ Apil) 
-Solidarity for Anti-Discrimination Legislation (Ch'apyŏl kŭmchipŏp chechŏng yŏntae) 




Thus, under the Roh administration, negotiation and cooperation shaped the relationship 
between the women’s movement and the state. 
Capitalizing on the favorable political environment, migrant women’s advocacy 
organizations began to lobby the MGEF to fund support programs for migrant women. 
As an activist with extensive ties within civil society and the government, Han Kuk-
kyeom at the Center was critical in bringing attention to migrant women. For two years, 
Han pressed upon Minister Chi Eun-hee with whom she had worked together in the 
KWAU and the Korea Council for Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan, to 
consider instituting programs for migrant women (interview with Han Kuk-yeom, 29 
February 2012, Seoul).  
These efforts paid off when the Ministry instituted its first program for migrant 
women in 2004 when it commissioned six organizations including the Center, to create 
language textbooks and guidebooks on maternal care for marriage migrants. The other 
organizations included in this project were the Incheon Women’s Hotline, Choongbuk 
Women Migrants Human Rights Center, Jeonbuk Women Farmers Association, 
Changwon Women’s Hotline, and the Busan Women’s Association. The Ministry 
allocated funding support to these organizations over a five year period beginning in 2005 
with a hundred million won (approximately US$1 million) grant from a major 
conglomerate, the Amore Pacific Corporation (formerly known as Taepyongyang 
Chemicals).The project marked the first official government support program for migrant 
women (K. Han 2009).  
Despite their close cooperation with the government in developing programs for 
migrant women, many of the concerns of advocacy organizations were overlooked when 




involved in discussions with officials from the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Labor who had sought out their advice, and 
they had harbored high hopes that the government would integrate their concerns into the 
policy agenda. Yet, when the Roh government revealed its “Grand Plan” in April 2006 as 
discussed in Chapter Three, it was evident to activists that the policy neglected many of 
their concerns. According to one activist, it was as if the government had “used civic 
organizations as sources of information, but disregarded their concerns” (interview with 
an activist, 13 October 2011, Seoul).   
In June 2006, a coalition of advocacy organizations consisting of the Center, 
KWH, the Solidarity Network for Migrants Human Rights, the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM-Seoul), and Gonggam hosted a discussion forum to criticize the 
government’s “Grand Plan” for integrating marriage migrant families which was 
announced in April 2006. During this forum, Kim Min-jeong, an activist and the policy 
director of the Solidarity Network, expressed concern that the policy requires more 
specific and professionalized content without which it would lose effectiveness (M. Kim 
2006:56). Another advocacy activist and human rights lawyer, So Rami, shifted the 
attention to marriage brokers, arguing that “the current system of international marriage 
brokering is structured by an unequal gender hierarchy, where the ultimate victims are 
women” (So 2006:12). The heaviest critique came from Han Kuk-yeom who stated that  
“this policy treats marriage migrants as objects of protection who receive 
education and welfare, and it fails to see women as active agents. Marriage 
migrants do not exist for the sake of the family. The family should exist for the 
women. If not, migrant women will continue to be marginalized and become 
sacrificial lambs for sustaining traditional gender ideals. The only win-win 
strategy is to establish a policy that does not subordinate women to the family but 




In short, the institution of policy brought out the divergent perspectives between activists 
and government officials.  
The Price of Human Rights 
Echoing earlier campaigns for women’s rights, women’s organizations have been 
mobilized around promoting the human rights of migrant women. On the one hand, by 
organizing their activism around the discourse of human rights, women’s activists have 
made migrant women a highly visible minority to whom extraordinary public attention 
has been paid. The public awareness about the difficulties faced by migrant women 
presents a stark contrast to previous generations of Korean women who married 
foreigners and gave birth to mixed-race children and were shunned by mainstream 
society (M. Lee 2008, K. Park 2013).  
Moreover, migrant women’s advocacy groups have successfully secured 
incremental reforms to immigration procedures and regulations that aim to guarantee the 
legal status of migrants. Not only that, they were instrumental in developing the initial 
educational and support programs for marriage migrants to assist them with their 
adjustment to life in Korea. By bringing attention to the myriad problems associated with 
an unstable legal status, migrant women’s organizations like the Center were pivotal to 
securing reforms to the nationality law in 2004 that instituted simplified naturalization 
procedures and extended employment rights to migrant spouses. Furthermore, they 
successfully pushed for reforms to the anti-domestic violence legislation to include non-
citizen marriage migrants as subjects of legal protection and services in 2006.  
On the other hand, the demand for human rights has distinct and oftentimes 
unintended consequences for those whose human rights are claimed and protected (Choo 




by linking them with localized and often gendered ideas that may facilitate the re-
articulation of national identity and ideals of femininity (Merry 2006). In her critical 
study of the anti-prostitution movement in Korea, Sealing Cheng (2011) demonstrates 
how human rights for women in prostitution were articulated as anti-trafficking which 
made all prostitutes into trafficked women who have been victimized by criminals.  
In the case of marriage migrants in Korea, human rights were articulated through 
multicultural family support policies that mandate state responsibility to protect migrant 
women, based on gendered ideas about women’s roles in the family.  In other words, 
migrant women have been depicted as deserving of human rights protection not because 
human rights are universal but because migrant women belong to families and provide an 
important function as reproducers and care providers in those families. Because both the 
state and civil society can appropriate human rights discourses for their own agendas, 
claiming human rights requires an examination of how human rights discourse translates 
into legal and policy reform, and what kind of impact these institutional changes have on 
women. Below, I identify four major “costs” associated with claiming human rights for 
migrant women.  
Migrant Women as Victims  
First, the articulation of human rights relies on the construction of migrant women 
as victims whose human rights have been violated. In the case of marriage migrants, the 
campaign against marriage brokers illustrates how the treatment of migrant women as 
victims resulted in legislation that regulates marriage brokering but fails to protect the 
needs of marriage migrants in the brokering process. As a result, gross human rights 




Perhaps the greatest driving force behind marriage brokerage has been the local 
governments that have supported the efforts of rural bachelors to find foreign wives 
through commercial brokers. As early as 1996, local rural governments instituted a 
“Farmers and Fishermen Bachelors’ Marriage Project” (nongŏch'on ch'onggak changga 
bonaegi undŏng) which provided monetary subsidies for local bachelors to find wives (C. 
Freeman 2011, H. Lee 2008). For instance, as early as 1996, the Naju city government in 
South Cheolla province began to offer approximately US$4000 in assistance to offset 
costs for weddings to ten rural bachelors beginning (Yonhap News 20 August 1996).  
While such government programs did not aim specifically at international marriages and 
included support for domestic marriages, by 2007 more than sixty local governments 
were supporting rural bachelors to find foreign wives by offering some form of subsidy 
(Cheng 2011:1639). These subsidies were used to offset expenses incurred from hiring 
the services of marriage brokers. 
In addition, the brokerage industry grew significantly after its deregulation by the 
central government. In 1998, the Korean government reformed the Family Rites Act 
(kachŏngŭilyee kwanhan pŏplyul), by no longer requiring commercial marriage brokers 
and introduction agencies to have a license or register with a local authority (G. Han and 
Seol 2006:245). Due to the deregulation, commercial brokers grew exponentially, and by 
2005, there were approximately 2,000 brokerage agencies offering their services (Ibid). 
Because these enterprises rely on introduction fees which are paid out only in the case of 
a successfully arranged match, brokers have been competitively intent on producing as 
many couples as possible through the active recruitment of prospective brides for their 
male clients. To win over as many clients as possible, brokers have used slogans such as: 




“no age limit”; “only 7 days from meeting to wedding”;“they [foreign brides] will never 
run away” (H. Yang 2011). 
Beginning in the early 2000s, advocacy organizations began to problematize the 
practices of marriage brokers when they uncovered through testimonies from migrant 
women that brokers employed deceitful and sometimes coercive practices during the 
process of recruiting and matchmaking. Brokers often did not truthfully reveal accurate 
information about the prospective grooms that would be disadvantageous to a successful 
match, hiding mental health, physical disabilities, incomes, marital history, and level of 
education (H. Kim 2009). Furthermore, many women had been lured to meetings with the 
Korean men under false pretenses and held in debt bondage if they tried to back out of the 
arranged meetings with men. Alarmed activists characterized these practices as violations 
of human rights that were reminiscent of “trafficking” (insin mae mae) and 
“commercialized marriage” (mae mae hon) (Cheng 2011:1639).  
Public attention began to focus on the problem of marriage brokers when a major 
progressive newspaper, Hankyoreh, came under fire in 2005 after publishing an 
advertisement for a marriage brokerage. Stating that “the advantages of a Vietnamese 
bride- her bloodline is similar to ours, she follows the custom of serving a single husband, 
and devotedly takes care of her husband; unlike Chinese and Filipinas, her body odor is 
pleasant,” the advertisement prompted protests from women’s groups and ordinary 
readers who found it highly offensive and discriminatory (Paik 2011:136). 
 To add insult to injury, another media incident provoked public concerns over 
how migrant women were being portrayed within Korean society. A conservative daily, 
the Chosun Ilbo published an article in April 2006 titled,” The Land of Dreams: Korea” 




on the fact that these brokers were actively engaged in brokering which is illegal in 
Vietnam, the article focused on how Vietnamese women fueled the demand for brokers 
because they desired to come to Korea in order to achieve the “Korean dream.” In the 
article, a group of Vietnamese women were photographed along with the caption that 
read: “women eagerly waiting to be chosen by their “Korean prince” (Chae 2006).  
Furthermore, the article prompted an escalation of diplomatic tensions between 
Korea and Vietnam when a Vietnamese newspaper Tuoitre, got wind of the article and 
filed an official complaint with the Chosun Ilbo demanding that it retract the article and 
extend a formal apology to the Vietnamese people (Chae 2006). The state-run 
Vietnamese Women’s Union called for a crackdown on brokers active within Vietnam, 
while the Korean ambassador in Vietnam was forced to make a public apology on behalf 
of the Korean government. Due to the protests from Vietnamese diplomatic officials who 
expressed their dissatisfaction over Korea’s treatment of Vietnamese women, marriage 
brokerage in Korea attracted both national and international attention at this time. 
Moreover, the controversy sparked the mobilization of a wide range of civic 
organizations in protest against the activities of marriage brokers. On May 20, 2006, 
more than fifty people consisting of Vietnamese students, workers, and housewives 
supported by the Center, and the KWH organized a street protest against marriage 
brokers. At this protest, one Vietnamese marriage migrant noted, 
” As a Vietnamese woman who is married to a Korean man, the advertisements by 
marriage brokers were demeaning and humiliating to me. These advertisements 
treat Vietnamese women like commodities who can be bought at any price, where 
any Korean man can buy a pretty and young Vietnamese bride” (Nam 2006).  
 
In July 2006, the Center and its coalition partners formed the Action Committee 




a formal petition to the National Human Rights Commission to prohibit the use of 
offensive advertisements by marriage brokers.
40
 In a press release, the Action Committee 
argued,  
“Thoughtless advertisements that blatantly commodify women in order to expand 
business profits are actions that violate the human rights of women and should be 
stopped immediately. This problem not only violates the human rights of women 
from other countries, it violates the human rights of all women by fostering 
prejudice and discrimination against women. Also many advertisements glorify 
Korea by denigrating and purposefully distorting the native cultures of the 
migrant women. These problems can foster more prejudice towards people who 
become our family members through international marriage” (So 2006).  
 
The tragic death of a Vietnamese woman further supported the growing calls for 
imposing government regulations on marriage brokers. On July 4, 2007, nineteen-year-
old Huan Mai was found dead in Cheonan in South Choongcheong province, after being 
beaten to death by her husband. In a fit of rage, the husband had beaten Huan Mai until 
eighteen of her ribs were broken. It was later discovered that the broker who had arranged 
the marriage had hidden the husband’s mental health problems from Huan Mai. The 
Huan Mai case received extensive media coverage for its shocking brutality and 
prompted the Korean public to reflect upon the ramifications of their complicity in 
promoting international marriages. In the husband’s sentencing, the presiding judge 
released the following statement,  
“This criticism should not be focused solely on the accused. Rather, this case 
reflects the immaturity of our society as a whole. It comes from our arrogance in 
importing foreign women as if they were tools for resolving the marriage problem 
of rural bachelors. It also comes from our recklessness in thinking that a man and 
a woman living together, even if communication is impossible between them, is a 
marriage. Thus our foolishness inevitably sowed the seeds of this tragedy. 
Through this case, we must heartbreakingly confess our incivility trapped inside 
                                                 
40
 Participating groups include: You &Me (Vietnamese student organization), women’s committee of the 
Democratic Labor Party, Gonggam (public interest law group), Sister Network (feminist group), Korea 




the false façade of a civilized, economic powerhouse of the 21st century” 
(Daejeon High Court 2008, K. Han 2009).  
 
In the aftermath of this case, migrant women’s organizations revamped their efforts to 
demand attention to the problems of domestic violence in cross-border marriages, the 
irresponsible practices of commercial brokers and the ill-preparedness of Korean spouses.   
Such sentimental eloquence however, has worked to construct migrant women as 
pitiful victims of deceptive brokers and abusive husbands who deserve public sympathy. 
By stressing the horrific abuses experienced by migrant women, advocacy organizations 
reinforced the stereotype of all migrant women as victims of sexual and domestic 
violence. A policy aide to National Assembly member Kim Choon-jin who sponsored the 
Regulation Act notes that the advocacy organizations “successfully raised attention to the 
issue (of migrant women) in a very short period of time. However, because they are so 
focused on “battered women” they ended up steering attention away from other aspects of 
the problem. The problems faced by marriage migrants are multi-faceted, but it has 
become reduced to one thing: battered women (mae matneun yŏja)” (interview with Yoo 
Kyeong-sun, 14 August, 2012, Seoul).  
The unilateral portrayal of migrant women as victims robs them of their agency 
and situates them as those who cannot be anything but victims. According to human 
rights lawyer So Rami of Gonggam, a leading public interest law organization, the 
Korean government does not “view migrant women as rights-bearing individuals (kwŏnli 
chuch'e), but as policy targets (daesang)” (interview with So Rami, 2 December, 2011, 
Seoul). While it is true that many migrant women have been victims, to treat all migrant 
women as such fails to acknowledge that the experiences of migrants vary, and that 




Feminist ethnographic studies of migration have stressed the different degrees of 
agency that women exercise in the migration process (Freeman 2011, Constable 2005, 
Piper and Roces 2003). While cross-border marriages have been regarded as a reflection 
of structural economic inequalities between countries and a coercive patriarchal practice 
for migrant women, Piper and Roces (2003:11) have countered the one-sided portrayal of 
international marriage as oppressing women by arguing that in some cases migrant 
spouses can “benefit from international marriages in a way same-nationality wives do 
not.” Contrary to dominant perceptions, not all women are “sold” into marriage or 
deceived by brokers. Many women opt for marriage migration for economic as well as 
non-economic reasons.  For instance, in the early 1990s, hundreds of Filipina women 
married Korean men through the Unification Church, which actively promoted interracial 
marriages as a religious practice. In short, treating migrant women as victims of deceitful 
brokers and abusive husbands fails to adequately recognize the agency of migrant women. 
Moreover, the wholesale treatment of migrant women as victims creates 
“unwarranted blurs” between different categories of migrant women (Constable, 2006). 
Nicole Constable (2006:2) has pointed to the dangers of treating all migrant brides, 
domestic workers, and prostitutes as ‘trafficked’ women; doing so reinforces negative 
stereotypes about migrant women and neglects attention to the varying circumstances by 
which women migrate. In particular, Constable takes issue with the depiction of migrant 
brides as trafficked women. According to Constable, the failure to take the different 
circumstances and perspectives of women into consideration has resulted in misguided 
legislation like the International Marriage Broker Regulation Act which was passed by 
the U.S. Congress in July 2003. Because the legislation presumes and conflates foreign 




legislation is unable to adequately address the problem of domestic abuse faced by some 
foreign brides.  
Similarly, the Act to Regulate Marriage Brokerages (Regulation Act) passed by 
the Korean National Assembly in 2007, which has been directed at policing and 
administering to the activities of commercial brokers, treats migrant wives as victims who 
must be protected through state regulation. According to the act, brokerages are required 
to register with a local government, and brokers located abroad must abide by the local 
laws of the country where they conduct business. As critics point out however, increased 
state regulation has not been effective in policing the activities of commercial brokers nor 
in diminishing human rights abuses. Migrant women continue to be exposed to high rates 
of gender violence, especially domestic violence.  From 2007 to 2009, the Emergency 
Hotline for Migrant Women reported that the number of domestic violence incidents 
doubled from 1,674 to 4205 cases. Although migrant women compose less than two 
percent of the total female population in Korea, migrant women comprised eight percent 
of the total deaths due to domestic violence in 2014 alone, where seven migrant women 
died at the hands of their Korean husbands (Gonggam 2014).  
The legislation to regulate marriage brokers have been ineffective because for one, 
there is no way to protect women victimized by unregistered agencies. According to the 
NGO shadow report submitted to the UN CEDAW in 2011, it was estimated that only 
about 400 out of more than 1,300 brokerages are registered. Second, there is no way for 
the Korean government to control the illegal activities of brokerages located abroad, even 
in countries where brokering is considered illegal (KWAU 2011). Third, while local 
governments are in charge of implementing the Regulation Act, they are the very ones 




men who wish to seek the services of a marriage broker. Thus, local governments have 
very little incentive to crackdown on the activities of marriage brokerages.  
The State as Male Protector: heightened state surveillance 
Second, in mobilizing around migrant women’s human rights, women’s 
organizations have looked to the state as the male protector, which has provided 
“protection” through increased state surveillance on migrant women and their bodies. 
Political theorist Wendy Brown (1995) has argued that the portrayal of women as 
helpless victims can lead to the legitimization of the state as their protector which 
paradoxically enhances state power to exert more controls on women and their sexuality. 
In Korea, the institution of multicultural family support policies has been accompanied by 
heightened state efforts to keep detailed statistical records on migrant women. Since 2005, 
the Korea Immigration Statistics (KIS) bureau within the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has 
published highly detailed statistical data on immigrant women (kyorhon iminja), 
including data on country of origin, visa-type, gender, geographic location, and 
nationality status. 
 Additionally, the Act to Support Multicultural Families mandates a fact-finding 
survey to be conducted every three years by the MGEF in order to re-evaluate policies for 
multicultural families (Article 4).The first national survey on multicultural families 
published in 2009 reports statistical data on multicultural families, including nationality 
status, age, income, Korean language ability, employment, life satisfaction, children, and 
marital relations (MHW, 2009). In order to conduct this survey, government officials and 
researchers treat marriage migrants as objects of research who are constantly called upon 
to provide information not only on vital statistics but personal anecdotes for evaluating 




being called upon by strangers to provide information about her experiences in Korea: “I 
receive calls all the time from reporters, local officials, and acquaintances requesting 
personal interviews with me. I feel like I have become some guinea pig for an experiment 
that is constantly poked and prodded” (interview with Ting, 27 June 2012, Seoul).  
The state uses the information it has gathered to implement and evaluate 
government programs, and also to maintain surveillance on the lives of migrant women. 
Through the multicultural family support centers, which keeps detailed records on 
multicultural residents in the vicinity, the local and central governments are able to keep 
track of the movement and activities of multicultural families, including the number of 
children they have, their language ability, and marital status. The home-visit language 
program (pangmun kyoyuk) for example dispatches private language tutors employed by 
the multicultural family support centers to the individual homes of multicultural families, 
which allows the support centers to intimately monitor the lives of migrant women. In 
this case, the private homes of multicultural families have become sites of state 
surveillance over migrant women.  
In addition to increased monitoring of migrant women, the government has 
instituted measures to fortify the border by tightening requirements for potential migrant 
women who wish to apply for spousal visas. Beginning in April 2014, the Ministry of 
Justice instituted new procedures that require marriage migrants to demonstrate basic 
proficiency in Korean by passing at least the first level on the Test of Proficiency in 
Korean (TOPIK) before they are issued a spousal (F-6) visa. Additionally, men who wish 
to invite foreign spouses to Korea must also earn at least 14.8 million won 
(approximately US$13,500) a year. In the year following the new regulation, the Korean 




from 5,708 to 2, 967 in 2014 (Chosun Ilbo 25 April 2010). In the name of protecting 
migrant women, the state has thus made it more difficult for migrant wives to secure a 
legal status in Korea through revamped border controls.  
Service Provision at the Cost of Advocacy 
Third, increased state intervention in the name of human rights not only heightens 
state surveillance on women, it has also worked to structure opportunities for civic 
organizations to shift the focus of their activities to service provisions. In March 2008, 
the National Assembly passed the Act to Support Multicultural Families which mandated 
local governments to establish government support centers for multicultural families, a 
task that could be delegated to civic organizations. As the legislation does not restrict the 
type of civic organization that can provide services to multicultural families, a wide range 
of organizations from faith-based to social welfare organizations have sought to secure 
government funding by offering programs for multicultural families. Since continued 
government support is contingent on the demonstrated impact that these organizations 
bring to the local communities, these organizations have oriented their activities toward 
maximizing their reach and influence through a competitive struggle to secure as large a 
clientele pool as possible.  
From the moment they enter the country, marriage migrants are guided through a 
streamlined process where government and civil society organizations bombard them 
with information on the variety of resources and educational programs that are made 
available to them. Beginning with the local immigration bureau where migrant women 
first visit to register and receive their foreign resident registration cards, they are directed 
to the local multicultural support center where they are given orientation information and 




navigate the public transportation system. At the local support center, they are provided 
guidebooks on family life and cultural etiquette which have been translated into the 
native languages of the migrant women. One advocacy activist described how marriage 
migrants have responded to the explosion of services: “Because there are so many 
programs that marriage migrants can choose from, they end up “shopping” for programs 
and services by going from organization to organization benefit from free events such as 
medical check-ups and family outings” (interview with an activist, 11 November 2011, 
Seoul). 
On the one hand, the expansion of government-run centers has afforded migrant 
women more options and greater conveniences in seeking out services to assist with their 
settlement and adjustment in Korea. Since all the centers offer the same basic services, 
marriage migrants are able to take language classes at a nearby local center, or if they are 
unable to travel, request the services of tutors who offer private language lessons by 
visiting their homes. Hung, a Vietnamese marriage migrant who lives in Guri city, a 
commuter city located outside of Seoul in Kyeonggi province, decided to visit the 
multicultural family support center near her home in Guri rather than commute over an 
hour to an advocacy organization in downtown Seoul. She notes, “the Guri city 
government operates a library for multicultural children and my son really likes to go 
there” (interview with Hung, 24 August 2012, Guri). With the convenience of such 
facilities right in their neighborhoods, growing numbers of marriage migrants do not feel 
the need to venture far to seek support services from specific advocacy organizations  
On the other hand, as the number of government-sponsored multicultural family 
support services and centers has grown, advocacy organizations have become 




Human Rights Center, which used to be the only provider of support for migrant 
communities only a decade ago, the expansion of government-run services is likened to a 
competitive free market struggle for more clientele. Anthropologist Han Geun-Soo notes 
that “competition between government and civic organizations gives rise to inconvenient 
relations in which the “customers are snatched away unilaterally and the operations 
disrupted” (G. Han 2007:51, Kim 2006:25).  
Women’s organizations engaged in advocacy are not immune from the 
competitive pressure because many of them also rely on central and local government 
funding to sustain their organizations, such as the Women’s Hotline which provides 
counseling and shelter services to abused migrant women.  While advocacy organizations 
have attempted to remain focused on empowerment, they find it difficult when the social 
environment demands civic organizations to deliver service provisions. A Korean activist 
at the Center remarks:  
“We must focus on women's empowerment especially because other places are 
focused on service delivery. Our focus on empowerment is how we differentiate 
ourselves. The people who work here are in principle dedicated to empowering 
women, but because Korean society these days emphasizes service provisions, we 
also are unable to focus solely on empowerment. To do so, we need the societal 
resources to be able to promote empowerment, without which we are forced to 
compromise by focusing on service provisions” (interview with Heo-Oh Young 
Sook, 12 June 2012, Seoul). 
 
Despite these efforts, advocacy activists have expressed frustration that many 
people are not able to discern the difference between advocacy organizations and 
multicultural family support centers based on the services they offer. The distinction is 
further blurred by the fact that some advocacy organizations, like the Choongbuk Women 
Migrants Human Rights Center, has received local government funding to carry out 




state policies on the advocacy movement has been demobilization: “Before the 
government got involved, advocacy groups were able to foster tight coalitional ties and 
work together. With the expansion of both advocacy and service provision-oriented 
organizations, there are too many voices and clashing interests to reach a consensus. 
Everyone thinks they know what is best so there is no sense of unity and direction in the 
movement” (interview with Heo-Oh Young Sook, 12 June 2012, Seoul).  
The emphasis on service provision over advocacy is not unique to the migrant 
women’s movement, but is a common story for grassroots women’s organizations in the 
face of increased state intervention in Korea and elsewhere. In her study of women’s 
NGOs in Latin America, Sonia Alvarez (2009) notes that women’s movement 
organizations have become more like professionalized service providers that are 
subcontracted by the state, in contrast to the grassroots feminist organizations that 
operated more organically and informally in previous decades. Prior campaigns for 
women’s human rights in Korea experienced parallel shifts as the expansion of state 
support for sexual and domestic violence counseling centers, led to the increase in non-
feminist, government-affiliated organizations whose interests were mostly focused on 
program implementation rather than advocacy.  
As of 2012, there were 165 sexual assault centers (SACs) and 18 shelters, with 10 
centers specializing in child sexual assault cases. Kyungja Jung (2014:89) notes that 
“[f]unding, particularly from the state, has played a pivotal role in changing feminist 
practice in terms of the organizational structure, the prioritization of activities, and the 
depoliticization of feminist practice.” Subject to government scrutiny in exchange for 
continued funding, these sexual assault centers are forced to abide by directives and goals 




have directed their attention to securing and fulfilling specific short-term government 
projects that seek to demonstrate the impact of state funding rather than long-term 
transformative change such as shifts in societal views on sexual violence. Moreover, 
government funding has not only forced feminist organizations to compete against each 
other, it has also changed the very grassroots nature of the organizations by demanding 
increased bureaucratization.  
Reproducing Patriarchy 
When the state takes on the stance of a paternal provider by offering protective 
services to women in their capacity as wives and mothers, deeply entrenched patriarchal 
ideals of womanhood are not only left unchallenged but reinforced. For instance, support 
policies for multicultural families have prioritized the interests of the family over 
individual women. The emphasis on support services have been on maternal health and 
child care programs that assist with childbirth and childrearing, where migrant women are 
encouraged to receive support so that they become proper mothers to their Korean-born 
children.  
In the Guidebook for Living in Korea published by the MGEF for marriage 
migrants, the government reinforces traditional beliefs about prenatal care and 
motherhood with scripts like:  
“Koreans have long believed that the behavior and mentality of the mother during 
pregnancy affects the baby mentally, emotionally and physically. This approach 
to prenatal care is called “Tae-gyo.” Based on traditional beliefs, the pregnant 
mother should take precaution in every action she takes, refrain from foul thinking 
and harsh actions, and talk and act in a relaxed manner in order to give birth to a 
healthy child” (MGEF, 2014: 146).  
 
Patriarchal ideals about motherhood are thus reproduced when the state propagates and 




In their efforts to claim human rights as women’s rights, activist women have 
ironically implicated themselves in fostering a gendered and nationalist project of making 
Korean mothers and wives out of migrant women, in ways that goes against the very 
principles of gender equality that they have long struggled for. Additionally, activists 
have not posed a challenge to immigration and family policies that seek to incorporate 
migrant women based on the fulfillment of their wifely and mothering duties. Nor have 
they posed an effective challenge to citizenship policies that condition the membership of 
migrant women on their domesticity and reproduction (Cheng, 2011: 1641).  
Instead, women’s activists have relied on existing institutional frameworks such 
as anti-domestic violence legislation to push for exceptions to be made for migrant 
women who have become victims of domestic violence. Ultimately, such requests for 
exceptions have minimal impact when migrant women’s legal status continues to be 
premised on their dependent status on men. These assertions do not come from a 
universalism that all migrants deserve protections and legal rights, but from specific 
gendered understandings of a woman’s role in the family: as mothers who provide care 
for their husbands and their children. In effect, human rights as articulated by civil 
society and the state have gone hand in hand to reassert traditional ideals of motherhood 
and family and thereby reinforce patriarchy.  
This chapter has discussed how negotiations of human rights by women’s 
organizations have expanded legal rights and protections for migrant women. In Chapter 
Two, I presented a framework of citizenship as a negotiation by the state and women over 
membership and rights that has unintended and contradictory consequences. In this case, 
mobilization over human rights by women’s organizations has unintended consequences 




require state protection and surveillance based on patriarchal ideals about womanhood 
and family.  
Broadly, the migrant women’s movement echoes earlier women’s movements 
against gender-based violence that mobilized over human rights in their promotion of 
women’s rights. While successful at securing public support and formal institutional 
changes, women’s mobilization over human rights has time and again proven to be 
inadequate when it comes to undermining the patriarchal ideals that underlie women’s 
citizenship. Through enhanced state protection of women, the negotiation of human rights 
has reinforced patriarchy while providing a space to acknowledge the vulnerability of 
women.  
As a result, migrant women continue to be subject to high rates of gender violence 
as well as gender inequality where their rights are not universally ensured but conditional 
on the fulfillment of patriarchal ideals. Similarly, the limitations of the movement for 
migrant women indicate that human rights as the basis for negotiating citizenship has 
unintended consequences that neither fully protects nor empowers women. The next 
chapter turns to the strategies that women’s organizations have encouraged migrant 







Citizenship as a Paradox for Marriage Migrants 
 
 
One of the first things that Koreans want to know when they meet a marriage 
migrant is whether she has naturalized. Marriage migrants are the only category of 
foreign-born, non-ethnic migrants in Korea who are encouraged and furthermore, 
expected to naturalize. To Koreans, naturalization is an indicator that the marriage 
migrant has become a genuine “Korean bride” who intends to fulfill her role as a dutiful 
wife and mother. On the other hand, marriage migrants who do not naturalize are 
regarded as those whose sincerity and commitment to their families are suspect. For older 
generations of Koreans who still adhere to the Confucian ideal of ch'ulkaoein, the 
normative assumption is that married women are no longer members of their natal family 
but of their husband’s family (Gelb 1994, Kendall 1996).
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 For cross-border marriages, 
this translates into the belief that as a member of the husband’s family the migrant bride 
should also hold the same nationality. 
For marriage migrants however, citizenship acquisition is not a symbol of filial 
duty or commitment but the only method of securing a legal status in the face of 
immigration policies that make it difficult to reside in Korea with a non-citizen status. 
While the spousal visa (F-6) grants employment and residency rights to noncitizen 
spouses of Korean nationals, it is a precarious and temporary legal status because the visa 
must be renewed every year. Moreover, at each application for renewal, the Korean 
spouse is required to serve as a legal guarantor (sinwŏnpochŭngin). Without the 
sponsorship of the Korean spouse, marriage migrants are unable to apply for visa 
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extensions, citizenship or permanent residency. The dependent status of marriage 
migrants means that their legal status is one that can be easily revoked at the whim of the 
Korean spouse. As a human rights lawyer from the public interest law group Gonggam 
notes,  
“[m]any of the problems are exacerbated by the fact that the (migrant) woman 
cannot do anything about her legal status without her husband’s help. So in the 
case of domestic violence, it will go unreported because the woman is afraid that 
she will lose her visa status in the event that the exposure leads to a divorce” 
(interview with So Rami, 2 December 2011, Seoul).  
 
For marriage migrants then, Korean citizenship is the only way to have an independent 
legal status. When asked why she would not divorce her husband who had physically hit 
her on multiple occasions during their altercations, one marriage migrant who held a 
spousal visa explained her predicament: “I can’t divorce him because I don’t have 
citizenship in Korea. If I divorce him, I may be deported to the Philippines and I can’t go 
back to the Philippines because divorce is illegal there” (interview with Jackie, 19 June 
2012, Seoul).  
Marriage migrants not only prefer naturalization as a protective measure against 
abuses from their spouses, but also because it resolves the inconveniences of maintaining 
a foreign resident status in Korea. While foreign residents with valid visas can apply for a 
foreigner registration card (oekukin dŭngnok chŭng) which serves as legal proof of 
identity, the lack of a citizen registration number causes many challenges for foreign 
residents in their day-to-day lives. Many activities such as opening banking and cell 
phone accounts, making purchases online, and getting tax receipts require having a 
citizen registration number. Although many places now recognize foreign resident 




number continues to incur huge inconveniences for foreign residents in ways that make it 
more beneficial to acquire a citizen registration number if possible.  
For some migrant women, the very ordeal they must endure in order to maintain a 
foreign legal status is an incentive for naturalization. Because the spousal visa is only 
valid for one year, marriage migrants must visit the immigration office to renew the visa. 
Moreover, they must apply for the visa at the immigration bureau located in the 
jurisdiction where they initially registered their permanent address. For migrants who 
have moved to a different city or do not live particularly close to an immigration bureau, 
the trip to renew the visa can be a day-long affair. Furthermore, the visa renewal process 
requires that marriage migrants be physically accompanied by their husbands who must 
serve as their legal guarantor. A marriage migrant from Vietnam explains why she 
naturalized: “[m]y husband kept complaining about having to visit the immigration office 
every year. It was a huge inconvenience for him because he had to ask for a day off from 
work in order to go to the immigration office with me” (interview with An, 3 August 
2012, Seoul). Thus, marriage migrants opt for Korean citizenship in order to avoid the 
myriad difficulties and inconveniences of maintaining a precarious and dependent status.  
 In 2004, the National Assembly revised the Nationality Act to introduce 
“simplified naturalization” (ganyi gwih’wa) requirements for certain categories of people, 
including spouses of Korean nationals. According to the revised Nationality Act, 
marriage migrants qualify for simplified naturalization if they meet the following 







TABLE 5.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR SIMPLIFIED NATURALIZATION 
 Must be a legal adult (19 years of age or older) 
 Must have good moral conduct 
 Must have the ability to maintain living on his/her own 
 Must have basic knowledge of language, customs and 
culture befitting a Korean national 
 Must have maintained marriage status and kept residence in 
Korea for the past 2 or more consecutive years; 
OR 
Must have maintained marriage status for 3 or more 
consecutive years and kept residence in Korea for at least 1 
year 
 
In contrast to the five year residency requirement for all other foreign nationals, the 
simplified naturalization procedures allow marriage migrants to apply for naturalization 
after two consecutive years of residence in Korea.  
 Following the revision, the number of naturalizations by marriage migrants has 
increased steadily. According to figures from the Korea Immigration Service (KIS), more 
than 91,609 marriage migrants acquired Korean nationality from 2002 to 2013 (KIS, 
2002-2013). The Korean government reported a record high in the number of 
naturalization in 2009 when 25,044 individuals acquired Korean nationality [see Table 
5.2 below]. Of these, 17,141 or 68 percent of all approved naturalizations that year were 
applications from marriage migrants. By 2013, the number of marriage migrants who 
naturalized that year had declined to 9,021, but marriage migrants comprised an even 
larger proportion at 80 percent. These figures indicate that marriage migrants constitute 
the largest category of foreign residents who are acquiring Korean citizenship and 
becoming new citizens in Korea. 
TABLE 5.2 NATURALIZATIONS BY MARRIAGE MIGRANTS, 2002-2012 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Naturalizations 1,734 5,339 5,768 8,419 3,344 4,190 7,916 17,141 10,271 10,733 7,733 





This chapter focuses on how migrant women negotiate the terms of their 
incorporation as naturalized Korean citizens. In the first section, I discuss three strategies 
by which migrant women negotiate their memberships. Applying the three-dimensional 
framework I introduced in Chapter Two, I argue that citizenship poses a paradox for 
migrant women, one that both encourages and hinders their empowerment. Next, I revisit 
Korea’s multiculturalism campaign by tracing its evolution from a grassroots discourse 
aimed at including different social minorities to an official government policy focused 
exclusively on incorporating marriage migrant women. The last section critically engages 
the tensions between the multiculturalism campaign focused on migrant women and 
women’s quest for gender equality in Korea.  
Three Strategies for Negotiating Membership 
Since the early 2000s, a diverse range of women’s organizations have organized 
around migrant women’s rights. I identify three different but overlapping strategies 
adopted by migrant women to negotiate their memberships. The first strategy focuses on 
migrant women’s autonomy from the household and the private sphere by encouraging 
participation in the labor market. A second strategy of negotiating membership is through 
civic activism and participation in voluntary organizations aimed at transformative social 
and political change. Finally, a third strategy aims to negotiate membership by 
encouraging migrant women’s active political engagement and participation.  Taken 
together, these participatory strategies represent how migrant women seek to redefine 
their membership and hence citizenship.   
Empowerment through paid employment 
Studies on the economic status of marriage migrants reveal that migrant women 




of Health and Welfare reported that approximately 60 percent of the women surveyed 
were employed; of these women, 88 percent desired to remain employed, while 93 
percent of those who were not presently employed desired to be employed in the future 
(Seol 2005:xii). Moreover, more than 74 percent of respondents had previously been 
employed in their countries of origin prior to marriage (Ibid). 
One women’s organizations that has been a prominent advocate for the labor 
participation of migrant women is the Korea Foundation for Women (Han’kuk  yŏsŏng 
jedan, or KFW). Founded in December 1999 by leading feminist intellectuals and leaders, 
such as Yoon Hyo-jung, Park Young-sook and Lee Yeon-sook, the foundation 
characterizes itself as the first public interest foundation for women in Korea. Under the 
slogan of “giving hopes to our daughters” (ttaltŭleke hŭimangŭl) the stated mission of the 
KFW is to strive towards “a gender-equal society by supporting women’s grassroots 
efforts.” Created with the support of 124 grassroots women’s organizations, the KFW 
serves as an important source of independent funding for women’s nongovernmental 
organizations. To this end, the KFW has financed NGO-led programs that address gender 
discrimination, foster women’s leadership, and prevent violence against women. In recent 
years, empowering minority women, including the poor, the disabled, North Korean 
women and marriage migrants have become important priorities for the KFW.    
Leaders in the KFW have supported employment training programs for migrant 
women because they regard employment as a central path to empowering migrant women. 
According to the former chairwoman of the KFW, Cho Hyeong, who is a longtime 
feminist activist and scholar with a long tenure at Ewha Women’s University, “[f]or 
migrant women ‘work’ is not just a strategy for their livelihood, but a strategy for 




their lives according to their own desires” (Cho 2011). In order to encourage migrant 
women’s employment (ch’wieop) and entrepreneurship (ch’ang eop), the KFW instituted 
a program for migrant women from February to December 2011. In financing the 
program, the KFW distributed over 400 million won (approximately US$40,000) that it 
had received from institutional sponsors, Samsung Life and the Life Insurance Social 
Contribution Committee.
42
 The funding was distributed to a total of nine migrant 
women’s organizations. Six grassroots women’s organizations: Guro Women’s Human 
Resource Development Center, Dobong Women’s Center, Jeju Foreigners’ Shelter, 
Jecheon Women’s Associations United, Chilgok Counseling Center, and Tongyeong 
YWCA, received funding to implement vocational training programs. In addition to 
educating migrant women on basic economics, accounting, and the Korean labor market, 
these programs specifically aimed to secure jobs for migrant women as multicultural 
tutors, nail and hair stylists, traditional craft-makers, and domestic violence counselors.   
Meanwhile, three other organizations received financial support for 
entrepreneurship training programs: Daegu Migrant Women’s Human Rights Center, 
Changwon-Masan Multicultural Family Support Center, and Choongbuk Migrant 
Women’s Human Rights Center. Furthermore, the entrepreneurship program focused on 
helping migrant women jumpstart their own commercial enterprises, including the 
establishment of a Thai restaurant called ‘KOON’ in Daegu. According to a progress 
report published by the KFW, a total of 117 women participated in the programs and 27 
of the participants secured jobs after completing the program (Shin 2011).  
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Perhaps the most significant impact of employment for marriage migrants is that 
being employed has improved their standing within the family. One marriage migrant 
who participated in the job training program funded by the KFW remarks, “[a]t first, I 
had a really difficult time here, and I regretted coming to Korea. But after learning 
Korean and getting work, I became happier. My children are proud when I show them the 
things I have made at work and my husband supports me by helping out with the 
household chores.  I feel that my standing in the home as gone up a bit” (interview with 
Alice, 30 November 2011, Seoul). 
Another marriage migrant who began to work as a multicultural tutor found that 
her employment and contribution to the household income had a visible impact on 
transforming her relationship with her mother-in-law: “[b]efore I started working, I felt 
that my mother-in-law did not respect me, and she was always yelling at me for spending 
too much money- her son’s money. Once I started making my own money, my mother-
in-law did not say a word when I bought things and now she is more careful about how 
she treats me. I even overheard her as she was bragging about me to the neighbors” 
(interview with Bona, 26 November 2011, Seoul). These anecdotes reveal that 
employment can serve as a strategy to maneuver a higher position within the family, one 
that garners respect from other family members. 
On a more personal level, job training programs like the one implemented by the 
KFW have instilled a sense of confidence in migrant women to engage in independent 
activities outside of the household. When they first arrive in Korea, many migrant women 
suffer from a lack of confidence and fear due to the unfamiliar environment. Working is 
one strategy that allows migrant women to regain a sense of confidence in their abilities 




reflected on what working has meant for her: “I gained a lot of confidence after I started 
working. Because I didn’t speak Korean very well, and didn’t know many things, I was 
scared that I would make a mistake or wouldn’t understand what I was told, but I started 
to be more confident in my abilities and about my future in Korea when I began to work 
(interview with Alice, 30 November 2011, Seoul).” By gaining the confidence to be 
independent of the household and the family, migrant women like Alice and Bona are 
negotiating their membership beyond the boundaries of the family through their labor 
participation.  
Contrary to dominant societal expectations that their role is to provide unpaid care 
labor, the employment of migrant women means that they have been able to acquire a 
new subjectivity as a worker. According to a staff member at the KFW, “for migrant 
women, participating in the labor market is not just a means of solving the family’s 
poverty and gaining economic stability, it is also interlocked with the citizenship 
(simink’won) of individual women…in expanding the range of their participation from 
family to the market, they are not passive subjects but active actors, who are not just the 
wives and mothers of Koreans, but workers and naturalized citizens (interview with KFW 
staff member, 26 October 2012, Seoul).”  
Despite the efforts to secure the right to work however, migrant women continue 
to face numerous barriers to paid employment that keep their activities restricted to the 
realm of the family and the household. According to national surveys conducted by the 
Korean government in 2009 and 2012 respectively, only about 40 and 53 percent of 
female marriage migrants were employed (Kim 2010, Jun 2013). These figures are 
significantly lower than the total female labor participation rate in Korea which was 




reason for the low labor participation rate of migrant women is due to childcare 
responsibilities (49 percent), followed by language difficulties (13 percent) and inability 
to find suitable work (9.6 percent) (Kim 2010:266).  
Furthermore, some migrant women are unable to overcome considerable 
opposition from their husbands and in-laws who insist that they stay at home as full-time 
providers of child and elderly care for the family. While some women have been able to 
overcome this opposition and even secure support from family members, others have 
been forced to give up on employment altogether. Another difficulty in securing 
employment for marriage migrants comes from the fact that most prior professional 
training and educational credentials from the home country are not recognized in Korea. 
Therefore, marriage migrants who used to be in professional fields such as teaching, 
nursing, and accounting before coming to Korea have found that they must start anew in 
building their credentials in Korea which has discouraged some from entering the labor 
market altogether.  
Third, migrant women often find it difficult to find employment outside of 
designated “multicultural” activities and programs. For instance, one type of job that has 
opened up for marriage migrants is as “multicultural lecturers” (tamunhwa kang’sa) hired 
by local governments and multicultural family support centers to educate local Korean 
residents on cultural diversity as “cultural ambassadors” who talk about and share their 
native cultures. However, these jobs are often part-time and temporary, failing to lead to 
longer-term prospects for employment.  Regardless of these challenge however, 
negotiating the right to work remains an important strategy for migrant women in 





Activists within Civil Society  
Participating in voluntary organizations represents a second strategy by which 
migrant women negotiate their membership within Korean civil society. Originally from 
the coastal city of Haiphong located in northeastern Vietnam, An is one of the most 
prominent marriage migrant activists in the movement for migrant women. An’s path to 
becoming an activist began with her relationship with the Korea Women Migrants 
Human Rights Center, the leading advocacy organization for migrant women. She first 
became acquainted with the Center when she visited with a friend in 2006 to enroll in 
Korean language classes. After completing the language classes, activists at the Center 
pressed her to stay on as a staff member and counselor to other migrant women because 
of her fluency in Korean which set her apart from her peers.  
Describing herself as an “accidental activist,” An remarked that hearing the 
personal stories of other migrant women put things in perspective for her, and she 
realized that she could use her knowledge about Korea to help more recent arrivals who 
were experiencing difficulties in Korea (interview with An, 30 October 2012, Seoul). 
Even though someone like An could find other better paying work because of her fluency 
in Korean, she remains with a nonprofit organization like the Center because she finds the 
work there meaningful. In an interview, An described what she liked most about her job 
as a counselor and activist: “[i]t is exhausting to listen to the many difficulties migrant 
women face in Korea, but when I give advice to someone and their lives seem to take a 





Through her voluntary civic participation, An expresses a desire for 
transformative social change as well as for personal improvement. Her desire to achieve 
change stems from a direct criticism of Korean attitudes toward marriage migrants:  
“Korean society views marriage migrants with the same discriminatory lens- they 
don’t just judge us, they look down on us. When they see us, they make 
assumptions about the country we came from, the color of our skin, and they ask 
rude questions that are filled with prejudice and discrimination. So we (migrant 
women) need to work together to fight this discrimination, and to change Korean 
society for the better” (interview with An, 30 October 2012, Seoul).  
 
Additionally, working at the Center made An, who never had the opportunity to go to 
college realize that she could have a greater impact if she received more education and 
training. In addition to her full-time work at the Center, An has been taking online 
university-level courses and working towards a degree in social welfare in hopes that she 
can get involved in other social welfare and voluntary work in the future. 
As discussed previously in Chapter Four, the Migrant Women Human Rights 
Center (hereafter Center) has led the movement for migrant women as the most 
influential advocacy organization for migrant women. Rather than emphasize the 
provision of welfare and social services for migrant women like government-run support 
centers, the Korean activists at the Center have sought to empower migrant women by 
encouraging and educating women to become activists (hwaltonga) like them who are 
mobilized around transforming society. To that effect, one of the Center’s main programs 
has been to train migrant women to become counselors who advise and assist other 
migrant women.  
Since 2009, the Center has operated a training program through a partnership with 
the MGEF for migrant women who are interested in becoming domestic violence 




Young-sook who has been in charge of organizing the program, the program seeks to 
“empower migrant women by equipping them with the knowledge and confidence to help 
others and by instilling in them a sense of self-autonomy (jalipshim) instead of treating 
them as subjects who always require help (interview with Heo Oh Young-sook, 7 June 
2010, Seoul).” Upon successful completion of the program, which requires a minimum of 
100 hours of instruction, the women are officially certified by the Ministry to work as 
counselors in organizations such as the Emergency Hotline for Migrant Women (1577-
1366), an organization under the MGEF which provides twenty-four hour support 
services to migrant women around the country. Since the program began, the Center has 
been training a class of twenty to twenty-five migrant and Korean women activists every 
year. Through hands-on experience gained by interacting closely with Korean activists, 
migrant women learn firsthand what it means to engage in contentious activism in Korea 
as they participate in organized protests and rallies alongside seasoned Korean activists.  
Increasingly, migrant women like An are not just participating in Korean-led civic 
organizations but branching out and forming their own organizations, signaling the 
beginnings of a movement by migrant women to seek change from within Korean civil 
society on their own terms. The Waterdrop Society (mulbangeul naeum sahoe) represents 
one leading example of civic mobilization led by migrant women. The Waterdrop Society 
is a voluntary cultural organization founded in 2009 by migrant women who had gotten 
to know each other through the popular TV talk show “Love in Asia.”
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 At present, the 
Waterdrop Society has more than 230 members who come from more than 20 different 
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countries. The aim of the organization is empowerment and solidarity through seminars, 
lectures, and workshops where migrant women share stories and experiences of living in 
Korea. It has also organized cultural street festivals showcasing different cultural 
performances by migrant women. Watanabe Mika, a migrant woman from Japan and the 
current leader of the organization has explained the motivation of the Waterdrop Society 
as the “engagement in social and cultural activities that promote the rights of migrant 
women and the fostering of greater public consciousness towards multiculturalism” 
(Yonhap News 24 March 2014). 
Talk to Me is another example of how migrant women are becoming leaders of 
civic organizations. Led by Iresha, a woman originally from Sri Lanka, who like 
Watanabe Mika was a regular panelist on “Love in Asia,” Talk to Me aims to provide a 
platform for migrant women to articulate themselves within civil society, instead of being 
spoken for by other Koreans. It poses a direct critique of some civil society organizations 
which have been accused of preempting the opportunity for migrant women to speak for 
themselves. When explaining her motivation for creating the organization, Iresha notes, 
“[e]ven though it has been over ten years since I lived in Korea, I felt that people treated 
me unkindly based on the fact that my skin color is different. I also had a hard time with 
the prejudice against multicultural families. There is a widespread belief that 
multicultural families are those who experience many hardships and thus are subjects 
who must be helped. I wanted to break that prejudice and to introduce the notion that 
migrant women are not just an underclass who needs assistance, but that they can give 
assistance too” (Lee 2013). 
Organizations like Talk to Me and Waterdrop Society seek to challenge the 




independent members of civil society (simin sahoe) who actively contribute to making 
society more inclusive. One of the major activities of Talk to Me is the “multicultural 
dosirak” program. Dosirak refers to a home-packed lunch, similar to the Japanese bento. 
Instead of operating a Korean cooking class like most government-run programs, the Talk 
to Me dosirak program conducts cooking classes for Koreans who are taught how to cook 
different ethnic foods by migrant women. Another program run by the organization is the 
“Monika doll program” where migrant women teach Koreans how to make dolls named 
“Monika,” out of recycled cloth which are later sold and whose proceeds are sent to 
support impoverished areas in the migrant women’s home countries.  
Despite these efforts, there are many barriers that migrant women face in 
negotiating their civic membership. For one, the women who are creating these 
organizations tend to compose a select and privileged handful within the migrant women 
population. Burdened by household, child-rearing and livelihood responsibilities, many 
migrant women simply do not have the time or energy to participate in these voluntary 
activities. One migrant woman who has belonged to an informal gathering of marriage 
migrants from Vietnam remarked on the difficulties of encouraging other migrant women 
to attend regularly:  
“Usually, we make Vietnamese food, chat, and try to organize an outing about 
once a year. There is a membership fee to participate. Initially, there were about 
twenty-some people. The number has stayed more or less the same, but the people 
have changed a lot. Usually they come because they can’t speak Korean and are 
stuck at home because they’ve just given birth, but once they’ve been in Korea for 
a while, they have to work or have other family duties so they don’t come to the 
gatherings anymore (interview with Hoang, 3 August 2012, Seoul).  
 
Another major challenge for migrant women seeking to create and participate in 
self-organized voluntary associations is the disproportionate number of government-run 




already so many programs (often free of charge) that are offered to migrant women by 
local governments and Korean civic organizations, they have become complacent with 
these services because their needs are already spoken for.  
“There are people who work hard [to improve themselves] but there are many 
more who don’t. The policies do not encourage migrants to work hard and 
demand things. Many people are used to getting things for free from the 
government. I attended a lot of self-organized gatherings and when some people 
suggest doing something to change the system, many people find excuses to not 
participate” (interview with Lee Ra, 29 October 2012, Ilsan).  
 
While there are signs that migrant women are increasingly asserting themselves as 
members of civil society by voicing their opinions and concerns, including criticisms of 
government policies, such anecdotes reveal that the civic participation of migrant women 
remains sporadic and non-committal.  
Exercising Political Rights 
Heightened political engagement at both the local and national levels is a third 
strategy adopted by migrant women to negotiate their political memberships. Lee Ra, 
originally from Mongolia became the first marriage migrant to be elected to public office 
when she became an assembly member in the Gyeonggi Provincial Assembly. Lee Ra 
came to Korea when she married her husband in 2003, and she became a naturalized 
citizen in 2008. When she arrived in Korea it was before the Korean government 
instituted multicultural family support policies, and there were very few places that Lee 
Ra could go to meet and interact with other migrant women. One of the places where she 
did find herself becoming active was the “Multicultural Network” (tamunhwa neteuweurk) 
affiliated with the Korean Immigration Service (KIS), which is a volunteer group that 
serves as a liaison between migrant women and immigration officials. Later, Lee Ra also 




city outside of Seoul located in Gyeonggi province. One day, the director of the center 
strongly encouraged her to consider running for office by participating in the “Project to 
Make a Marriage Migrant Legislator” an educational program run by an organization 
called the Center for Korean Women and Politics (CKWP). 
The Center for Korean Women and Politics (hankuk yoseong chungchi yeonguso) 
is a women’s organization that has promoted the political participation of women, 
especially marginalized groups of women who have been politically underrepresented 
such as the disabled and the working poor. One of its major achievements is in organizing 
efforts to institute a gender quota in the electoral system. At the time of its founding in 
1990, there were only a total of six female representatives out of a total of 299 seats in the 
National Assembly. Due to the mobilization of women’s groups, the Political Parties Act 
was amended in 2000 to introduce a gender quota to the electoral system. Since then, the 
National Assembly saw a considerable rise in the number of seats occupied by women, 
and in the present 19
th
 National Assembly, 47 seats or 16 percent of the total seats are 
occupied by women (IPU 2015).  
Primarily a research-oriented think tank, much of the CKWP’s activities have 
focused on policy research on ways to increase women’s participation in politics. Most 
notably, the CKWP has operated an educational and training program for women who 
desire to become politicians by coaching potential candidates on how to secure the 
endorsement of political parties and on running an election campaign. The organization 
also runs an internship program for young women who are interested in working as 
legislative aides in the National Assembly and a transnational exchange program through 
a partnership with the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Germany. According to the MGEF, 




Election Commission, a governmental organization and the Women’s Development Fund 
which is financed jointly by the central and local governments. 
The inspiration for encouraging the political participation of migrant women came 
from the executive director, Kim Eun-joo.  During a trip to the U.S. in 2007 when she 
was on an exchange program sponsored by the U.S. State Department, Kim had a chance 
encounter with an older Korean-American woman who served as her interpreter. The 
interpreter, a Korean woman who had immigrated to the U.S. when she married an 
American in the late 1960s, had been unable to fit into American society for most of her 
life. However, she told Kim that she felt that Americans treated her differently once a 
Korean-American was elected to the Washington state senate in 1998. Her story inspired 
Kim to encourage marriage migrants to become political participants who have a sense of 
pride as immigrants (H.-J. Lee 2012). The initial goal of the project was to get one 




One of the first participants in the program run by the CKWP, Lee Ra decided to 
run for a seat in the Gyeonggi Provincial Assembly for the 2010 local elections after 
participating in the program. Lee Ra describes her decision to run as stemming from 
curiosity more than anything else. Lee recounts her feelings about running at the time: “it 
didn’t matter to me whether I won or not, I did it mostly for the experience of seeing what 
it was like to run for office” (interview with Lee Ra, 29 October 2012, Ilsan). Initially, 
she did not have a party preference but it was the conservative Grand National Party 
(Hannara dang, or GNP) that accepted her application for candidacy. When she became 
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elected, Lee Ra remarks that she was dumbfounded because she did not think that she 
would actually be elected, not even in her wildest dreams:  
“It was hard for me to believe that I had won the seat. In Mongolia, we have a 
different electoral system. The party decided on me at the beginning of May and 
then all of a sudden I was in the public spotlight. The election was in early June, 
and they were asking me what I would do if I were elected. All this time, I 
wondered to myself, do I even have a chance at being elected? I couldn’t believe 
that I had actually been elected until the day after the election” (interview with 
Lee Ra, 29 October 2012, Ilsan). 
 
Once she was thrown into the throes of local politics, Lee Ra notes that she gained 
a sense of pride and responsibility as an elected official who represented not just other 
migrant women, but her local constituents. As someone who had lived as a housewife and 
mother since arriving in Korea, she had limited public experience before her election to 
office. Once she became a politician however, Lee Ra realized that there were things she 
could do to improve people’s lives. Lee Ra also came to believe that marriage migrants 
have a responsibility as members of society and the political community to participate 
and to be well informed rather than expect Koreans to automatically accept them as equal 
members. According to Lee Ra,  
“[a]s the first generation of multicultural family members, we (migrant women) 
should pave the way for the next generations. First, it requires putting in the effort 
to learn and speak Korean well. It is not just about surviving on a day-to-day basis 
but about learning and caring about Korea. It is about speaking up on behalf of 
multicultural families and engaging in discussions with Koreans on a range of 
different topics. That way, Koreans will begin to throw away their biases and 
acknowledge us as their equals” (interview with Lee Ra, 29 October 2012, Ilsan).  
 
Thus, Lee Ra recognizes that political incorporation is a two-way process that demands 
migrants and their host societies to strive towards accepting each other as equals and as 
members of a political community.  
Inspired by the achievements of the CKWP and women like Lee Ra, migrant 




group of migrant women under the leadership of Wang Ji-yeon, who is originally from 
China, formed the Migrant Voter’s Alliance (iju yoseong yukwonja yeonmaeng) in 2014.  
Ahead of the 2014 local elections, Wang noted in an interview that she created the 
alliance based on the belief that other migrant women have a responsibility to know about 
Korean society and politics. She also notes that “there are many cases where migrant 
women do not vote because they are not aware that they have the right to vote. They 
don’t know that even if they do not naturalize, they can vote in local elections if they 
have permanent resident status. Even if they do end up voting, they often do not know 
who the candidates are or who they should vote for” (Yonhap News 28 April 2014). 
Even as migrant women are exercising their political rights in greater numbers, an 
unending vitriolic public backlash against Jasmine Lee, the first migrant woman to be 
elected to the National Assembly in 2012 highlights the limitations for migrant women in 
negotiating a more inclusive political membership. Two years after Lee Ra’s election to 
office, Jasmine Lee who is originally from the Philippines, made history by becoming the 
first foreign-born citizen elected to the National Assembly in April 2012. Like Lee Ra, 
Jasmine Lee was elected as a proportional representative candidate for the conservative 
party. At the time of her election to office, both the international and domestic media 
covered the election as a shining example of how Korea had become a progressive 
country that embraces cultural and racial diversity.  
On the other hand, the onslaught of criticisms by disgruntled hate groups that are 
mostly active in cyberspace demonstrates the limitations of political participation for 
migrant women. In the immediate aftermath of Lee’s election, many bloggers and 
netizens launched a personal attack against Lee, expressing doubts about her credentials 




a role in the death of her husband due to a freak drowning accident in 2011. More 
generally, the opponents raised doubts about her ability to properly represent the interests 
of Koreans and suggested that she would only advance the interests of foreign residents 
by securing greater benefits to illegal migrants. Many members of these anti-damunhwa 
groups have been Korean men who claim to be victims of fake marriage scams by 
migrant women.  
More controversy erupted when Lee along with twenty-one other National 
Assembly members sponsored a bill called the “Act on the Basic Rights of Migrant 
Children” (iju adong gwŏnri bojang beob) in December 2014. This act proposed to 
guarantee the basic social, health, and education rights for migrant children in Korea 
without a legal status.
45
 Despite the fact that the proposal was sponsored by a coalition of 
progressive and conservative lawmakers, angry Korean netizens opposed the proposed 
bill, referring to it as the “Lee Jasmine law” and an indicator that Lee intended to take 
public welfare benefits away from Koreans and extend them to illegal migrant children. 
Controversy erupted yet again when a news outlet MBN falsely reported in February 
2015 that Lee’s teenage son had stolen hundreds of cigarette packs while working part-
time in a convenience store, which lead to a flurry of renewed criticism of Lee and her 
parenting abilities. When it was discovered that the news was false, none of the netizens 
who have vigilantly monitored and advocated media transparency bothered to demand an 
apology from the news outlet for the false report (Sung 2015).   
In an op-ed, Jung Hye-sil, an anti-racism activist and the director of the 
Transnational Asian Women (TAW), a grassroots organization that advocates for 
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diversity among multicultural families, sought to offer an even-handed explanation as to 
why Jasmine Lee had become such a hated target by so many people. According to Jung, 
“Lee’s election elicited criticism from political pundits because she had been chosen as a 
PR candidate by the conservative party, which did not hide the fact that it was using her 
to revamp its public image. Even though she had received an education in politics, she 
lacked political experience and she did not have an established base of political support. 
Part of the opposition comes from the fact that as a migrant, there is no way [for Koreans] 
to evaluate how well she could represent her constituents” (Jung 2015). Based on this 
view, criticisms against Jasmine Lee in part reflect broader dissatisfaction with an 
electoral system that extends political power to underrepresented groups on the basis of a 
gender quota.  
On the other hand, Korean activist Heo-Oh Young-sook understands the negative 
public sentiment towards Lee as a reflection of migrant women’s unequal citizenship: 
“[w]hen migrant women are portrayed as pitiful subjects, they receive sympathy, yet 
Koreans perceive someone like Jasmine Lee as threatening because as a public official, 
she appears to have more political power than the average Korean. The roots of this 
discomfort with Jasmine Lee stems from the fact that migrant women are not perceived 
as equal citizens” (Shin Yoon 2015).  Although migrant women have formal political 
rights that allow them to reach the highest echelons of office, the ongoing controversy 
surrounding Jasmine Lee point to the fact that migrant women’s ability to exercise these 
political rights are unresolved points of contestation that reflect migrant women’s liminal 
status as members who are only partially incorporated.  
In sum, the different strategies adopted by migrant women represent divergent 




challenge the notion that migrant women are passive subjects who are spoken for by 
others. Despite the different approaches to empowering migrant women, they share in 
common the focus on participation, self-improvement, and autonomy from the household. 
Each of these approaches emphasizes the need for migrant women to participate actively 
outside the private sphere, whether it is through participation in the labor force, civic 
organizations, or in politics.  They also focus on the need for self-improvement as the 
basis for broader social change, where migrant women need to do their share to get their 
voices heard. In other words, the assumption is that migrant women need to learn how to 
adjust to Korean society and make their demands as rightful Korean citizens, where 
inclusion is not a given but something that requires effort.  
Finally, all three approaches demand women’s autonomy and self-reliance from 
the household based on the explicit understanding that women’s relegation to the family 
and household is a major source of their oppression as well as impoverishment. The 
assumption is that only by participating in activities outside of the household, can migrant 
women become empowered as citizens.  
Applying the framework of  citizenship as a negotiation over 1) access to rights, 2) 
rights, and 3) membership that I introduced in Chapter Two, I argue that citizenship for 
migrant women presents a paradox, one that holds both emancipatory and oppressive 
possibilities. On the one hand, citizenship presents an opportunity for migrant women to 
demand greater rights and inclusion through efforts to seek self-improvement and 
autonomy from the private sphere. On the other hand, citizenship means that even with 
rights, including human rights, migrant women may not have the opportunity to exercise 
their rights because their access to rights rests on their unpaid care labor and roles in the 




status and opportunities for empowerment and engagement, in exchange, it demands that 
migrant women, like the majority of Korean women, take on the burden of reproducing 
the patriarchal family which sustains rather than undermines gender inequality.    
Korea’s Multiculturalism Revisited 
The incorporation of marriage migrants and their children has been the exclusive 
focus of Korea’s multiculturalism campaign. While marriage migrants constitute a 
comparable proportion of the foreign resident population in Japan and Taiwan, they are 
not the main targets of multiculturalism. The multicultural framework in Japan 
emphasizes the maintenance of harmonious relations between” old-comer” (i.e. Korean 
residents) and “newcomer” foreign residents without promoting their citizenship 
acquisition (Nakamatsu 2014, Flowers 2012, Chung 2010c). Meanwhile, multiculturalism 
in Taiwan has concentrated on the recognition of its ethnic minorities such as the 
aborigines, Hakka, and Hoklo ethnicities, and seeks to promote a unified sense of 
Taiwanese identity in the face of increased immigration from mainland China (Wang 
2004, Hsia 2008). Unlike Japan and Taiwan, where multicultural frameworks are not 
gender-specific, the multiculturalism campaign in Korea targets foreign-born women as 
the subjects and objects of multicultural policies and programs. Thus, the 
disproportionate attention paid to migrant women in Korea presents an anomalous 
example of multicultural politics in East Asia. 
Although Korea’s multiculturalism campaign has come to be focused primarily on 
migrant women and their children, when the multicultural (tamunhwa) was first 
introduced as discourse, it was not initially limited to women but was used in reference to 
various social minorities within Korean society. Multiculturalism first entered public 




cultural anthropologist Cho Haejoang and Kwon Hyuk-bum called for a multi-culture 
based on universal values such as peace and human rights, as a critique of the anti-
communist, nationalist monoculture inherited from the Cold War period. In particular, the 
appeal for multiculturalism aimed at carving a public space that included the political 
differences of North Korean defectors who were settling in the South, a exodus that 
began in the aftermath of the massive famine in the North during the mid-1990s (Paik 
2010: 59-60). As a call for a new political culture that tolerates political differences, 
multiculturalism referred not to cultural difference, but aimed to reconcile the political 
differences that had defined Korean politics for much of the twentieth century.   
Soon thereafter, advocates of other social minorities within a growing and 
democratizing civil society, such as overseas Koreans who were returning to Korea, 
sexual minorities and migrant workers invoked the rhetoric of multiculturalism to 
demand their inclusion. A non-governmental organization called the Korean International 
Network (KIN, or jiguchŏn dŏngpo yeondae) created by a group of Korean-American 
youth in 1999 embraced the slogan of “multiculturalism, minority rights, and peace” to 
promote the social inclusion of different diaspora communities, including communities 
from the U.S., Japan, China, and the former Soviet Union who were experiencing cultural 
isolation and discrimination within Korean society (Hankyoreh 1999). Activists in the 
sexual minority movement which emerged in the public sphere in the late 1990s such as 
the Korea Homosexual Human Rights Movement (Han’guk tongsongaeja inkwon undong 
hyobuihoe) invoked multiculturalism in a call to expand the recognition of difference to 
include sexual difference (Seo 2001, Bong 2009). 
During this time, activists within civil society also began to invoke 




migrant workers from different parts of Southeast and South Asia began to enter Korea 
first as undocumented labor and later as industrial trainees (J. Kim 2003, Lim 2003). In 
the late 1990s, activists in the migrant worker advocacy movement began to adopt the 
language of multiculturalism to promote rights for migrant workers (N. Kim 2009). 
Specifically, they invoked multiculturalism as a critique of Koreans’ exclusionary and 
biased attitudes toward migrant workers and foreigners more generally and to push for a 
transformation within Korean society (S. Lee 2007).  
Not only the advocates of migrant workers, but civic organizations that provide 
assistance to mixed-race families invoked multiculturalism to demand that derogatory 
labels toward mixed-race be abandoned. In 2003, a Protestant Christian organization 
called HiFamily spearheaded a public campaign against the use of the term ‘honhyeol’ (or 
mixed-blood) by submitting an official petition to the Korea National Commission on 
Human Rights
46
 that argued that the use of the term represented a human rights violation 
for mixed-race people (H. Kim 2007:208).
47 
HiFamily instead recommended that 
honhyeol be replaced with the term, “2
nd
 generation multicultural families” (damunhwa 
gajeong). These discursive contests over multiculturalism by different grassroots actors 
within civil society thus preceded the official adoption of Korea’s multiculturalism 
campaign. 
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The institution of a major policy framework to socially integrate marriage 
migrants and their children, called the “Support Measures to Integrate Female Marriage 
Immigrant Families” in 2006 marked the beginning of the state’s appropriation of the 
multiculturalist rhetoric. In appropriating the discourse of multiculturalism, the Korean 
government was responding to two distinct impulses: the first, grassroots pressure from 
civic organizations, especially women’s organizations to address human rights concerns 
and the second, the crisis of social reproduction facing families due to low birth and rapid 
aging (H. Lee 2008, N. Kim 2007).  
Although the Korean government enthusiastically embraced the slogan of an 
“open (transparent) multicultural society,” (yŏllin tamunhwa sahoe ) a closer scrutiny of 
the policies reveal that at no point does the government’s use of the term “multicultural” 
suggest the adoption of multiculturalism as a new guiding political ideology or principle. 
As Park Jin-kyeong (2010:178), a scholar at Ewha Women’s University notes, 
multicultural society merely refers to a “social phenomenon describing increases in 
diversity, not a normative concept or an orientation towards a political principle.” For 
instance, the government’s blueprint for foreigner-related policy, the 1
st
 Basic Plan on 
Foreigner Policy announced by the Ministry of Justice in 2008, reveals that 
“multicultural society” denotes the “recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity in 
society,” and neither presents a plan of action nor a shift in political orientation toward 
immigrants and their rights (MOJ 2008).  
The onset of the state’s multiculturalism campaign brought “multicultural families” 
(tamunhwa kajok), or the families of marriage migrants and their Korean spouses to the 
center of public attention as newly celebrated members of Korean society. In 2008, with 




National Assembly, “multicultural family” became a fixed legal category that accords 
human rights protection and welfare benefits to those who are identified as such.  
While the official definition of marriage migrant is not gender-specific, because 
the vast majority of marriage migrants or more than 70 percent have been women, the 
policies have been catered to women in their roles as wives and mothers. Aimed at the 
secure and stable adjustment of multicultural families, the Support Act outlines the 
responsibilities of the central and local governments to provide educational and social 
services through the operation of local support centers. Unlike multicultural legislation 
found in countries that embrace multiculturalism as a political philosophy, the Support 
Act did not aim to protect cultural rights for multicultural subjects nor prevent 
discrimination, but to provide support to families deemed to be non-normative and 
precarious due to their marginal status.   
Sociologist Hye-soon Kim (2012:149) characterizes the multicultural family 
support policy as “a hybrid policy that combines existing family policies with immigrant 
policy.” The hybrid nature comes from the fact that marriage migrants are both 
immigrants and members of families. While multicultural family support policy 
recognizes marriage migrants as immigrants -in fact, they are the only category of 
migrants that the government refers to as immigrants (or iminja) in official documents- 
the emphasis of the policy is on providing services to marriage migrants in their capacity 
as members of families, rather than as immigrants. The Korean government’s reluctance 
to promote an immigrant policy independent from the framework of family is consistent 
with its stance on restrictive immigration which refuses to acknowledge the presence of 




The appropriation of state funding for multicultural family support programs since 
2006 set in motion a multicultural “boom” as numerous state and non-state organizations 
oriented their activities toward implementing programs for multicultural families (N. Kim 
2007). Among policymakers, the domain of multicultural policies has become a site of 
power struggle, as various governmental agencies, especially the Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ), the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) and the Ministry of Gender Equality 
and Family (MGEF) have competed for jurisdiction over policy implementation (Lee 
2008). The MOJ has historically been in charge of all policies related to foreign residents, 
including overseas Koreans with foreign citizenship, while the MHW implemented social 
welfare and educational programs for families and children until the expansion of the 
MGEF in 2005.  
According to one of the country’s leading experts on multicultural family policies, 
the entrusting of multicultural family policies to the MGEF the smallest and least 
powerful of the government ministries, first in 2005 and then again in 2011, provoked 
criticism from officials within the MHW and the MOJ who were not happy with the new 
funding that was being directed to the MGEF (interview with Chung Ki-seon, 3 
November 2011, Goyang).
48
 The consequence of this inter-ministerial power struggle has 
been a remarkable lack of coordination in policy formation and execution, and a web of 
overlapping programs that undermine effectiveness and efficiency in delivering services 
and programs to multicultural families (B. Lee 2009, Kim 2011).  
                                                 
48
 As discussed in Chapter Three, from 2009 to 2011, the Lee Myung-bak government significantly 
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Not only at the government level, but also within civil society, the channeling of 
public resources towards multicultural families triggered a competition among local 
governments and a broad range of civic organizations to secure government funding to 
implement programs for multicultural families. The majority of the state’s funding has 
gone into the operation of multicultural family support centers and in particular, the 
Korean language instruction programs. The Support Act mandates local governments to 
subsidize funding for voluntary organizations and NGOs that provide services for 
multicultural families.  
As a result, hundreds of civil society organizations such as educational institutes, 
social welfare organizations, and charitable foundations with little prior interest or 
experience with multiculturalism have flocked to partner with local governments to offer 
a variety of multicultural family programs (KIHF 2011). According to one migrant 
activist who lives on Jeju Island, “because engaging in these support activities provides 
relatively easy access to state funding, it has become “profitable” and “trendy” to institute 
multicultural family programs for many different kinds of citizens’ organizations” 
(interview with Jung Yong-ha, 7 March 2012, Jeju).  
In little over a decade, multiculturalism in Korea has unexpectedly morphed from 
a broadly inclusive term used by various social minorities, including North Korean 
defectors, diaspora communities, sexual minorities, and migrant workers to the narrow 
category of marriage migrants whose status is legitimated by their marriage and family 
ties to Koreans. While scholars in Korea continue to debate whether damunhwa should be 
considered a variant of liberal multiculturalism or a distinct Korean concept with no other 




with the “multicultural citizenship” espoused by Will Kymlicka (1995) and other liberal 
theorists (N. Kim 2009, Seol 2010).  
In advocating a liberal and just citizenship, Will Kymlicka (1995) proposed 
group-differentiated rights for cultural minorities and immigrants. By group rights, 
Kymlicka (1995: 35-44) refers to the right of a collective to regulate the activity of its 
members in any way it wishes, including but not limited to language, religious 
exemptions, political representation rights, and the right of self-government. Rather than 
a moral need to recognize cultural difference, the multiculturalism campaign in Korea 
seeks to minimize cultural difference by encouraging “gender sameness” which demands 
foreign women to conform to gender roles by demanding their total cultural and linguistic 
assimilation (H. Kim 2010, Cheng 2011:1641).  
Tamunhwa and the Korean Women’s Movement  
 
In various different countries, multiculturalism and multicultural practices have 
come under fire from feminist scholars who have pointed to how multicultural policies 
can exacerbate the gender inequality of minority women. One perspective of this view 
has been presented by political theorist Susan Moller Okin (199) who criticized group 
differentiated rights as something that can negatively impact minority women by 
perpetuating the patriarchal practices of minority cultures. Okin further claimed that 
gender equality and the protection of women should take precedence over the demand of 
minority cultures to claim group rights.  
By pointing to how the advancement of group rights may actually perpetuate 
inequalities, especially gender inequalities within the group, Okin’s critique raises an 
important question about the tension between group rights and inequality within the 




group rights, Okin is unwilling to support external protections for a minority culture that 
may inadvertently condone abuses against minority women. In her view, feminists have a 
moral obligation to choose the rights of minority women over cultural rights.   
More broadly, multiculturalism has been problematic because of what some 
perceive to be a one-dimensional treatment of difference. Nancy Fraser (1996) has argued 
that a “pluralist” multiculturalism in the U.S. is problematic because it is premised on 
celebrating difference while failing to interrogate its relation to different kinds of 
inequality, such as class, race, and gender. Difference for Fraser, is not solely rooted in 
culture. When difference is treated as if it pertained exclusively to culture, Fraser argues 
that it “divorces difference from questions of material inequality, power differentials 
among groups, and systemic relations of dominance and subordination” (Fraser, 1996:70). 
Thus for Fraser, the singlehanded focus on cultural difference is inadequate in addressing 
the larger questions of equality and justice. Instead of attempting to transcend difference, 
Iris Marion Young (1990) presented another approach that is based on the recognition 
and respect for difference across various cleavages.  
While appreciative of Okin’s critique of multiculturalism, other scholars have 
attempted to reconcile the tension between culture and gender rights. Ayelet Shachar 
(2001), a legal scholar, acknowledges that multicultural policies protecting cultural 
groups can be harmful to individuals but that defenses of differentiated citizenship rights 
should be honored as long as they are not promoting the systemic maltreatment of 
individuals within the group. Perhaps in the strongest critique of Okin, Seyla Benhabib 
and Judith Resnick (2009) have argued that minority women should not have to make a 
choice between their culture and rights as women. Such a dichotomous framework for 




gender. Rather, they argue that it is possible for women to forge a middle path between 
their culture and their gender by empowering themselves to articulate their own points of 
view (Benhabib and Resnick 2009: 285).  
Similarly, feminist scholars and activists in Korea have critiqued the 
multiculturalism campaign as reinforcing gender inequality. Unlike Western liberal 
multiculturalism which some feminists have associated with perpetuating patriarchy by 
granting cultural protections to minority groups, Korean women’s activists have argued 
that multicultural policies in Korea reinforce patriarchy by denying cultural rights to 
migrant women. They point to how multicultural family support programs have 
encouraged foreign women to become “proper” mothers and wives of Koreans through 
an emphasis on Korean language acquisition and cultural learning.  
For example, the Guidebook to Living in Korea published by the MGEF (2014) 
for marriage migrants explicitly emphasizes the need for rapid assimilation by stating that 
“marriage immigrants who understand the characteristics of Korean families can more 
easily adjust themselves to their new families and understand Korean culture” (MGEF 
2014:72-3). For marriage migrants who are having difficulty adjusting to life in Korea, 
the guidebook further suggests that marriage migrants learn more about family traditions 
from their husbands and in-laws (Ibid). By unilaterally demanding assimilation into the 
Korean family and culture without regard for the native cultures of migrant women, 
government programs treat migrant women as “if they have no culture of their own” 
(interview with Heo-Oh Young-Sook, 22 June 2012, Seoul). Failed to be recognized as 
bearers of culture, migrant women are deprived of their cultural rights by the 




The demand for immediate assimilation has meant that marriage migrants more 
than any other migrant group are subject “to the strongest and harshest demands for 
assimilation” where they are often denied the basic right to choose the foods they eat and 
the languages they speak within the household (Han 2007: 45). Marriage migrants also 
regard cultural differences as the biggest source of conflict and difficulty in their 
adjustment in Korea (Wang 2005, Kim 2006). Huan, a marriage migrant from Vietnam, 
recounted how her mother-in-law demanded that she eat only Korean food during her 
pregnancy even though she could not stomach the spiciness of Korean food. “One day I 
managed to eat some squid that I had brought from Vietnam, but my mother-in-law 
scolded me angrily. She even accused me of harming my baby by eating “unsanitary” 
food. I was so shocked and hurt by her words” (interview with Huan, 28 August 2012, 
Guri).  Disagreements and quarrels over food created tension between Huan and her 
mother-in-law, making her first few years in Korea quite miserable. Stories like Huan’s 
demonstrate the intense societal pressure exerted upon migrant women to assimilate and 
fulfill anachronistic gender roles within the family.  
Not only does the multiculturalism campaign work to deny cultural rights for 
migrant women, women’s activists have pointed to how it normatively assumes migrant 
women to be reproducers and primary caregivers within families. For instance, they have 
pointed to how public support for migrant women is discriminatory in that it provides 
welfare and health services to migrant women who are pregnant or soon to be pregnant. 
Women who do not wish to become mothers are regarded with suspicion and openly 






 The heavy emphasis on pregnancy, childbirth and infant care 
reflects the normative assumption that marriage migrants have an instrumental purpose: 
to culturally and biologically reproduce Koreans families (H. Lee 2012).  
Even as they criticize the government’s policies, women’s organizations and 
activists are nevertheless complicit in promoting the multiculturalism campaign because 
many of them rely on public funding and have been co-opted into implementing 
government programs. Women’s organizations along with the MGEF have been the 
primary operators of the government-sponsored multicultural family support centers. For 
one, women’s organizations recognize that multicultural family policies do come with 
tangible benefits for migrant women.  
Due to the multicultural “boom,” more Koreans than ever are aware of the issues 
facing migrant women and their attitudes toward diversity and multiculturalism have 
begun to shift (J. Hwang 2010). The exponential growth of publicly and privately-run 
support organizations mean that migrant women especially in urban areas have many 
places where they can go for assistance and support services. The creation of an 
emergency hotline for migrant women and the expansion of shelters and counseling 
centers have no doubt been beneficial to vulnerable and abused migrant women. 
Although the multicultural family support centers can be interpreted as increased state 
management of families, they have also served to provide migrant women with a space to 
forge their own social networks and communities.  
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When asked about what was most problematic about Korea’s multiculturalism, 
Han Kuk-yeom of the Women Migrants Human Rights Center and a leader of the migrant 
women’s advocacy movement remarked:  
“In theory, there is nothing wrong with having policies that support migrant 
women. But the greatest problem with tamunhwa is that it fails to properly reflect 
on the role of patriarchy in producing marriage migration in the first place. 
Because the policies are directed at multicultural families and not specifically for 
women, migrant women, who don’t fit the normative stereotype, like those who 
don’t have children, cannot benefit from multicultural policies. As long as we 
condone patriarchal practices, we continue to jeopardize the human rights of 
migrant women” (interview with Han Guk Yeom, 29 February 2012, Seoul). 
 
As I discuss in Chapter Four, migrant women advocacy activists who were previously 
involved in women’s struggles against trafficking, sexual violence and prostitution have 
long problematized the phenomenon of marriage migration prior to the multiculturalism 
campaign, indicating that activists do not view the oppression of migrant women as a 
result of the multiculturalism campaign but as the product of a strong tradition of 
patriarchal family relations. According to women’s activists, it is these patriarchal 
traditions that made marriage migration, a process that commodifies women into a wide 
commercial success, one that is sustained by the collusion between local governments, 
village and community associations, and individual Korean families. For women’s 
activists, the multiculturalism campaign then is a symptom and not the cause of 
patriarchy.  
By distinguishing between multiculturalism and patriarchy, women’s activists like 
Han are careful not to reduce Korea’s multiculturalism campaign to a practice of 
patriarchy. In fact, they acknowledge that many gains have been made in protecting the 
rights of migrant women through the state’s growing responsiveness to demands for 




include measures to protect migrant women’s human rights- e.g. the expansion of 
counseling centers and shelters for battered migrant women- are a testament to the close 
partnership between the women’s organizations and the state. Furthermore, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter, women’s organizations have relied on state funding to foster 
migrant women’s education, career development and entry into various spheres of public 
life which have opened up new avenues for migrant women to negotiate their 
memberships within Korean society. 
In conclusion, the uncomfortable but constitutive relationship between women’s 
organizations and the state in negotiating migrant women’s citizenship demonstrate how 
the multiculturalism campaign has unintended consequences for women’s organizations. 
As I discussed earlier, the multiculturalism campaign has opened up a space for migrant 
women to negotiate their memberships in multiple collectivities and thus have led to their 
increased participation in the economic, social, political and civic spheres. While 
women’s organizations recognize that the multiculturalism campaign has structured 
opportunities for the participation and engagement of migrant women, they are also 
acutely aware that the campaign is based on articulations of patriarchal ideals concerning 
the family and womanhood that work to reinforce gender inequality. Thus, the 
multiculturalism campaign poses a major dilemma for women’s organizations: one that 










Citizenship under Negotiation 
 
 
According to a 2010 survey conducted jointly by the MGEF and a leading 
conservative newspaper the Donga Ilbo on Korean attitudes towards multiculturalism, 
seven out of ten Koreans believed that Korea is no longer an ethnically homogeneous 
society, but a multicultural one (Woo 2010).  While such results reveal shifts in 
conceptions of national identity, these ongoing shifts have not necessarily translated into 
a widespread acceptance of multiculturalism. A 2012 survey conducted by the MGEF on 
public receptiveness towards multiculturalism reported that only 36.2 percent of Koreans 
support cultural diversity. In contrast, the average public receptiveness towards 
multiculturalism in the EU was 73.8 percent (Chosun Ilbo 19 April 2010). Furthermore, 
one in three Koreans responded that they do not want a neighbor of a different race 
according to the 2013 World Values Survey (Fisher 2013). These conflicting statistics 
point to the fact that Korean attitudes toward diversity and national identity are shifting in 
accordance with demographic changes, but many Koreans remain undecided about 
whether or not to fully embrace multiculturalism.  
Korea continues to maintain restrictive immigration and citizenship policies that 
deny citizenship to the majority of its foreign resident population. Korean citizenship 
remains defined by the principle of jus sanguinis, where citizenship is bestowed 
exclusively to those whose parents are Korean citizens. Conversely, children born in 
Korea to non-citizen parents remain unable to lay claims to Korean nationality. Such 
restrictive policies have resulted in more than 3,000 children born to undocumented 
migrant workers in Korea who have been rendered stateless (Yonhap News 20 November 




as sojourners who are institutionally denied access to long-term denizenship through 
controls that restrict the permitted length of stay. These restrictive measures have 
correlated with a sizable undocumented population which amounted to over 183,000 
migrants according to official estimates by the Korea Immigration Service in 2013 (KIS 
2013). 
Despite its grand posturing of progressive liberal inclusiveness, the Korean model 
of multiculturalism rests upon a conservative and gendered conception of belonging and 
membership. On the one hand, multicultural practices have promoted the incorporation of 
immigrant women and their mixed-race children; on the other hand, these practices have 
excluded the rest of the foreign population as permanent outsiders. For instance, the 
disproportionate focus on marriage migrant women has meant the exclusion of foreign 
men married to Korean women, who comprise approximately 10 to 15 percent of all 
marriage migrants and who have not benefited from most of the services and protections 
extended to marriage migrant women. Such gendered practices of multiculturalism have 
worked to rearticulate the link between citizenship, gender and nationhood.  
Contrary to the conventional view that pits multiculturalism against national 
identity, the case of Korea illustrates how multicultural rhetoric and practices can be 
appropriated by the state and civil society actors to reinforce ideas about nationhood. In 
the name of multiculturalism, both Korean state and non-state actors have promoted the 
gendered construction of nationhood where the symbolic boundaries of the nation are 
articulated through feminine ideals of domesticity and reproduction. Similarly, in the UK, 
various ethnic communities were granted a representative stake in the political system 
based on a national identity that was decidedly against assimilation but instead sought to 




identity under the rhetoric of multiculturalism by encouraging immigrants, mostly from 
Turkey, to maintain separate communities, and by denying citizenship to them until the 
1990s.  
Returning to the central questions initially posed this study: what explains the 
disjuncture between citizenship policies based on ethnocultural homogeneity and 
practices that espouse immigrant incorporation under the rhetorical banner of 
multiculturalism? Furthermore, why have marriage migrant women who comprise a small 
minority of the foreign population been situated at the center of Korea’s efforts to 
promote multiculturalism? Explanations that are rooted in international norms, the 
developmental state, and civil society ultimately overlook the prominence of gender in 
Korean immigration politics. I argue that this gendered immigrant incorporation reflects 
the unintended consequence of negotiations between state efforts to regulate women’s 
access to rights and the attempts by women’s organizations and migrant women to secure 
rights and expand memberships.  Applying a framework that defines citizenship as an 
ongoing negotiation across three dimensions - access to rights, rights, and multiple 
memberships- this dissertation demonstrates that citizenship ultimately poses a paradox 
for women, one that holds emancipatory potential on the one hand, and unintended costs 
that reinforce women’s unequal and subordinated status on the other hand.  
This study has sought to explain how the efforts of the state to regulate women’s 
access to rights have shaped women’s- both Korean and migrant- attempts to negotiate 
their rights and memberships. In analyzing the evolution of family planning into family 
policies, I demonstrate the continuation in state efforts to incorporate women through 
controls on their reproductive labor. Under authoritarian rule, the state instituted family 




to adopt contraceptive practices. Even after the transition to democracy in 1987 and the 
emergence of a grassroots women’s movement that demanded gender equality, the state 
continued to maintain its family planning program until the 1990s. In the mid-2000s, 
mobilized conservative interests pushed for the reformulation of family planning into 
family policies which institutionalized women’s access to social rights through their roles 
as the primary care providers of families. These policies were expanded in 2008 to 
incorporate marriage migrant women as providers of care who make the social and 
biological reproduction of families and the nation possible.  In short, the institution and 
expansion of family policies reflect state efforts to regulate women’s access to rights 
through the gendered division of labor. 
From the grassroots, women’s organizations have mounted challenges to these 
top-down efforts to incorporate women by mobilizing around women’s rights as human 
rights. Led by progressive grassroots organizations like the Korea Women’s Associations 
United, the Korea Women’s Hotline, and Womenlink, women’s activists have integrated 
human rights into the movement’s agenda since the late 1990s.The integration of human 
rights was accompanied by broader changes in the relationship between the women’s 
movement and the state from a confrontational to a more cooperative and negotiated 
relationship where they have worked together to expand support services such as 
counseling and shelters to women. Although women’s groups succeeded in waging 
campaigns that led to the passage of formative legislation aimed at preventing and 
punishing sexual violence, domestic violence and prostitution, the institutionalization of 
human rights has not been without major shortcomings and unresolved points of 




Meanwhile women’s organizations, led by the Women Migrants Human Rights 
Center capitalized on the emergence of migrant women as the new victims of gender 
violence and patriarchy to renegotiate the terms of women’s rights and memberships. The 
convergence between the state’s concerns about population decline and the crisis of the 
family and women’s human rights advocacy efforts led to the institution of support 
policies for marriage migrants and their families in 2006 which marked the beginning of 
Korea’s shift towards multiculturalism. Through partnerships with the state, women’s 
organizations have supported migrant women as they engage in multiple strategies to 
negotiate more equal memberships in the family, within civil society, and as members of 
the state. Perhaps most notably, women’s organizations have facilitated the political 
incorporation of migrant women by encouraging them to exercise their political rights 
through political participation and engagement. As a result, Korea welcomed its first 
naturalized citizen, Jasmine Lee, to the National Assembly in 2012. Over time however, 
women’s organizations have found themselves implementing policies that work to 
incorporate migrant women in ways that reaffirm rather than challenge patriarchal ideals 
of the family and womanhood that they have long opposed. 
The contradictions of citizenship and immigration politics reflect the broader 
tensions between gender equality and democracy in Korea. Despite the advancement of 
women’s rights and increased women’s participation in all spheres of public life, there 
are many indicators that Korea is still far from reaching a measure of gender equality that 
is comparable to other advanced countries. While Korea has witnessed a growing number 
of women in positions of power, including the election of the first female President, Park 
Geun-hye in 2012, it has consistently ranked near the bottom when it comes to the 




Parliamentary Union and UN Women ranked Korea 91
st
 out of 145 countries in terms of 
the number of women in parliament (IPU 2014).  In the present day, women occupy 
about 16 percent of seats in the National Assembly, and the majority of them are 
proportional representation candidates, meaning that female legislators are often single-
term legislators.  
The gender wage gap in Korea is also the widest among developed countries, 
where women are paid on average 37 percent less than their male counterparts (OECD, 
2012). The gap is the largest in the banking sector where male employees on average earn 
2.2 million won (US$1977) more than female employees (Korea Herald 18 March 2015). 
In 2012, the World Economic Forum reported that ranked Korea 108 out 135 countries in 
terms of gender equality. When gender equality is considered part of a broad cultural 
change that supports the growth and strength of democratic institutions, these indicators 
bode ill for long-term democratic progress in Korea (Inglehart 2003).  
Re-conceptualizing Citizenship 
The findings of this study challenge conventional understandings of citizenship as 
empowering, inclusive and transformative. The task facing feminists then is how to 
envision a citizenship that is based on solidarity in difference, one that recognizes the 
different positionings of women, but includes them as equals. As a starting point, this 
study suggests the need for more comparative research on how immigrant women shape 
the politics of immigration as central political actors. All too often studies of immigration 
have neglected women as independent actors and treated them as passive subjects who 
remain dependent on men. Immigrant women do actively contest and negotiate the terms 
of their incorporation, but they may not always be visible because these negotiations 




workers. An approach to citizenship that focuses on the bargaining between the state and 
women over different yet overlapping dimensions can provide critical comparative 
insights as to what is gained and lost in the negotiation of citizenship. This study also 
suggests that migrant women despite being partially incorporated have tools at their 
disposal to negotiate more expansive rights and memberships.  As Seyla Benhabib and 
Judith Resnik (2009) persuasively argue, only by allowing migrant women to voice their 
own concerns can we begin to think of a more inclusive citizenship. 
Second, the findings of this study suggest the need for further research on whether 
civil society organizations hinder or facilitate the incorporation of immigrants as equal 
members. In Korea, not only women’s groups but broader categories of civil society 
organizations such as faith-based, pro-labor, and human rights organizations have 
dominated advocacy efforts for migrant labor. As intermediaries between the state and 
migrant communities, these civil society advocates with a well-polished repertoire and 
mobilization strategies have been able to secure significant reforms from the state in a 
relatively short period of time. Although their actions have been well-intentioned, these 
organizations have also drawn criticisms as to whether or not they are misrepresenting the 
interests of those who matter the most: the migrants. The advocacy movement for 
migrant workers began as a partnership between migrant workers and Korean civil 
society leaders (Lim 2003); however, Korean leaders have dominated in dictating the 
agenda and mobilization strategies which have led to criticism that these civil society 
organizations harbor “paternalistic” attitudes toward migrant workers (D. Kim 2011). 
 Similarly, the presence of migrant women invigorated Korean women’s activists, 
many of them former pro-democracy activists, to revisit unresolved issues involving 




dominated the advocacy efforts on behalf of migrant women especially when it comes to 
decision making and strategizing the needs of the migrant women communities. For 
instance, mainstream women’s organizations like the KWAU and the women’s ministry, 
the MGEF, have represented migrant women’s interests to the central government and to 
the National Assembly. By continuing to speak on behalf of migrant women, these 
organizations reinforce a hierarchal relationship between Korean and migrant women; 
only when migrant women can speak for themselves can they begin to redefine 
multiculturalism and to negotiate a citizenship that it is more inclusive and equal.  
Finally, by focusing on gender, this study has demonstrated how immigrant 
incorporation can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can present an 
opportunity to challenge gender inequalities by facilitating women’s access to rights and 
expanding their rights and memberships. On the other hand, gender hierarchies can 
structure immigrant incorporation so that it replicates and reproduces gender, class and 
racial inequalities in ways that incorporate migrant women as members with an unequal 
and subordinated status. This finding suggests that future research on immigrant 
incorporation would benefit from shifting the lens away from the formal granting of 
rights as a measure of incorporation to an examination of whether or not immigrants have 
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